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COLLEGE OF BUSINESS

EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF  
BEHAVIORAL INTEGRITY IN ORGANIZATIONS

By

KEVIN J. BASIK

A Dissertation submitted to the  
Department of Management  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

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I dedicate this to my wife Jennifer, my daughters, Kiley and Ally, and a mysterious golfer from Boston who changed the trajectory of my life with one phrase.

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## **ABSTRACT**

Leaders' actions often speak louder than words, and when a pattern of incongruity between leaders' espoused values and their actions is perceived by subordinates, the individual and organizational consequences can be significant. Behavioral integrity (BI), defined as a perceived pattern of alignment (or misalignment) between a target's words and deeds (Simons, 2002: 19), has recently emerged as an interesting organizational construct, predicting a number of important outcomes. BI represents a potentially critical antecedent to trust formation, and may be an important cognitive mechanism in other related areas of interest (i.e., cynicism, deviant behavior, accountability, and political skill). This dissertation conceptually discusses potential antecedents to BI perceptions (i.e., managers' political skill and felt accountability intensity), and empirically examines the causal paths relating subordinates' BI perceptions to their trust in their managers, cynicism toward the organization, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, task performance, and deviant behavior. In addition, it proposed that organizational cynicism mediated the relationship between trust and attitudinal, but not behavioral, outcomes. The structural equation model confirmed BI's role as a significant antecedent of trust, which, in turn, was related to cynicism, commitment, and deviant behavior. In addition, cynicism demonstrated the hypothesized distinction between attitudinal and behavioral outcomes by mediating only the role between trust and both job satisfaction and commitment, but not between trust and deviant behavior or performance.

This study answered a number of calls from different research streams, empirically tested BI relationships heretofore only conceptually proposed, and expanded the boundaries of BI literature to include cynicism and objectively-measured deviant behavior. Additionally, it provided further evidence for the unique role of organizational cynicism in trust-based outcomes. Finally, this study examined a number of exploratory constructs (i.e., effort, tension, political skill, and LMX) in an effort to initiate future BI-related research.

# **CHAPTER ONE**

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **Overview**

In this time of high-profile political and corporate scandals, organizational scholars have a unique opportunity to explore the causes and consequences of key organizational perceptions, and make a very real contribution to knowledge and practice. Specifically, polls suggest that 20% of American workers feel that their senior managers do not live the values they espouse (Bates, 2002), and over 50% of survey respondents described themselves as cynical at work (Hochwarter, James, Johnson, & Ferris, 2004). No doubt, certain individual and systemic factors are contributing to the perceived inconsistency between what managers say and do, and these perceptions likely will manifest themselves in attitudinal and behavioral outcomes important for individuals, organizations, and society.

Behavioral Integrity (BI), defined as “the perceived pattern of alignment (or misalignment) between a target’s words and deeds” (Simons, 2002: 19) has shown significant direct and moderating relationships with outcomes, such as employee and customer attitudes (Davis & Rothstein, 2006; Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007), behaviors (Dineen, Lewicki, & Tomlinson, 2006; Prottas, 2008; Simons, Friedman, Liu, & McLean-Parks, 2007), well-being (Prottas, 2008), and firm performance (Simons, 2008; Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007). BI reflects the perception-based dimensions of promise keeping, as well as the degree of fit between espoused and enacted values, regardless of whether the observer agrees with those values. Whether these values are espoused via written, verbal, non-verbal, or implied channels, they establish in perceivers expectations that targets will behave in a certain manner, establishing a basis for trust.

Therefore, a perception of BI serves as a necessary, albeit not sufficient, antecedent of trust (Simons, 2002), which itself underscores most critical relationships within and outside the organizational context (Ferris, Liden, Munyon, Basik, Summers & Buckley, 2009; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). As such, dynamics contributing to, and resulting from,

subordinates' perceptions of their managers' BI represent important conceptual relationships, with far-reaching consequences.

Despite its critical role in explaining relationship-based outcomes at multiple levels of analysis, and multiple calls for its development (i.e., Parry & Proctor-Thompson, 2002; Simons, 1999, 2002, 2008; Prottas, 2008), BI is a relatively new construct that is now beginning to gain momentum in the research community. Initial conceptualizations of the BI construct (Simons, 2002) proposed a number of relationships that now demand empirical testing. In a recent meta-analysis, Davis and Rothstein (2006) reported a significantly large effect size ( $r = .48$ ) between BI perceptions and employee outcomes, such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, satisfaction with leader, and affect with the organization, although only 12 studies were available for the analysis. These authors echoed the call by other scholars (Prottas, 2008; Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007) for additional BI research, to include multi-level, longitudinal studies that include non-attitudinal measures.

Although some recent work has answered that call, this dissertation offers additional conceptual insights. By leveraging and extending the original literature, BI is offered as a useful construct to connect research relating to contextual factors (i.e., accountability environment), individual differences (i.e., political skill of the manager), and both proximal (i.e., trust, cynicism) and distal (i.e., satisfaction, commitment, deviance, performance) outcomes at multiple levels of analysis (i.e., individual, dyad, unit).




Figure 1: Expanded and tested (in dashed box) model

Figure 1 represents the relationships of interest in this dissertation. The model within the dashed box indicates the relations that were empirically tested in the study, whereas the role of managers' accountability and political skill are examined conceptually. Although accountability and political skill are not formally tested in this research, their relationship as potential antecedents to BI are examined in order to (1) more clearly inform the discussion regarding BI perception formation, and (2) lay the groundwork for future research linking these domains of interest.

Simons' (2002) foundational article on BI offered a list of potential factors that create conditions or directly cause actual word-deed misalignment, thereby increasing the chance that subordinates will perceive low BI in their managers. Two particularly important antecedents represent individual and contextual factors that are relevant in today's organizational environment: managers' accountability intensity and political skill.

Simons (2002) proposed that managers' requirement to satisfy multiple competing constituencies will result in such managers not being able to present a consistent message to their subordinates with regard to apparent word-deed alignment. Managers often are required to modify their behavior to avoid punishments, garner rewards, or simply to maintain a favorable image in the eyes of their audiences (Tetlock, 1985). Further, satisfying one audience often means acting in ways that frustrate another, especially when accountability expectations are at odds (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987).

This contextual condition for managers, as described by Simons (2002), closely corresponds to a feature of the accountability environment called "accountability intensity" (Hall, Bowen, Ferris, Royle, & Fitzgibbons, 2007). In particular, the level to which individuals feel accountable to multiple persons, and/or for multiple outcomes, creates stressful conditions for actors (Frink et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2007), leading to strain (Frink et al., 2008), heightened decision anxiety (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996), and reduced effectiveness (Tsui & Ashford, 1994). This construct differs from role overload or role conflict in that it has the accountability-specific component of evaluation apprehension as a fundamental part of the stressor (Hall, 2005).

This "web of accountabilities" that managers must navigate (Frink & Klimoski, 1998) often is associated with cross-pressures that tax cognitive capacities (Erdogan, Sparrowe, Liden, & Dunnegan, 2004; Tetlock, 1985), possibly leading to behaviors such as aggression, "lashing out" (Hambrick, Finckelstein, & Mooney, 2005), protest, avoidance, buck-passing, withdrawal

(Tetlock, 1985), and overall reduction in performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Many of these behaviors may be misaligned with previously stated or implied values, thus leading to a perception of low BI.

Just as empirical BI research is in its infancy, there also exists a dearth of accountability research in applied settings (Frink et al., 2008), where the accountability “web” is most prevalent and powerful. Including accountability intensity in the BI process links the two related streams of research in a way that not only formally acknowledges the contextual factors of the manager (Johns, 2006), but also elevates the typically micro-level BI construct to one that is influenced by meso- or macro-level features.

Simons’ (2002) conceptual model also identified managers’ personality traits as a antecedent to their actual word-deed alignment. Although Simons specified conscientiousness and self-monitoring as potential areas to explore, the ability of managers to influence subordinates’ perceptions in a way that enhances their judgments of BI is viewed here to be particularly promising. Consequently, managers’ political skill also can be important in creating or managing such perceptions.

Political skill is defined as “the ability to effectively understand others at work, and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one’s personal and/or organizational objectives” (Ferris et al., 2007: 291). Politically skilled leaders have the ability to easily comprehend social cues and accurately attribute the behavioral motivations of others with relatively little effort, all the while appearing sincere and genuine (Treadway et al., 2004). Managers lacking this ability no doubt will have a harder time accessing critical feedback (Tsui & Ashford, 1994) and creating favorable subordinate impressions when employing any accounting strategies. Although correlated with self-monitoring, political skill has demonstrated discriminant validity, and is uniquely predictive of outcomes, such as leader effectiveness, team performance, and trust (Ferris, Davidson, & Perrewé, 2005; Semedar, Robins, & Ferris, 2006; Treadway et al., 2004).

Effective communication and justification of both espoused values and demonstrated behavior matter considerably, and therefore, managers’ political skill may be an important factor in BI perceptions. Simons’ (2002: 27) model identified managers’ social accounting as critical to BI in that these accounts, “represent the most straight-forward and least costly way that a manager can influence her subordinates’ perceptions of her behavioral integrity.” However,

managers' accounting techniques (i.e., causal, ideological, referential or penitential accounts) are only useful to the degree that they can be effectively executed by the user. For example, managers attempting to account for their behavior by using an excuse or apology will only be effective if they are perceived as sincere. Particularly interesting is the notion that political skill can be learned and developed (Ferris et al., 2005), creating opportunities for organizations to potentially manage and improve BI perceptions, thereby controlling associated outcomes.

Again, no research to date has examined the effects of managers' individual differences on BI, despite the potential for impact on subordinates' formation of their BI perceptions. Given the empirically demonstrated relationship between political skill and trust (Treadway et al., 2004), a natural opportunity exists to introduce political skill as an important variable in the BI framework. In addition, the BI construct may offer a new, mediating variable to existing political skill theory, better explaining the relationship between political skill and trust, cynicism, and other key outcomes (Ferris et al., 2007; Treadway et al., 2004). Although the final model in this dissertation did not empirically test these antecedents, these variables were conceptually examined in the literature review in an effort to more fully inform the resultant hypothesized relationships associated with BI.

The relationship between BI and trust has been a central theme in the BI literature, and indirectly, in the trust literature as well. Despite the obvious importance of trust in organizational relationships (Ferris et al., 2009; Fisher & Brown, 1988), little work has examined how and why trust develops, how it is maintained, and how it deteriorates over time (Simpson, 2007; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). However, some common themes have emerged in the extensive trust literature that highlight the importance of evaluations of past consistency of words and actions, as well as perceived integrity as fundamental dimensions of trust.

The most widely cited definition describes trust as, "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party" (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995: 712). Upon reviewing the existing conceptualizations of trust in the literature, these authors identified ability, benevolence, and integrity as the three dimensions of trust, with the integrity dimension capturing previous notions of cognition-based trust, reliability, dependability, and consistency (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996;



McAllister, 1995; Mishra, 1996; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985), all of which are distinct from the other dimensions of ability and benevolence (Schoorman, Mayer & Davis, 2007).

Simons (2002) distinguished between BI and trust by clarifying that BI is a backwards-focused trait ascription based on history of word-deed consistency, reliability, and dependability, where trust is expectancy-based and forward focused. This anticipatory view of trust also is consistent with other researchers, who conceptualized trust as targets' willingness to accept risk and be vulnerable in the future (Ammeter et al., 2004; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Ferris et al., 2009; Tyler & Kramer, 1996). Although BI and trust obviously are closely related, previous authors have demonstrated evidence of discriminant validity of the constructs (i.e., Simons, Friedman, Liu, & McLean Parks, 2007). The positioning of behavioral integrity as an antecedent to trust offers a direct input to the integrity dimension of trust, which has been identified in attribution literature as the factor of trustworthiness perceived by subjects as most stable (i.e., internal, unchanging) (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). As such, this integrity dimension is the most resistant to repair after a violation has occurred.

The role of cynicism in the context of trust, BI, and associated outcomes is particularly important in today's environment, as it has been described as the new paradigm of employer-employee relations (Feldman, 2000). In a study of employee attitudes toward organizational leaders, Mirvis and Kanter (1992) found that many workers believed that, given the chance, corporate management would take advantage of them, would withhold information, and cannot be counted on to provide consistent support. Although the empirical tests are limited, scholars have proposed a number of antecedents leading to such perceptions, many of which align with the conceptualization and antecedents of BI.

Organizational cynicism (i.e., employee cynicism toward the organization) is defined as "attitudes related to one's employing organization, characterized by negative beliefs, feelings, and related behaviors in response to a history of personal and or social experiences susceptible to change by environmental influences" (James, 2005: 7). Often, these negative beliefs are described as frustration, contempt, hopelessness, and disillusionment (Dean, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 1998; James, 2005).

Surprisingly, empirical research on organizational cynicism has been extremely limited, and typically has presented very specific antecedents for study (e.g., workforce restructuring/layoffs; Brandes, Castro, James, Martinez, Matherly, Ferris, & Hochwarter, 2007).

One thread of research that holds promise in connecting the cynicism literature with the BI construct relates to psychological contract violations. Perceptions of psychological contracts breach differ from perceptions of low behavioral integrity in that BI perceptions can be associated with word-deed misalignment in a context beyond the terms of a particular job (Simons, 2002). Indeed, individuals can perceive low BI of managers based on how they fail to deliver on promises to others, or in areas unrelated to specific job requirements. Although BI is a broader conceptualization, BI perceptions no doubt will reflect perceived breaches in psychological contracts, and therefore, the empirical findings in the psychological contract literature may inform expectations of BI (Davis & Rothstein, 2006), especially with regard to cynicism. Dean et al. (1998) issued a call for future research that will identify the causes of cynicism, possibly as a function of leadership or justice perceptions. BI may represent a valuable response to that research challenge.

Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly (2003) demonstrated that psychological contract breach and organizational cynicism both represent reactions to violations of social exchanges, but differ with regard to person specificity (i.e., with contract breach representing a violation to a personal promise). In a multi-source study of bank employees, they found that cynicism partially mediated the relationship between psychological contract breach and attitudes (i.e., job satisfaction and commitment), whereas cynicism did not significantly contribute to the relationship between psychological contract breach and behavioral responses (i.e., performance and absenteeism). Interestingly, these findings appear inconsistent with Andersson and Bateman (1997), who found that cynicism contributed to both attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. This dissertation offers an opportunity to re-examine this relationship with both similar and new behavioral and attitudinal outcomes.

The independent literature streams on BI, trust, and cynicism have established strong foundations regarding their relationships with certain outcome variables. Consistent with previous studies (see Davis & Rothsetin’s 2006 meta-analysis), attitudinal outcomes (e.g., job satisfaction and organizational commitment) were expected to be positively related to perceptions of behavioral integrity. Additionally, introducing the mediating variables of trust in the manager and cynicism into the model also was expected to impact these outcomes in ways that correspond with the findings in their respective bodies of literature (e.g., Tan & Tan, 2000; Abraham, 2000). The current study serves to highlight the unique contribution of these specific

variables in the BI process, thereby linking the literature and adding detail to understanding of each of the variables.

The behavioral (i.e., non-attitudinal) outcomes examined in the current study offer a different opportunity. Behavior-focused research in BI has not included cynicism as a potential mediating variable, and as mentioned previously, cynicism's unique relationship with behavioral and attitudinal outcomes has been inconsistent. In addition, the relationship between trust and organizational performance primarily has been argued conceptually (e.g., Burke, Sims, Lazzara, & Salas, 2007), or has included self-report survey measures of performance (e.g., McAllister, 1995).

In one of the few studies to empirically examine the effect of trust on organizational performance, Davis, Schoorman, Mayer, and Tan (2000) found that restaurants with trusted general managers reported higher sales and profits, but not turnover. Interestingly, the integrity dimension of trust was the best predictor of these outcomes, and the authors called for similar research in non-restaurant contexts. Although Simons and McLean-Parks (2007) found a significant relationship between BI and the financial performance of hotels, they did not control for a number of variables that may have contributed to performance outcomes. By focusing on non-financial, objective measures of performance in a new context, an opportunity exists to more clearly capture the contributions of BI, trust, and cynicism on performance.

Finally, when integrity of any sort is discussed, the issue of deviant behavior is likely to be a variable of interest. Some authors have argued that deviant behaviors by managers contribute to perceptions of low BI (Simons, 2002), mistrust (Mayer et al., 1995), and cynicism (Kanter & Mervis, 1989), whereas others have suggested that employees' deviant behavior are likely to result from such perceptions of low-BI managers. Still others have proposed that low trust and high cynicism actually can inhibit deviant behaviors by decreasing individuals' willingness to comply with organizational requests to engage in unethical behaviors (Andersson & Bateman, 1997). This dissertation proposes that deviant behaviors (i.e., in the form of rules infractions and honor violations) will result from unfavorable BI and trust perceptions, but will operate independent of organizational cynicism.

### **Purpose and Intended Contribution of the Research**

This dissertation offers contributions to the behavioral integrity, trust, and cynicism literatures, as well as introduces BI as a new and complimentary element to other models of

work relationships (i.e., Ferris et al., 2009). Specifically, this research targets several areas for potential contribution. First, it answers calls in several streams of literature for empirical field work in new contexts that include behavioral outcomes (i.e., Simons, 2002; Simons & McLean Parks, 2007; Davis & Rothstein, 2006; Davis et al., 2000; Andersson & Bateman, 1997). To date, BI research has focused primarily on attitudinal outcomes (e.g., Hinkin & Schriesheim, 2009; Davis & Rothstien, 2006). In the few instances where performance behaviors have been examined (e.g., Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007, Simons et al., 2007), researchers have focused on extra-role behaviors, or have used self-report or business unit level measures (e.g., Palanski & Yammarino, 2009a). No studies have examined objective measures of individual task performance or deviance as a dependent variable of BI.

Second, this study will provide an empirical evaluation of the foundational propositions of Simons' (1999, 2002, 2008) models regarding outcomes of BI perceptions. In doing so, it will bridge multiple complimentary streams of literature that are intricately connected in organizations (i.e., BI, trust, cynicism), but heretofore have been investigated in isolation. In addition, this dissertation conceptually and theoretically introduces two new constructs (i.e., accountability intensity and political skill) as potential BI antecedents into Simons (2002) framework. These variables may serve to initiate future studies and further advance our understanding of BI.

Third, the model in this paper identifies a series of relationships that extend the process boundaries of particular constructs in ways previously ignored. For example, accountability research traditionally has examined how changes in managers' level of felt accountability impact their own behaviors and attitudes (e.g., rating accuracy, increased attention, deviant behavior). By contrast, the discussion put forth in this dissertation represents a unique perspective on how increases in managers' felt accountability to multiple audiences translate into perceptions and responses at the subordinate level. Data collection limitations did not permit the measurement of managers' felt accountability or political skill from the managers' perspective. However, the conceptual discussion of the relationships is offered to integrate the previously distinct literature streams, and to clarify important mechanisms potentially impacting both the managers' actual word-deed misalignments as well as the subordinates' perceptions of those actions.

Finally, this dissertation directly targeted conflicting, or inconsistent results in the literature on the relationship between cynicism and affective versus behavioral outcomes. In

doing so, serves to illuminate previous unexpected findings and better explain the true nature of trust-based outcomes.

### **Study Context**

The research context of this dissertation was a military setting, comprised of sub-units within a larger university organization. Due to the hierarchical structure, rigorous selection criteria for inclusion, random assignment to sub-units, and demographic constraints, this context provided an attractive balance of almost experimental control with realistic organizational field conditions. Specifically, the mission and institutional culture created natural accountability cross-pressures (Romzek & Ingraham, 2000), which enhanced the potential for high levels of felt accountability intensity, and, in turn, for behaviors to be perceived as inconsistent with previously stated values. Such contextual features are likely to influence perceptions of BI by subordinates, ultimately impacting important attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. In addition, the inability for military members to simply exit the organization (i.e., due to service commitments) exacerbated the potential for cynicism to influence individual and organizational outcomes. Despite the unique culture and organizational constraints, the implications of this study are expected to generalize well beyond the military context to other performance-based social environments where trust is an essential relational element.

### **Organization of the Study**

To accomplish these objectives in an orderly manner, this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 begins with an overview of the literature relevant to behavioral integrity, including distinguishing it from other constructs, and highlighting its relationship with interpersonal trust. Then, political skill and accountability are discussed as important antecedents to behavioral integrity. The chapter concludes by describing relevant literature regarding organizational cynicism, job satisfaction, commitment, performance, and deviant behavior as predicted outcomes of the behavioral integrity-trust perception. Chapter 3 begins with a graphical representation of an “ideal” model for investigation, reflecting all constructs discussed in Chapter 2. Using social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) as the overarching theoretical framework for integration, the reduced, focal model investigated in this dissertation is then described, followed by the development of hypotheses for that model. Next, Chapter 4 describes the design of inquiry used to test hypothesized relationships, including the statistical methodology, measures, and data analysis. Chapter 5 provides the results of the statistical

analyses for the hypothesized model as well as a number of interesting BI-related exploratory variables. Chapter 6 summarizes these overall contributions of the study, highlights its strengths and weaknesses, presents a number of directions for future research, and discusses implications of the findings. Finally, the appendices contain survey measures and supporting materials used in data collection.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

*“You want to set yourself apart as a leader? You want to be someone that people trust and respect? It’s this simple...be the guy who actually does what you say you’re going to do.”*

- Don Tierney

Behavioral integrity (BI) is an important and interesting construct that has only recently emerged in organizational research. In addition to its value in predicting a number of critical outcomes, it also may represent a key cognitive mechanism by which a number of interesting relationships occur (i.e., leader political skill-team performance; Ahearn, 2004). The current study aims to expand our understanding of BI by examining both causes and consequences heretofore only proposed conceptually, or inferred across a number of different streams of literature. Specifically, the goal of the current research is to conceptually examine the effect of managers’ characteristics (i.e., political skill) and context (i.e., felt accountability intensity) on subordinates’ BI perceptions. In turn, it empirically examines the implication of these perceptions on a number of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes at the individual and unit levels of analysis. In order to do so, it is important to review the literature that informs the proposed relationships among these variables.

In 2005, integrity was the most looked-up word in the Merriam-Websters Dictionary website, suggesting that people know it is important, but they are not sure what it means (Simons, 2008). Despite the resounding cry from the population for increased integrity among leaders and followers alike, and extensive conceptual debate over the meaning and impact of integrity, there remains “great confusion about what integrity is or how to foster it” (Palanski & Yammarino, 2007). BI has recently emerged as a valuable construct in its ability to predict important organizational outcomes, as well as through its role in clarifying often inconsistent relationships between different streams of literature (e.g., trust, psychological contracts, integrity). The following section reviews a representative sampling of the literature relative to this construct and the key variables of interest in this study.

## **Integrity**

Stephen Carter (1996: 6) suggested that “Integrity is a lot like the weather: everyone talks about it, but no one knows what to do about it.” Recent corporate, military, and political scandals have only elevated the interest in the topic of integrity among researchers and practitioners alike (Grover & Moorman, 2007). Palanski and Yammarino (2007, 2009b) suggested that the surprising lack of progress in the formal study of integrity is likely the result of three primary problems: little agreement about the meaning of integrity, a dearth of theory on the topic, and few empirical studies to investigate it. Scholars only recently have begun to clarify the definitional confusion and establish testable theories at multiple levels of analysis (Palanski & Yammarino, 2009b).

Integrity can be directly linked to the trait-based theories of leadership (e.g., Stogdill, 1948) and more contemporary models, such as transformational leadership (Bass, 1990; Simons, 1999) and authentic leadership (Luthans & Avolio, 2003). Along with the dimensions of ability and benevolence, integrity has been defined as a necessary, although not sufficient, antecedent of trust (Mayer et al., 1995; Simons, 2002), which is, itself, a critical element of organizational relationships (Ferris et al., 2009). In addition, researchers suggest that integrity is a fundamental requirement for effective leadership (Grover & Moorman, 2007), with some empirical evidence being offered to that effect. For example, integrity has been linked to perceptions of transformational leadership (Parry & Proctor-Thompson, 2002; Tracey & Hinkin, 1994), but the definitions of integrity are not consistent.

To address this definitional confusion, Palanski and Yammarino (2007) conducted a broad review of the management literature, and identified five categories of meanings assigned to integrity. First, integrity as the idea of “wholeness” builds on the original Latin translation for the word, implying a broad, inclusive evaluation of managers’ values, actions, and organizational aims (Badaracco & Ellsworth, 1992). The second category is the definition of integrity as being true to oneself. This notion reflects the fundamental proposition of authentic leadership, which assumes that people own their personal experiences and act accordingly (Lowe, Cordery, & Morrison, 2004), and that leaders cannot effectively fake their true principles and values over time (Becker, 1998). In essence, this category suggests that only those who are aware of and act in accordance with their “true self” demonstrate integrity (Fields, 2007)



Third, many conceptualizations have defined integrity as moral or ethical behavior (often beyond the norm), or as the absence of unethical behavior (Craig & Gustafson, 1998). For example, Becker (1998) suggested that integrity is demonstrated when a leader acts in accordance with a justifiable moral code, while other scholars added that the principles to which the actors adhere must be acceptable to the observers (Mayer et al., 1995). Integrity often is used synonymously with concepts such as honesty, trustworthiness, respect, justice, openness, empathy or compassion (Palanski & Yammarino, 2007). Similarly, McFall (1987) clarified that adherence to a set of principles reflects ones' *personal* integrity, but if the principles are not deemed appropriate by the trustor, then this implies an absence of *moral* integrity. Similarly, the fourth category of definitions is described as consistency in adversity. This definition suggests that challenge, temptation, and choice are necessary for integrity to be present (McFall, 1987).

Finally, integrity can be defined as consistency between words and actions, often associated with promise-keeping and consistency between espoused values and displayed values. Simons' (2002) definition of BI directly aligns with this conceptualization, emphasizing that leaders can demonstrate word-deed consistency even for values and behaviors that may not be considered moral, or may not represent their true, authentic beliefs. Fields (2007) reminds us that in all of these definitions, follower perceptions (to include their implicit leadership theories and cultural schema) and sense-making at the individual and group levels will impact the evaluation of leader integrity.

Palanski and Yammarino (2007) suggested that integrity is but one of several virtues that, collectively, represent components of good character. They argued that some virtues are morally good in themselves (i.e., "substantive virtues" such as honesty and compassion), while others, including integrity, are not inherently moral or immoral (i.e., "adjunctive virtues" such as courage). This distinction removes the element of morality from the definition of integrity (and of other adjunctive virtues), and suggests that a moral evaluation is more appropriately assigned to other, distinct virtues. Specifically, they proposed that being "true to oneself" is better explained by *authenticity*, and "consistency in adversity" is better operationalized as the virtue of *courage*. Finally, Palanski and Yammarino (2007) suggested that moral/ethical elements of leaders behaviors are more appropriately assigned to discreet substantive virtues, such as *honesty*, *fairness*, and *compassion*.

Palanski and Yammarino's (2007) sweeping review concluded that the domain of integrity is best represented by the category of word-deed alignment. They defined integrity as "the consistency of an acting entity's words and actions," separating out the perceived morality of either the word or action (Palanski & Yammarino, 2007: 178). This definition closely aligns with Simons's (2002) definition of BI, except that Simons focuses on the *perceived* pattern of alignment, where Palanski and Yammarino (2007) suggested that the *actual* alignment is most important. This current study argues that it is the subjective evaluation of leaders' word-deed alignment that enables followers to anticipate future exchanges and expectations. Indeed, scholars often have emphasized the role of perceptions over reality in influencing sense-making, attitude formation, and behavioral responses (Fields, 2007; Lewin, 1936; Meindl, 1995; Wieck & Roberts, 1993).

Given this recent advancement in operationalization surrounding integrity, the ground is now fertile for empirically investigating the role of behavioral integrity in organizations. The following section introduces the central construct of BI, presents the evidence for its distinction from other related constructs, and discusses the state of our understanding of the construct relative to antecedents and consequences.

## **Behavioral Integrity**

For countless reasons, managers often are unable or decide not to behave in a manner consistent with promises or values they have espoused, ultimately impacting trust in their work relationships. Broken promises, violated declarations of personal standards, inconsistent management decisions, hollow mission statements, requests for participation without consideration of input, and the like – these and other common actions contribute to perceptions of managers as not "walking their talk" (Simons, 2002). Added to that, there may be times when employees perceive such misalignment, when in reality, managers' words and deeds may be consistent. In both cases, as patterns of such perceptions emerge, employees engage in a cognitive sense-making process (Weick, 1988) that has significant implications for the employment relationship and organizational outcomes.

Simons (2002:19) defined BI as "the perceived pattern of alignment between an actor's words and deeds," reflecting the dimensions of promise-keeping, as well as the perceived fit between espoused and enacted values. Particularly important in this definition is the notion that

BI does not consider the morality of the espoused values, but simply the degree to which the managers' actions align with them. This distinction parallels the value-neutral conceptualization offered by Palanski and Yammarino (2007) discussed above. As such, managers who advocate an ethically unfavorable value can still be perceived as possessing high BI, so long as their actions align with the espoused value. Granted, traditional leadership theories assume (hope, recommend) that managers' espoused values are ethical and authentic (Davis & Rothstein, 2006; Simons, 1999), but the predictive utility of the BI construct lies in the perception of word-deed consistency over time, not the morality.

The notion of alignment between what a manager does and says has emerged a number of times in the trust literature. For example, McFall (1987) and Mayer et al. (1995: 719) identified "the extent to which a party's actions are congruent with his or her words" as affecting the overall perception of integrity. Similarly, Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, and Werner (1998) identified behavioral integrity (i.e., defined as the consistency between what a manager does and says) as a dimension of trustworthy behavior. Although these references appear to reflect the concept of BI, the previous definitions either made moral assumptions or did not clearly distinguish the construct from other concepts, such as behavioral consistency or dependability. In addition, these earlier conceptualizations often evaluated integrity based on specific instances of behavior, rather than a pattern (Dineen, Lewicki, & Tomlinson, 2006).

The current construct of BI has several important unique attributes (Simons, 2002). First, it is *subjective*, and, as such, is influenced by the actor, the perceiver, the nature of the relationship, attributions, biases, and a host of other cognitive processes. Simons' (2002) model identified a number of antecedents that contributed to actual word-deed (mis)alignment, but acknowledged that the true driver of consequences was the degree to which that (mis)alignment was, in fact, perceived as such. Factors that influence this perception (e.g., environment, personality, task characteristics) are particularly important to understand.

The second attribute of BI is that it is an *ascribed trait*, indicating some degree of causal attribution regarding the aligned or misaligned behavior. Research on the Fundamental Attribution Error (e.g., Ross, Green, & House, 1977) suggests that perceivers will overestimate the role of internal, stable dispositional qualities and underestimate situational effects when forced to make sense out of behaviors. Such attributions only will be strengthened by the fact

that BI, by definition, reflects a pattern of word-deed comparison (Simons, 2002). A history of low word-deed alignment will serve as evidence of a stable low BI trait assigned to the manager.

Because managers often are seen as symbolic representatives of the organization (Pfeffer, 1981), BI ascriptions can be directed not only to individuals (e.g., the manager), but also toward the level of analysis that the actor represents (e.g., “management,” “the union,”) (Dineen et al., 2006, Simons, 2002, Simons & McLean Parks, 2007). For example, Love and Kraatz (2009) demonstrated that external audiences perceived corporate downsizing as a behavior inconsistent with espoused values and assumed psychological contracts (Rousseau, 1995). As such, downsizing elicited a strong, negative effect on reputation of the organization (an aggregated evaluation of BI), regardless of the firm’s performance. The authors suggest that audiences tend to anthropomorphize organizations, evaluating them on dimensions such as character, in an attempt to identify the firm’s suitability as an exchange partner. They stated, “when firms make critical decision that are consistent with their espoused values and historical commitments, audiences should hold them in higher esteem” (Love & Kraatz, 2009: 316). Conversely, when decisions are perceived as opportunistic or lacking integrity, a negative ‘organizational character’ ascription will drive a reduction in their reputation.

The fourth attribute of BI is that it is *slowly built and quickly lost*. Kramer (1996) suggested that violations of trust-based exchanges are perceived as more vivid than confirmations, indicating that word-deed misalignments will be “tallied aggressively,” but alignments will be afforded less credit (Simons, 2002: 25). Interestingly, Simons et al. (2007) offered evidence in a study of 1,944 employees at 107 different hotels that there may be racial differences in sensitivity to BI. Specifically, in addition to demonstrating that BI was significantly related to outcomes such as trust, job satisfaction, justice perceptions, commitment, and intention to stay, they found that Black employees were much more critical of Black managers who violated their espoused values.

Finally, BI *can be managed*. Because BI is a perception-based phenomenon, there is an opportunity for managers, subordinates, and even outside entities to influence these perceptions. As discussed later, favorable BI perceptions have a number of positive impacts on individual attitudes and behaviors, as well as organizational outcomes. As such, any party interested in capturing these benefits can target certain controllable antecedents and moderating variables. No doubt, simply increasing someone’s awareness of BI-impacting events, or gaining insight about

how others perceive their BI, may be exceptionally helpful in this regard. Previous conceptualizations of integrity tended to focus on less accessible dimensions of the actor, to include the basis of their values or the core self (to whom they should be authentic). On the other hand, BI offers two possible targets for prescription: those factors that contribute to actual word-deed alignment, or the perception of that pattern of alignment.

BI is a potentially useful construct primarily because of its relationship to other important phenomena, and its ability to link related areas of research. The first step in demonstrating this value is to conceptually distinguish BI from other related constructs.

### **Distinction from Other Similar Constructs**

**Trust.** Despite the centrality of trust in critical organizational relationships at all levels of analysis (Ferris et al., 2009; Fisher & Brown, 1988; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998), surprisingly little work has examined the development and maintenance process of trust (Simpson, 2007). Mayer et al. (1995) advanced the field of study by offering what has come to be one of the most referenced definitions of trust as, “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party” (Mayer et al., 1995: 712). By consolidating the myriad conceptualizations of trust in previous literature, they highlighted the nature of trust as anticipatory, probabilistic, and expectancy-based (Ammeter et al., 2004; Ferris et al., 2009)— something Simons (2002; 2008) described as “forward-looking.” The willingness to assume risk and be vulnerable places the trustor in a position of evaluation and calculation, similar to Lewicki and Bunker’s (1996: 118) notion of deterrence-based (i.e., often called “calculus-based” trust), which is the belief that people “*will* do what they say they are going to do” (*italics added*).

By contrast, BI represents a “backward-looking” conclusion about a target (i.e., manager) in the present, based on a history of word-deed alignment (Davis & Rothstien, 2006; Prottas, 2007; Simons, 2002). As such, BI serves as a key informational input into the trust equation. Supporting this assertion, Mayer et al. (1995) identified integrity, ability, and benevolence as the three antecedents of trust formation. This was echoed by Schoorman et al. (2007: 346) as they expanded Mayer et al.’s (1995) model of trust to multiple levels. “If the supplier’s integrity is suspect because, for instance, its track record with other firms is inconsistent with its stated policies, trust will again be lacking.” Similarly, Tomlinson and Mayer (2009: 87) suggested that

“a decline in trust is preceded by some evidence justifying a decrease in some aspect of trustworthiness.” Therefore, in order to increase trust, one must offer new evidence that will influence the expectation of future performance. Such evidence can be represented in the target’s pattern of word-deed alignment. In sum, BI is a necessary, although not sufficient, antecedent of trust (Simons, 2002; 2008)

Empirical evidence also supports this conceptual distinction between BI and trust. Although the two constructs are highly related, their correlations are not so high as to be redundant (consistently ranging between .70-.74), indicating that they are unique constructs. Similarly, in one of the most thorough studies of the 8-item scale of BI to date (representing the operationalization outlined in this dissertation), Simons et al. (2007) conducted a competing models confirmatory factor analysis with trust and BI separate and combined. Despite a high interscale correlation (.84) between the two constructs, the model fit was significantly worse when the BI and trust were combined compared to when they were separated ( $\Delta\chi^2[5, N=743] = 2,191.72, p<.001$ ). These findings were replicated by Hinkin and Schrieschier (2009).

**Credibility.** Credibility is defined as an assessment of whether a given speaker’s messages will serve as a reliable guide for future beliefs and behaviors (O’Keefe, 1990). This indicates that credibility, like trust, is a forward-looking construct in comparison to BI (Simons, 2002). Research on legal court cases demonstrates that witness credibility may be severely diminished if evidence is presented that there has been a pattern of prior misrepresentation of information by the witness, even if the prior deception was mild (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003; Strong, 1999 as cited by Simons 2002).

Similarly, scholars have suggested that credibility is an important subclass of the broader trust phenomenon (Davis & Rothstein, 2006; Prottas, 2008; Simons, 1999, 2002, 2008). For example, marketing scholars have defined source credibility as the perceived expertise, trustworthiness, and attractiveness of the information source (Ohanian, 1990), and corporate credibility as “the extent to which the consumer feels that the firm has the knowledge or ability to fulfill its claims, and whether the firm can be trusted to tell the truth or not (Newell & Goldsmith, 2001: 235). In these examples, it is clear that credibility also reflects the recognized dimensions of trust (i.e., ability, integrity, and benevolence). Consequently, just as BI is an important antecedent to trust, it serves as a necessary, but not sufficient ingredient to credibility.

Clearly, as managers are perceived as demonstrating alignment between actions and espoused values/promises, it will improve their credibility (Kouzes & Posner, 1993).

**Reputation.** This has long been acknowledged as an important signaling mechanism (Spence, 1974) that indicates predictability of behavior, thus making risk assessments for trust exchanges clearer (Burt, 1992). As a result, favorable reputations often are associated with lower accountability demands (Hall, Blass, Ferris, & Massingale, 2004), and increased decision latitude (Ranft, Ferris, & Perryman, 2007), power (Pfeffer, 1992), ability to influence (Hochwarter, Ferris, Zinko, Arnell, & James, 2007), and managerial effectiveness (Tsui & Ashford, 1994).

Zinko, Ferris, Blass, and Laird (2007: 165) defined reputation as “a perceptual identity formed from the collective perceptions of others, which is reflective of the complex combination of salient personal characteristics and accomplishments, demonstrated behavior, and intended images presented over some period of time as observed directly or from secondary sources, which reduces ambiguity about expected future behavior.” At first glance, this definition appears to closely correspond with many of the elements of BI outlined above. It reflects a perception about a target’s behaviors (among other things) that occur over time, for the purpose of clarifying expectations regarding future actions. Additionally, its role as an antecedent to trust is also well established (e.g., Hall et al., 2004).

The true distinction between reputation and BI lies in the level of aggregation. At the individual level, BI is an individual perception directed at a target, whereas reputation reflects a collective perception. Sociologists describe reputation as a sum of opinions about a target (Frink et al., 2008), or a community’s collective judgments about an entity’s qualities or character. As such, individual-level perceptions of a leader’s performance (i.e., BI) can be aggregated to serve as an input into the leader’s collective reputation (Hall et al., 2004).

Researchers recently have suggested that the BI construct can be elevated to a higher level of analysis, reflecting how managers’ BI are perceived by groups of individuals within an organization. “As stories of word-action matches or mismatches are exchanged at the water cooler, they may take on lives of their own, creating a climate of shared high or low behavioral integrity judgments” toward the specific target (Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007). Therefore, it is possible to aggregate many organizational members’ perceptions regarding an actor’s or broader entity’s (i.e., management, union) BI in order to investigate that perception on other outcomes

(Simons, 2002). In this case, the aggregation of BI perceptions reflects at least one formative component of the target's reputation.

**Psychological contracts.** The term “psychological contract” reflects the expectations regarding the terms of the exchange agreement (and obligations) between an employee and the organization (Rousseau, 1995; Dulac, Coyle-Shapiro, Henderson, & Wayne, 2008). These expectations reflect perceived promises that have been stated overtly or merely implied (Robinson, 1996), regardless of whether the other party agrees on the expectations.

Violations or breaches tend to illicit strong emotional, attitudinal and behavioral responses, signaling that the “organization has failed to meet one or more obligations within one's psychological contract in a manner commensurate with one's contributions” (Morrison & Robinson, 1997: 230). Perceived breaches often occur through managers' apparently reneging on promises, through incongruence between managers' and employees initial understanding of the promised outcomes, or through factors that impact justice perceptions (Johnson & O'Leary-Kelly, 2003). Despite the cause, perceived violations serve as evidence of word-deed misalignment. This evidence negatively impacts perceptions about managers' integrity and benevolence (Robinson, 1996), ultimately eroding trust (Rousseau & McLean-Parks, 1993). Obviously, if a pattern of such breaches emerges over time, it will be directly associated with BI ascriptions.

Although some scholars have used BI and psychological contracts synonymously (e.g., Davis & Rothstein, 2006), compelling conceptual arguments have been made to suggest that BI is a broader construct that includes psychological contracts. One primary point is that psychological contracts focus specifically on the employee's perception of the fulfillment of obligations specific to *them* (Simons, 2002). By contrast, BI can reflect word-deed alignment perceptions that individuals observe in exchanges the manager has *with others*. For example, if employees observe a violation between their manager and a co-worker, that episode can still serve as a negative data point in their formulation of the managers' BI, even if their own contract is not violated. Indeed, many employees have come to clear conclusions about their manager's “open door policy” (and, in turn, their perceptions of the manager' BI) based on how other people were treated when they walked through the door.

In this respect, BI corresponds to Blau's (1964: 97) description of trust formation that can occur when “neighbors tell other neighbors” about a third person's failure to honor obligations.



Bandura's (1977) social learning theory emphasizes that individuals are not dependent on direct experiences and consequences in order for learning to take place. Similarly, BI perceptions can be informed by observed word-deed violations or successes in the exchange relationships of others.

In addition, psychological contracts are definitionally bounded by the context of the employment relationship. Conversely, BI reflects a broader, more inclusive evaluation of word-deed alignment extending beyond the boundaries of the expectancies specific to the job (Simons, 2002). For example, a manager who espouses the importance of family values, yet engages in ways that violate those values (e.g., is unfaithful or puts work before family) will be perceived as having low BI, despite the fact that such values do not directly impact the employee-employer exchange.

**Authentic leadership.** The basic premise of authentic leadership is grounded in the classic guidance that, in order to be an effective leader, one must "Know thyself" and "To thine own self be true." Authenticity can be defined as owning one's personal experiences, be they thoughts, emotions, needs, preferences, or beliefs, and behaving in accordance with the "true self" (Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Walumbwa et al., 2008). This end is achieved when one's conduct is motivated by internal values, rather than a response to external rewards, threats, or consequences (Avolio, Gardner, Walumbwa, Luthans, & May, 2004; Ryan & Deci, 2003).

Traditional conceptualizations of authentic leadership include an inherent moral component with a focus on high levels of cognitive, emotional, and moral development (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2003). High ethical standards serve to guide decision making and behaviors. Some scholars have proposed that authenticity exists on a continuum, with the highest levels reflecting someone who is genuinely true to their identity, core values, and emotions (Avolio et al., 2004).

At first glance, a number of conceptual elements of authentic leadership appear to closely align with BI. For example, in order for leaders to be considered authentic, they must demonstrate consistency between their values, beliefs, and action. Similarly, Avolio et al. (2004) identified authentic leadership as an antecedent to trust and credibility, and something that not only is inherent in the leader, but also is recognized by the followers. Specifically, they stated that, "authentic leaders act in accordance with deep personal values and convictions, to build

credibility and win respect and trust of followers, and thereby lead in a manner that followers recognize as authentic” (Avolio et al., 2004: 806).

However, one key premise distinguishes the constructs of BI and authentic leadership -- the notion that managers often espouse values or promises that do not inherently represent their core “self.” In these cases, managers can maintain high BI so long as their behaviors are perceived as aligning with those espoused promises or values.

Another example reflects what Simons (2008: 138) referred to as the “middle manager’s dilemma.” Often, managers are expected to champion and implement policies with which they disagree. For example, if managers espouse the importance of diversity while not *truly* valuing that notion, they will be perceived as possessing high behavioral integrity, so long as their actions are consistent with that theme. The fact that leaders do not truly embrace diversity is invisible to the perceived ascription made by the followers. Authenticity often must submit to professionalism when the firm demands it, as is reflected in this quote by the CEO of a global restaurant chain:

“People are not going to agree with every decision that comes from the boss. But ultimately, the reason he is the boss is that’s his job. You need to support the boss, to move ahead and do what’s required for the company. You need to sell it, just like it was your own idea.” (Simons, 2008: 139)

Leaders can espouse many things, especially as the winds of organizational change or management fads blow and redirect policy and the “party line.” In these cases, managers often are required to espouse new values that don’t align with previous behavior, or must behave in accordance with new requirements that seem at odd with previously stated values. Either instance BI can be maintained in spite of the fact that such shifting requirements are obviously not indicative of authentic beliefs.

In the same regard, the source of motivation can differ for authentic leaders and those with high BI. As mentioned earlier, authentic leadership requires behaviors that are motivated by internal forces (Ryan & Deci, 2003). Although this would be ideal, it is possible for managers to espouse values as the result of external forces and maintain high BI, so long as their behavior is consistent with those values. Such a scenario is very likely in conditions of high accountability (Hall et al., 2007).

Interestingly, even some authentic leadership scholars acknowledge that strategic authenticity may be a necessity in the organizational context. For example, Goffee and Jones (2005) discussed the need for individuals to often “manage their authenticity,” by adjusting and conforming to the requirements of the situation or audience at hand. Although this sounds a bit like impression management or political skill (Ferris et al., 2007), Goffee and Jones (2005) argued that it is possible to simply show only those true elements of one’s self that are necessary for the situation, as opposed to presenting images that are untrue to the authentic nature of the individual.

Shamir and Eilam (2005) proposed that it is possible to omit the leader’s values and convictions from the conceptualization of authentic leadership. They acknowledged that leaders can be authentic to their core beliefs, even if those beliefs are unethical or immoral. Indeed, they and others (e.g., Sparrowe, 2005) question “whether authenticity is a good thing among leaders with narcissistic or otherwise dysfunctional personalities” (Shamir & Eilam, 2005: 93).

Recently, scholars have recently differentiated the authenticity-BI relationship as being a distinction between process and outcome. Specifically, Leroy (2009: 26) clarified that, “Authenticity depicts the process by which others will perceive the leader to be more integer,” suggesting that authenticity is reflective of behaviors, whereas BI is grounded in perceptions. However, this position still holds firm to the notion that, over the long run, it is impossible to have positive BI while being inauthentic.

Finally, Simons (2009, personal correspondence) clearly summarized the distinction between BI and authentic leadership in this way. In the end, “BI is about words and actions. As long as words and actions are aligned, then BI is there, even if they are aligned around a value you do not like. Authenticity is about aligning words/actions with internal values. Authenticity facilitates BI, but can vary independently from it.” As such, BI is necessary for authentic leadership, so long as the values espoused are true to one’s core self. By contrast, one does not have to act authentically in order to be perceived as having high BI.

### **Antecedents of Behavioral Integrity**

Because behavioral integrity (as operationalized here) is in its infancy as an organizational construct, the preponderance of empirical research has focused on its consequences. However, Simons’ (2002) identified a number of potential antecedents that

contribute to both the degree of *actual* consistency between the manager word-deed alignment (i.e., true BI) and the *perceived* pattern of consistency (perceived BI). The absence of empirical investigation regarding these antecedents only serves to underscore the opportunity for the advancement of our understanding of this important construct.

Simons (2008) clustered his list of proposed antecedents to actual word-deed alignment into four categories: organizational structure, institutional forces, organizational processes, and individual processes. In addition, Simons identified perceptual and relational factors that moderate the relationship between actual word-deed alignment and perceived alignment by the employee. The following sections describe these proposed antecedents and moderators, highlight any empirical support in the literature, and conclude by discussing in detail the two antecedents of interest in this dissertation.

### **Organizational Structure Factors**

Diverse demands by key constituencies who control valued rewards and resources can lead to inconsistent managerial behavior. The challenge of managing and maintaining favorable perceptions regarding multiple, often competing expectations, represents what Hall et al. (2007) described as “accountability intensity” (i.e., an antecedent of interest in this dissertation, discussed in detail later). Other structural factors include instability in the environment, the degree of technological innovation, and the level of competition (Simons, 2008).

### **Institutional Forces**

Simons (2002, 2008) highlighted the role of management fads in creating an internal environment promoting misalignment between espoused values and actions. These fads often require managers to communicate lofty values and commitments that cannot be delivered upon. Similarly, they tend to introduce confusing or mixed jargon and signals that are misperceived by subordinates. Other institutional forces include poorly integrated management techniques and technologies.

Just as BI can be elevated to a higher level of analysis (e.g., does Congress/General Motors/ “administration” do what it says it’s going to do?), so too can the antecedents and consequences. Love and Kraatz (2009) argued that audiences view corporate actions as indicators of the character of the corporation, and “when firms make critical decisions that are consistent with their espoused values and historical commitments, audiences hold them in higher esteem. Conversely, corporate decisions perceived as connoting opportunism, unreliability, or a

lack of integrity should damage reputations” (Love & Kraatz, 2009: 316). For example, they suggest that corporate downsizing signals to key audiences a willingness to break promises, ultimately impacting a firm’s reputation. Similarly, the ability to execute lofty goals (e.g., often espoused through motivating slogans like “zero tolerance,” “zero defects” or “the customer is always right”) tend to crumble when these intentions interact with a complex and changing reality. This inability to deliver is an obvious source of word-deed mismatch.

### **Organizational Processes**

Organizational change increases the potential for managers’ words and deeds to become out of synch. Even successful organizational changes can go through periods of decoupling past approaches (and associated values/promises) with new ones (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988), introducing new expectations and managerial behavior that is likely at odds with previous ones. Robinson (1996: 574) stated that “constant contract change means increased opportunities for employees and employers to misunderstand the agreements and to perceive a contract breach even when one did not occur.” Other organizational process factors can contribute to low word-deed linkage, such as poorly integrated policies and procedures, or espoused promises for behaviors that cannot yet be demonstrated, due to process implementation delays (Simons, 2002). In addition, low spans of control may create increased interaction frequency, thus elevating the likelihood of word-deed misalignment to be demonstrated.

Finally, although not identified by Simons (2002), it is reasonable to suggest that reward systems may unintentionally encourage misaligned words and behaviors, reflecting what Kerr (1975) referred to as the “folly of rewarding A while hoping for B.” For example, Frink and Ferris (1998) demonstrated that, under high accountability conditions, individuals often set high goals as a way to create or manage a favorable impression in the eyes of their evaluators, yet their performance was not any higher than those in the low accountability conditions. Their findings suggest that the espousal of high goals (i.e. words) satisfied the primary impression management goal, reducing the need to deliver on performance (i.e., deeds). This only occurs if subordinates feel that favorable impressions are rewarded in a way that exceeds the rewards of performance alone.

Recent work by Hinkin and Schriesheim (2009) offered one of the few empirical studies modeling antecedents of BI. In particular, they investigated the role of leaders’ contingent reward behaviors (i.e., actively responding to good performance with acknowledgment and a

positive consequence) and contingent punishment behaviors (i.e., actively responding to poor performance by notifying the individual that their work is sub-par, and administering a punishment) on subordinates' BI of their leaders. In addition, they tested the effect of reward and punishment "omission" (i.e., leaders' lack of contingent response to good and poor behavior) on BI. Using a structural equation model with data from 600 employees at 15 restaurants in a national restaurant chain, they demonstrated that contingent rewards and punishments were significant, positive predictors of BI perceptions, while the reward omissions by leaders negatively impacted BI. The authors argued that these leader behaviors represented fulfillment or violations of the psychological contract, denying the subordinate of task feedback and social recognition they desired.

### **Individual Factors and Processes**

The managers' role in word-deed alignment perceptions cannot be overstated. Simons (2002: 31) suggested that "a manager can only represent her priorities and preferences accurately if she knows what they truly are." As such, development programs that encourage introspection and clarification of one's values should heighten sensitivity to potential violations, thereby improving both actual and perceived word-deed alignment. Other individual factors, such as personality traits (e.g., self-monitoring, conscientiousness, political skill), managers' priority regarding keeping their word, and familiarity with the audience also can impact their true and perceived BI (Simons, 2002). Political skill (discussed in detail below) may be a particularly interesting antecedent, considering its potentially critical role in influencing the employees' attributions regarding the causes of their managers' behaviors.

Finally, Simons et al. (2007) found an interesting relationship between managers' race and subordinates' perceptions of BI. In a study of 1,944 employees at 107 hotels found that Black employees were more critical of Black managers than were non-Black employees. Said another way, Black employees rated their Black managers lower on BI than they rated non-Black managers and lower than non-Black employees rated Black managers. This is particularly important given their finding of a "trickle-down effect" where middle managers' perceptions of their senior managers' BI affected line employees' perceptions of the middle managers' BI. This effect was stronger for Black as compared to non-Black employees.

## **Moderators**

Several moderation relationships have been described or demonstrated in the BI literature. First, Simons (2002) conceptual model identifies a number of factors that impact the degree to which managers' actual word-deed misalignment is perceived as such by subordinates. Specifically, he suggested that employees' dependence on managers, their perceived importance regarding the value in question, the managers' social accounting technique (e.g., apology, explanation), and employees' cognitive schema sensitivity (i.e., are they particularly sensitive to noticing broken promises) all moderate the strength of the link between actual and perceived word-deed inconsistencies.

BI has been shown to significantly influence the relationship between supervisory guidance (i.e., defined as the extent to which supervisors instruct their employees regarding right and wrong behaviors) and both positive and negative outcomes. Dineen, Lewicki, and Tomlinson (2006) demonstrated consistently across two independent field samples that no relationship existed between supervisor guidance and outcome variables (i.e., performance and OCBs) when considered in isolation. However the relationship was quite different when BI levels were considered. Specifically, when employees perceived high manager BI, increased supervisory guidance was positively associated with organizational citizenship behaviors. Conversely, when employees felt that their managers had low BI, increased supervisory guidance not only decreased OCBs, but also increased the tendency to exhibit deviant behaviors. These effects were even more pronounced as supervisors provided increased levels of guidance.

Research on the direct and moderating role of gender in the BI literature has been limited. Prottas (2008) found no gender effect to suggest that women perceive lower levels of BI. Similarly, they found that the relationship between BI and key outcomes (i.e., job satisfaction, life satisfaction, stress, poor health, absenteeism) did not differ as a function of gender, despite a very large sample size (2002 National Study of the Changing Workforce,  $n = 2,820$ ). It should be noted that this study used a 2-item BI measure (not completely aligned with Simons' 2002 definition), a cross-sectional design, and all self-report data. By comparison, Huang and Hung (2009), using the validated 8-item BI scale found in their study of Chinese employees, found that females manifested lower BI perceptions under public (versus private) settings, perhaps reflecting role conflict in an attempt to conform to cultural gender-based norms. Conversely, they found that Chinese males demonstrated lower BI in private settings.

## **Antecedents of Potential Interest**

Although not formally tested in this dissertation, two particularly important antecedents of BI are highlighted for inclusion in a broader conceptual model of interest: managers' level of felt accountability intensity and their political skill. As discussed earlier, an in depth exploration of these two factors is justified in order to highlight important, yet previously unexamined, variables that may significantly contribute to actual BI alignment and perceived BI formation. Specifically, accountability intensity is useful in that it reflects perceived factors representing the managers' broader, contextual environment. Conversely, managers' political skill is a valuable individual-level construct that can prove prescriptive in manager training and leadership development. The little research that has taken place about individual differences in BI has focused on the subordinate (i.e., gender, race: Simons et al., 2007; and chronic schema accessibility: Simons, 2002). Both felt accountability and political skill have shown significant relationships with key outcome variables in their respective literature streams, but have never considered BI as a possible mediating mechanism.

### **Accountability Intensity**

Accountability has been described as a fundamental principle of social and organizational behavior (Breux, Munyon, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2008), and the basic principle upon which society rests (Frink et al., 2008). Functionally, it represents a mechanism for maintaining social order in organizational systems, and for protecting the interests of the organizational principles (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Consistent with this premise, Ferris et al. (2008) argued that many human resource systems are, in fact, accountability mechanisms, designed to monitor, control, and direct the behavior of employees. In general, relationships marked by moderate levels of accountability should result in higher levels of quality (e.g., Ferris et al., 2008) and improved performance (Ammeter et al., 2004).

Accountability is defined as "...an implicit or explicit expectation that one's decisions or actions will be subject to evaluation by some salient audience(s) with the belief that there exists the potential for one to receive either rewards or sanctions based on this expected evaluation" (Hall et al., 2003: 33). The effect of accountability on the actor differs from other social influence phenomena (i.e., mere presence effect, social facilitation: Cottrell, 1972) in that accountability includes an evaluation component, more intentional cognitive processing, and strategic intent of response (De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005; Frink et al., 2008). In addition,



Ammeter et al. (2004) positioned accountability on one end on a continuum, with trust on the other end. They proposed that accountability is a substitute for trust, implying that, as trust decreases, the need for an accountability mechanism increases in order to minimize one's vulnerability in the relationship.

As stated in the definition, there are implicit and explicit dimensions of the accountability experience. Formal mechanisms, such as organizational rules, policies, reward systems, employment contracts, and performance evaluation systems, can contribute to the accountability system experienced by organizational members. Similarly, accountability can be established through informal mechanisms, such as norms, informal rules, traditions, and unsanctioned political processes (Frink & Klimoski, 1998; Frink et al., 2008; Tetlock, 1985). Whether formal or informal, these factors are perceived and interpreted by the accountable actor, creating a subjective experience (i.e., "accountability as a state of mind") that is just as important as the objective mechanisms intended by the organization (i.e., "accountability as a state of affairs") (Frink & Klimoski, 1998: 9). Collectively, these factors contribute to the actor's "felt accountability" (Frink & Klimoski, 1998; Hall et al., 2007).

Although the concept of accountability can be traced back to ancient societies (Carmona & Ezzamel, 2007), the formal study of accountability in organizations is surprisingly new. Several models and theories have advanced our understanding of the construct. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) suggests that some degree of monitoring and consequence is necessary to protect the interests of the principles/owners from the threat of employee "shirking." Control theory (Eisenhardt, 1985) expanded the concept by identifying three required elements of accountability: clear standards of performance, a comparison of current action against that standard (which requires accurate feedback about the performance), and a pressure for the actor to self-correct. Stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997) broke from the traditionally economic-based assumptions of Agency theory, reflecting, instead, elements of psychology and sociology. As such, new assumptions were offered that suggested that the agent and the principal could have aligning interests, and that governance mechanisms can include more supportive elements, such as empowerment and self-control.

Schlenker and colleagues helped differentiate accountability from responsibility by suggesting that responsibility is a component of accountability that serves as the basis for evaluative reckoning (Schlenker & Wiegold, 1989; Frink et al., 2008). The idea that

responsibility is a subset of accountability is one echoed by other scholars as well (e.g., Cummings & Anton, 1990). The distinction was further developed with the comparison of the “accountability triangle” (i.e., which included interacting elements of the standard of performance, event, and the identity image of the actor) with the “accountability pyramid” (i.e., which introduced the evaluative audience to the triangle elements) (Schlenker, 1986; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994; Schlenker & Wiegold, 1989).

Tetlock’s (1985) social contingency model suggested that people are “intuitive politicians,” motivated to protect or enhance their favorable identities in the eyes of key audiences. As such, they position themselves so that they can most easily justify their decisions or behaviors. This premise is in line with the symbolic interactionist perspective of identity (e.g., Blumer, 1969), which suggests that individuals imagine themselves in certain roles, anticipate responses from others, and choose the actions they believe will result in the most favorable impressions.

As such, knowing information in advance about accountability audiences (and their preferences) can help adjust their behavior to present the most defensible and attractive approach. This may include simply aligning with the known preferences of the audience (conformity) or increasing attention or focus on the task at hand (“pre-emptive self criticism”) (Tetlock, 1985). If actors are made aware of the accountability requirement after the behavior or decision has occurred, they may engage in post-hoc rationalizations for those actions as a way to protect their self-image (i.e., “defensive bolstering” or “retrospective rationality”) (Tetlock, 1985). This concept is closely aligned with the idea of escalation of commitment (Staw, 1981), where subjects continue on a course of action by justifying their previous behaviors post-hoc.

This “intuitive politician” concept is particularly important in the study of BI in that managers wish to remain in good standing with those audiences who control rewards, consequences, resources, and social networks. Falling out of favor can have implications for the ability to perform one’s job, as well as more indirect outcomes, such as pay, promotions, performance appraisals, and satisfaction (Brass, 1984; Siebert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001).

Antecedents of accountability include organizational context, social factors, characteristics of the accountability system itself, and even personal characteristics of the accountable actor. Organizational context include formal elements like the span of control (impacting the visibility of the performer), number of evaluating audiences, organizational

structure, laws and rules (Fandt & Ferris, 1990). Social factors represent more of the informal system. Specifically, accountability is positively associated with status/legitimacy of the audience (Mero et al., 2007) and familiarity with the audience preferences (Carnivale, 1985), and is negatively related to leader-member exchange (Erdogan, et al., 2004) and trust (Ammeter et al., 2004). The accountability system features also can contribute to the felt accountability level. For example, the frequency of evaluation, number of evaluations (Fandt & Ferris, 1990), timing of the accountability notification (Tetlock, 1985; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), and method of accounting (e.g., face to face) (Klimoski & Inks, 1990) all have been shown to impact accountability. Finally, personality factors have been demonstrated to relate to accountability experience, and resultant outcomes. Such factors include affectivity (Hochwarter, Perrewé, Hall, & Ferris, 2005), conscientiousness (Mero, Guidice, & Anna., 2006), self-efficacy (Royle, Hochwarter, & Hall, 2008), Type-A (Yarnold, Mueser, & Lyons, 1988), reputation (Hall et al., 2004), power (Mitchell, Hopper, Daniels, Falvy, & Ferris, 1998), moral development level (Beu & Buckley, 2001), and celebrity (Ranft et al., 2007).

Most research has focused on consequences of accountability, primarily decision-making and performance. Many scholars (e.g., Frink et al, 2008; Klimoski & Inks, 1990; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Mero et al., 2007; Tetlock, 1985) consistently have argued that the accountability context impacts not only what we think, but how we think. The evidence demonstrates that, when the accountability requirement is known in advance, increased accountability typically is associated with higher decision quality, attentiveness, cognitive complexity, accuracy of ratings, and performance, as well as less social loafing, attribution bias, and illegal behaviors.

Conversely, other scholars have demonstrated that increased accountability can be associated with undesirable outcomes, such as increased tension, emotional labor, deviance, conformity, wasted resources, abusive behaviors, impression management, and performance rating inflation, as well as decreased citizenship behaviors, job satisfaction, intrinsic motivations, and trust in the target (see reviews by Frink & Klimoski, 1998; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1985; Frink et al., 2008). Finally, the relationship between accountability and other outcomes has been moderated by factors such as political skill (Hochwarter et al., 2007), negative affectivity (Hochwarter et al., 2005), personality (e.g., Frink & Ferris, 1998), and gender (Medina, Povedano, Martinez, & Munduate, 2009).

Given the wide range of variables to which accountability is related, Hall et al. (2004) introduced a framework to better define the features of the accountability environment as experienced by the actor. They outlined four “lenses” that attempt to capture the important dimensions that form felt accountability. The lenses include accountability salience, focus, source, and intensity.

**Accountability salience.** This environmental feature refers to the degree to which the agent is accountable for important or significant outcomes. As an extreme example, the military officer assigned to safely carry the legendary briefcase with nuclear launch codes (“the football”) cannot ignore the importance of the task for which he is accountable.

**Accountability focus.** Focus indicates the emphasis the audience places on one of two aspects of the agent’s behavioral or decision-making activities: process or outcome. In process accountability, the audience holds the agent responsible for the standards used and the procedures employed en route to a final decision or outcome. In this case, how you “play the game” matters as much as, or more than, “winning or losing.” Outcome accountability, on the other hand, represents more of a “do what you need to do to get the job done” or an “ends justifies the means” approach to evaluation.

**Accountability source.** The source of accountability indicates the audience to whom one is accountable. Sources can include supervisors, peers, co-workers, team members, customers, shareholders, boards, and in a non-organizational context, family, friends and elements of society. As indicated by the feature of intensity (below), multiple sources can be present at the same time. As such, the notion of identity salience becomes important in prioritizing or ordering the sources based on some critical criterion (e.g., commitment to the group associated with identity membership).

**Accountability intensity.** This feature is the level to which an individual is accountable to multiple persons and/or outcomes. The “web of accountabilities” (Frink & Klimoski, 1998) associated with multiple audiences has been related to unfavorable outcomes such as higher role ambiguity and increased stress (Hall, Frink, Ferris, Hochwarter, Kacmar, & Bowen, 2003). Frink and Klimoski (1998:11) identified this as “a factor worthy of emphasis,” where the more constituencies, the less likely the alignment of accountability expectations, ultimately increasing the potential for conflict and stress. Accountability intensity differs from role conflict (i.e., defined as an incompatibility between the expected set of behaviors perceived by the focal

person and those perceived by role senders; Katz & Kahn, 1978) in that intensity includes an evaluation component not present in role conflict (Hall, 2005).

Although Hall et al. (2003) defined this feature of the accountability environment, their selection of the term “intensity” may unintentionally imply to some readers a focus on the *strength* or *magnitude* of individual or multiple accountability requirements. For the purposes of this discussion, accountability intensity is specifically focused on the challenge associated with managing the *number* of significant accountability demands from a single source or multiple sources. It is this “multiplicity” of accountability requirements that creates a stress, so long as the consequences of the accountability requirements reach some threshold of significance, creating a motivation for the actor to satisfy the expectation.

As individuals are held accountable to additional demands by the same or by multiple audiences, cognitive demands increase in order to monitor and manage the requirements (and any promises made regarding them). Therefore, increased effort must be expended in order to maintain a favorable image in the eyes of important audiences for each expectation. Each new audience or expectation potentially represents another “plate to spin,” especially if expectations do not align. Although the concept of accountability intensity is new, some broader accountability research may inform our expectations about its relationship with other constructs.

Frink et al. (2008) suggested that certain criteria are used to manage and prioritize conflicting accountability requirements. These factors can include the salience of one actor to another, the importance of the event itself, and the implications for meeting or not meeting expectations. Mero et al. (2007) demonstrated that individuals increased the accuracy of their performance ratings when they had to justify their ratings to a high-status versus low status audience, especially when having to account for their ratings in a face-to-face format. Finally, research on executive job demands (Hambrick et al., 2005) suggests that senior leaders are under constant pressure to adapt and manage impressions to multiple audiences (e.g., conveying confidence, control, compassion, decisiveness), creating a highly stressful condition that often results in poor performance, decision making, and even abusive behavior to subordinates.

Obviously, the criteria by which individuals attempt to de-conflict and prioritize audiences differ. For example, the audience’s status may be defined by the individual, as opposed to formal structures – something that is nicely exemplified in this example by Blau (1964:105)

“The miserly secretary saves all year despite the ridicule of her companions in hopes of impressing another social circle with her affluence during her vacations. The juvenile delinquent willingly draws upon himself the condemnation of the larger community for acts that command respect in his gang.”

Romzek and Ingraham (2000) underscored how certain environments are particularly susceptible for the stress of accountability intensity. For example, the military context often places officers in positions of being expected, and therefore answerable, for satisfying incongruent expectations from two or more high-value audiences. On one hand, the officer may be charged with demonstrating initiative and creativity in accomplishing the mission, while also being answerable for following the specific letter of the regulations, especially if things go wrong. These often incompatible expectations (i.e., “use your judgment and creativity,” versus “follow the rules explicitly”) can create “cross-pressures” which will no doubt satisfy some audiences and anger others (Romzek & Ingraham, 2000: 242). These authors implicated such pressures as a cause in several high-profile military accidents.

Similarly, in a non-military environment, industry executives, especially in times of financial crisis, may be pulled between competing and powerful expectations from union representatives, shareholders, politicians, customers, and so forth. To the degree that these audiences’ expectations diverge (i.e., protect the workers, reduce worker wages to lower operating costs, bring jobs to this state, modify your product line), at least some of these audiences will observe what they think are value-based behaviors inconsistent with those espoused at other times. These expectations can reflect promises (and values) at the micro, meso, and even macro level (Frink et al., 2008).

Previous empirical research has not investigated these “lenses” of the accountability environment in isolation. It is reasonable to assume that antecedents of accountability intensity include such things as the perceiver’s personality, audience personality, the number of accountability requirements, the alignment of the accountability expectations, and even the salience or importance of the accountability audience. This final factor may, at first, appear to be redundant with accountability importance, but, rather, reflects that a certain importance threshold which must be met in order for the expectation to be perceived as an additional accountability demand.

It is also expected that accountability intensity likely will demonstrate attitudinal, emotional, and behavioral outcomes. For example, it is reasonable to assume that accountability intensity represents an increased attention burden, and therefore, will positively relate to stress, strain, and feelings of tension. Similarly, as different audiences become present, the need for impression management tactic use also will increase. Consistent with previous accountability research, it is reasonable to expect that, if the high-priority audience's preference is known in advance, the actor will demonstrate increased conformity and heuristic use. Finally, as prioritization of audience importance shifts (e.g., as deadlines approach), or as new high-status audiences enter the mix, there will be a need for the actor to adjust behavior in order to, "shoot the wolf closest to the sled" (i.e., maintain favorability with the primary audience at the moment). This adjustment will increase the likelihood of apparent inconsistency of behavior to observers over time, influencing BI perceptions.

### **Managers' Political Skill**

Organizations have long been described as political arenas (Cyert & March, 1963; Mintzberg, 1985; Pfeffer, 1981), where certain skills are appropriate and necessary to navigate the political landscape. Such skills have been associated with individual and organizational success (Baron & Tang, 2009; Ferris et al., 2005a; Semadar et al., 2006; Ferris, Witt, & Hochwarter, 2001), just as their absence has been seen as a reason for manager derailment (Van Velsor & Leslie, 1995). Goffee and Jones (2005:91) suggested that, "Most great leaders have highly developed social antennae: They use a complex mix of cognitive and observational skills to recognize what followers are consciously- and unconsciously-signaling to them."

Political skill represents "the ability to effectively understand others at work, and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one's personal and/or organizational objectives" (Ferris et al., 2005b: 127). This competency has been described as fundamental to influence in the management of work and interpersonal relationships (Ferris, Davidson, & Perrewé, 2005a; Ferris et al., 2008).

Perhaps one of the most interesting application-based aspects of political skill is that, although it is reasonably consistent across situations, and is largely influenced by stable characteristics and personality dimensions (e.g., social/emotional/general intelligence, social self-efficacy, self monitoring, conscientiousness, locus of control), it is conceptualized as a trainable skill (see Ferris et al., 2000 and 2007 for antecedent list). Scholars suggest that

political skill can be developed through self-assessment, experiential (e.g., personal or vicarious learning, dramaturgical) exercises, mentoring, and evaluation and feedback (Blass & Ferris, 2007; Ferris et al., 2005a).

Political skill has four dimensions which are distinct yet moderately related (Ferris et al. (2000, 2007). These include social astuteness, interpersonal influence, networking ability, and apparent sincerity.

**Social astuteness.** This dimension represents a general sensitivity to others that enables the astute observation and understanding of diverse social situations. Socially astute individuals are keenly attuned to social settings, accurately interpret their behaviors and those of others (Ferris et al., 2007), and identify with others to obtain personally-desirable objectives (Pfeffer, 1992). Similarly, Goffee and Jones (2005:93) suggested somewhat ironically that even authentic leaders must demonstrate this competency in that they "...must judge just how much they need to conform to social and organizational norms."

**Interpersonal influence.** Interpersonal influence reflects interpersonal flexibility and the ability to appear pleasant, unassuming, and convincing (Ferris et al., 2007). Pfeffer (1992) added that interpersonal influence enables individuals to remain emotionally detached from a situation, enabling greater control of the environment. This competency allows individuals to calibrate their behavior to match the interests of a target, in order to achieve their goals.

**Networking ability.** This dimension refers to the ability to identify and develop diverse contacts and networks of people (Ferris et al., 2007). The ability to easily form friendships, make alliances, and build coalitions establishes critical links to information, resources, and opportunities through both strong and weak network ties (Pfeffer, 1992). The access to these resources may be what creates a perception of control and flexibility across diverse situations and stressors (e.g., Perrewé et al., 2004). This ability may prove particularly important for women and minority groups who often experience a lower range of networking opportunities (Ibarra, 1993).

**Apparent sincerity.** This dimension reflects the appearance of an individual by others as being authentic, sincere, and genuine (Ferris et al., 2007), which are essential to the formation of trust (Ferris et al., 2005). Bolino (1999) suggested that influence attempts are successful only to the extent the actor is perceived as genuine. Unfavorable evaluations regarding the motives and intentionality of leaders' influence attempts can quickly crumble trust formation,



increase cynicism, and tarnish future attributions regarding the leader (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). This is particularly important in the context of BI in that managers' social accounts (i.e., for apparent word-deed inconsistency) "represent the most straightforward and least costly way that a manager can influence her subordinates' perceptions of her BI" (Simons, 2002: 27).

Evidence consistently has demonstrated that political skill not only is distinct from other similar constructs, such as emotional intelligence, general mental ability, social skill, self-monitoring, locus of control, and self-efficacy (Bickle, Ferris, Munyon, Momm, Zettler, & Buckley, 2008; Semadar et al., 2006), but also is superior in predicting individual success relative to self-monitoring, leader self-efficacy, and emotional intelligence (Semadar et al., 2006). In addition to individual performance, political skill has demonstrated a positive relationship with outcomes such as team performance (Ahearn et al., 2004), entrepreneurial success (Baron & Tang, 2009), organizational support, and trust (Treadway et al., 2004) (see Ferris et al., 2007 for a full review of outcomes). Interestingly, Liu, Ferris, Zinko, Perrewé, Weitz, and Xu (2007) found that political skill's effect on performance was fully mediated by perceptions of managers' reputation, which has been described earlier in this dissertation as a collective perception of BI.

Finally, political skill consistently has been shown to moderate the stress-strain relationship, reflecting the actual or perceived ability of the individual to control or adapt to ambiguity in situations. For example, Perrewé et al. (2004) demonstrated that political skill can serve as an "antidote" for role conflict, whereby highly politically skilled individuals responded to the stress of role conflict with lower levels of physical and psychological strain. This is important for BI perceptions in that politically skilled managers will be less inclined to respond to the pressures of accountability intensity in ways that are incompatible with traditional manager role prototypes. Similarly, Brouer, Duke, Treadway, and Ferris (2009) showed that subordinates' political skill eliminated the negative impact of racial dissimilarity between dyadic members on LMX quality.

Other non-linear relationships have demonstrated that more political skill is not always better, with respect to effects on self (i.e., political skills' effects on others have been argued and found to be only linear in nature). For example, moderate levels of political skill were associated with higher levels of job satisfaction and lower levels of strain than were extremely high or low levels of political skill (Kolodinsky, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2004).

## **Consequences of Behavioral Integrity**

As mentioned earlier, the preponderance of empirical and conceptual research on BI has focused on its organizational, behavioral, social, and attitudinal consequences. Despite the newness of the conceptualization, consistent findings have emerged to offer some degree of confidence regarding these relationships. Simons (2008) suggested that subordinates' perceptions of managers' BI will directly and indirectly relate to a number of attitudes and behaviors. More specifically, Simons (2002) indicated that BI operates through trust to impact employees' willingness to promote/implement change, their intent to stay with the organization, and their in-role and extra-role performance.

Davis and Rothstein (2006) conducted a meta-analysis on 12 studies that conceptualized integrity in a manner most closely aligned with Simons' BI definition, finding a large effect size ( $r = .48$ ) between BI and employee attitudes (i.e., job satisfaction, organizational commitment, satisfaction with the leader, and affect to the organization). Other studies that used a true BI measure replicated these findings, and expanded the list to include significant positive relationships with trust, justice perceptions, life satisfaction, health, satisfaction with pay, and organizational effectiveness (Hinkin & Schriesheim, 2009; Parry & Proctor-Thomson, 2002; Prottas, 2007; Simons & McLean-Parks, 2002; Simons et al., 2007). Conversely, BI has shown a negative relationship with poor health, stress, and self-reported deviant behavior (Dineen et al., 2006; Prottas, 2007).

Recent work also has tested causal relationships with structural equation modeling on individual and organizational outcomes. Simons and McLean-Parks (2007) demonstrated that hotel employees' ratings of their managers' BI showed substantial associations with worker turnover, customer satisfaction, and hotel profitability. Interestingly, BI accounted for 13% of the variability in profitability across hotels, as partially mediated by trust in managers, affective commitment, and discretionary service behavior. Other studies have demonstrated similar relationships in restaurant chains (Hinkin & Schriesheim, 2009) and with student and nursing samples (Palanski & Yammarino, 2009a). The latter study consistently showed that trust in the leader and satisfaction in the leader each fully mediated the relationship between BI and subordinate self-reported performance.

Also, scholars are just beginning to examine BI at higher levels of analysis. For example, Cording and Simons (2009) found that companies' actual alignment between the values espoused

in their annual reports and their actions (i.e., policies and decisions) predicted aggregated employee productivity, and, in turn, company stock performance. In addition, this was the first study to distinguish between the types of values espoused and whether BI outcomes differ for under-versus over-promising (i.e., acting above/below the values espoused, respectively). They found that employees' aggregated performance was superior when companies' behaviors exceeded their values.

### **Consequences of Interest in This Study**

The current study examines a path model reflecting proximal and distal consequences of BI. Particularly interesting is the role of trust in the manager (which consistently correlates with BI between .70 and .73 in the BI literature), and the resultant relationship of trust with organizational cynicism, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and unit level performance and deviant behaviors. These consequences re-address inconsistent findings in the literature, and expand the domain of empirically tested outcome variables in the BI literature.

#### **Trust**

Trust long has been regarded as a fundamental factor in establishing and maintaining effective organizational relationships (Ferris et al., 2009; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). Fisher and Brown (1988:107) went so far as to say it is the single most important element of a good working relationship.” In addition, trust is considered key to organizational success. Specifically, it is so rare, valuable, and difficult to copy that it provides the trust-based organization with a sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Davis et al., 2000).

However, simply recognizing its importance does not mean that trust is simple to establish. A 1998 survey of 2,004 Canadian workers showed that 3 out of 4 employees surveyed did not trust the people for whom they worked (Ferres, Connell, & Travaglione, 2004). Similarly, a national survey of over 19,500 employees revealed a very low level of trust in managers, especially in the public sector (Morehead, Steele, Alexander, Stephen, & Duffin, 1997). Lewis and Wiegert (1985: 969) argued that the function of trust is social, and that “individuals would have no occasion or need to trust apart from social relationships.” Given that organizations represent a complex social context, trust is, therefore, a necessary element for managers, employees, and organizational scholars to understand.

**Conceptualizations and dimensions.** Trust represents the “willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995: 712). Whereas a handful of scholars have considered trust a dispositional construct (e.g., Rotter, 1967), the preponderance of research has defined trust as a psychological state, such as a belief or attitude (see Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). Mayer et al.’s (1995) definition (i.e., one of the most widely referenced operationalizations of trust) aligns closely with Simons’ (2002) conceptualization of trust as a forward-looking construct compared to the backward-looking BI construct. Mayer et al. (1995: 712) stated that, “Trust is not taking risk, per se, but rather it is a *willingness* to take risk” (italics in original). Likewise, others clarify that trust is a probabilistic estimation of future risk acceptability (Davis et al., 2000; Tyler & Kramer, 1996), and an expectancy that a target will behave in a certain way (Ammeter et al., 2004).

The elements of vulnerability and risk are fundamental to most trust definitions. Trust is only necessary only when there is uncertainty about the target doing something important, and, in the absence of trust, some accountability mechanism is usually required (Ammeter et al., 2004). Ironically, Strickland (1958) demonstrated that the presence of monitoring can, in itself, prevent trust from developing (i.e., trustworthy actions of monitored individuals were attributed to the control system, and not the trustee).

Early discussions in the literature often used trust interchangeably with predictability and cooperation (Ammeter et al., 2004). Mayer et al. (1995) argued that these constructs are conceptually very different in important ways. In particular, predictability does not necessarily indicate trustworthiness. Indeed, one may show they are predictably unworthy of being trusted. Similarly, cooperation differs from trust in that trust is not necessary for cooperation to occur (i.e., it may result from threat or the presence accountability mechanism), however cooperation is often an expectation in a trusting relationship. In their broad review of trust in organizational settings, Dirks and Ferrin (2001: 458) suggested that “Trust represents an expectation of cooperation that may make cooperation attractive and feasible.”

Numerous models, definitions, and conceptualizations of trust have been offered, creating a condition that Mayer et al. (1995) suggested may have prevented a consistent progression of our understanding of the trust construct. For example, McAllister (1995) distinguished between cognition-based trust (i.e., reflecting a perception of reliability and dependability) and the

resultant affect-based trust (i.e., representing elements of reciprocal care and concern). Other models similarly include affective and cognitive elements (see Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Conversely, several “transformational models” of trust were offered in the 1990s (i.e., Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992), which identified a number of bases of trust: deterrence (calculus)-based trust (representing a cost-benefit calculation for engaging in the trusting action); knowledge-based (relational) trust (being familiar enough to allow for predictability of behavior); and identification-based trust (internalizing and identifying with the other’s preferences) (see Lewicki, Tomlinson & Gillespie, 2006 for a full comparison of trust development models).

Other models consistently have listed dimension such as predictability, dependability, faith ability, competence, skills, openness, selflessness, concern, reliability, and integrity (e.g., Ammeter et al., 2004; Mishra, 1996; Rempel, Holmens, & Zanna, 1985). Mayer et al. (1995) consolidated these dimensional themes in a broad review of the trust literature, and identified three dimensions and aligned antecedents: ability, benevolence, and integrity. This has become one of the most widely used frameworks in the trust literature.

*Ability* reflects “a group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain” (Mayer et al., 1995). This element (which includes other concepts such as perceived expertise, ability, and competence) is domain specific, in that, one can be perceived to have ability in one area (e.g., car maintenance), but not in another (e.g., public speaking).

*Benevolence* is the “extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor,” and to perform in a way that disregards an egocentric profit motive (Mayer et al., 1995: 718). As alluded to above, the perceived motives behind one’s performance separate trustworthiness from need for accountability (Ammeter et al., 2004).

Finally, *integrity* represents “the perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable” (Mayer et al., 1995: 719). Integrity can encompass aspects of promise-keeping, reliability, belief that the trustee has a sense of justice, and the extent to which the party’s actions are congruent with his or her words.

**Antecedents of trust.** Obviously, any factors that contribute to perceptions regarding ability, benevolence, or integrity will demonstrate a significant impact on trust. Dirks and Ferrin (2002) offered a conceptual model that categorized antecedents by “leader actions and practices”

(many of which indicate ability, benevolence, and integrity), “follower attributes” (i.e., propensity to trust), and “relational attributes” (i.e., length of relationship). Burke et al. (2007) grouped their proposed antecedents into broader categories titled, “ability,” “benevolence,” and “integrity.”

Dirks and Ferrin’s (2002) meta-analysis of the empirical trust literature identified a number of significant antecedents to trust in leadership. Specifically, trust in leadership was positively related to transformational and transactional leadership, justice perceptions, perceived organizational support, and participative decision-making. Conversely, unmet expectations (arguably reflecting low BI) was negatively related (corrected  $r = -.43$ ).

Other studies have identified additional organizational factors that impact trust, such as a strong system of controls (Schoorman et al., 2007), frequency of interaction (McAllister, 1995), ethical climate (Mulki, Jamarillo, & Locander, 2006), and accountability mechanisms (Ferris et al., 2008). Similarly, relationship-based antecedents of trust have been identified, to include leader-member exchange quality (Gerstner & Day, 1997), status of the trustee (i.e., celebrity; Ranft et al., 2009), similarity of values (Nicholson, Campeau, & Sethi, 2008), tenure of the relationship (Burke et al., 2007), history of trustworthy behavior, role clarity (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996), and perceived BI (Dineen et al., 2006; Simons & McLean-Parks). Finally, scholars have noted a number of personality characteristics that impact trust formation. For example, reputation (Blass & Ferris, 2007; McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany, 1998), intelligence (Mayer et al., 1995), attribution styles (Burke et al., 2007), and experience all have been argued or shown to influence trust.

More recently, Kim, Dirks, and Cooper (2009) offered a bilateral model of trust repair that is particularly relevant to BI perceptions and highlights the importance of attributions in trust formation. Specifically, trust can be salvaged if the violation is determined to be something externally driven, or is fixable in the event the cause is related to the person. Simons’ (2008) model of BI formation similarly posits that such attributions can mitigate the perception of low BI.

Huang and Murningham (2010) even demonstrated in a multi-sample study that unconscious signals and relational cues can initiate automatic trust formation. Specifically, they demonstrated that subliminal relational cues were enough to influence willingness to accept risk and expectations for new relationship partner to reciprocate.

**Consequences of trust.** Trust has been a central focus of researchers for decades due to the benefits it offers to organizations, managers, and employees. Trust reduces the need for formal contracts, reduces or eliminates opportunistic behaviors, reduces the need for hierarchical controls, and serves as a basis for leader-member exchange (Brower, Schoorman, & Tan, 2000; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Hill and O'Hara (2005) argued that trust, when formed “swiftly” (Mayerson et al., 1996), is particularly useful in unique contexts, such as that between doctors and patients who have little to no history of interaction, in that it can result in cost savings and speed of diagnosis.

Trust has demonstrated a consistently positive relationship with outcomes such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, OCBs, individual performance, communication, resource exchange, innovation, perceived accuracy of feedback, and acceptance of decisions. Positive trust outcomes even have been demonstrated in a more intimate relationship – between an online shopper and the e-retailer (Chen & Dibb, 2010). Even here, trust in the website predicted positive attitudes and intentions toward the company. Conversely, trust has been shown to have exhibited a negative relationship with outcomes such as stress, conflict, and intentions to turnover (see Dirks & Ferrin, 2001, 2002; Lewicki et al., 2006). Although Dirks and Ferrin (2001) suggested that the research on the main effects of trust on unit performance was inconsistent, closer review demonstrates that much of the inconsistency was associated with lateral trust (i.e., trust in the group, with partners, or with negotiators). By contrast, the relationship between trust in the manager and unit performance consistently was positive in the study sample. This relationship has been demonstrated in studies conducted since Dirks and Ferrin's (2001, 2002) meta-analyses (e.g., Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007). Low levels of trust also have been associated with increased levels of employee cynicism toward the organization (Treadway et al., 2004).

In addition to the direct behavioral and attitudinal benefits associated with being in a trusting relationship, trust also can influence the way individuals respond to contextual factors. For example, trust in supervisors affects how the subordinates perceive the accountability mechanism imposed (i.e., if they don't trust the boss, they interpret monitoring as overly negative) (Ammeter et al., 2004). In their study of public sector Indian employees, Aryee, Budhwar, and Chen (2002) found that trust in supervisor fully mediated the relationship between

interactional justice ratings and task performance and both individually and organizationally-directed OCBs.

A number of scholars also have demonstrated that “more may not be better,” such that high levels of trust may have unfavorable consequences. For example, Schoorman et al. (1996) found that veterinary doctors took bigger risks with those employees they trusted more, increasing the probability of larger negative consequences, should the outcomes prove unfavorable. Others have argued that high levels of trust can, in fact, lead to exploitation, as well as promote groupthink and the blind acceptance of ideas (Hill & O’Hara, 2005). Finally, researchers investigating reputation and accountability have shown that strong leader reputations (i.e., CEO celebrity: Ranft et al., 2009) can be associated with reduced accountability requirements, thus increasing the likelihood for deviant or dysfunctional behavior (Blass & Ferris, 2007). Some level of distrust arguably can be useful for challenging the status quo or prevent reckless risk-taking (Ammeter et al., 2004).

There is surprisingly limited research regarding the relationship between trust at the individual level and organizational performance (Dirks, 2000; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). As mentioned earlier, scholars have argued that organizations with trusting relationships between managers and employees have a competitive advantage. Only a few studies that have tested this assumption since have demonstrated support for the assertion. For example, Davis et al. (2000) showed that restaurants with highly trusted general managers reported significantly higher levels of sales and profitability, and lower levels of turnover. Interestingly, they found that integrity demonstrated the greatest predictive effect for overall trust and performance measures

In addition, Davis et al. (2000) used general manager turnover data to demonstrate that trust is a causal antecedent of organizational performance, as opposed to trust being driven by the performance of the restaurant. By comparison, Dirks (2000) examined the relationship of trust in leadership and team performance among 30 NCAA basketball teams, supporting the hypothesis of a reciprocal relationship, such that trust in leadership is both a product and a predictor of team performance.

Finally and Shane and Cable (2002) presented an interesting contribution to the multi-level trust literature with a qualitative study about the process by which investors decide to fund entrepreneurial start-ups. Not surprisingly, investing in new ventures is associated with a high degree of uncertainty on the part of the investor (i.e., no track record of performance is



established). As a result, the investment firm must be willing to assume a great deal of risk in order to offer resources to this entrepreneurial firm. The authors interviewed 50 investors about why they did or did not fund entrepreneurial firms. The investors' perception of the entrepreneurial firm was often a reflection of personal perceptions of the founder of that firm. Those perceptions led, anecdotally, to financing decisions, such as in the following examples:

“We got to know [ENTREPRENEUR B] in our prior relationship...We decided that he was a person of high integrity, high intellect, very well educated, and very purposeful...We started with the person rather than the product.”

Another investor stated of a separate case:

“One of the founders worked for us the summer between his first and second year...We based our decision to invest in him on his integrity, desire, and drive to do something on his own. I did little checking outside of the data that we asked him to bring us” (Shane & Cable, 2002: 368).

In these and other cases, the notion of integrity of past behavior served as a key component to justify assuming risk in the future, and ultimately led to financial support for the organization. BI literature also offers evidence that trust in leadership (i.e., aggregated at the unit level) predicted organizational performance (Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007).

### **Consequences of Interest in this Study**

This dissertation investigates both attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Specifically, the effects of trust on organizational commitment and satisfaction are examined through the partially mediated role of organizational cynicism. In addition, as mentioned earlier, there is surprisingly little research demonstrating the link between leader-subordinate trust and objective outcomes. This study examines task performance and deviant behavior levels as important consequences of BI-driven trust.

#### **Organizational Cynicism**

Mirvis and Kanter's (1989) survey of American employees found a high level of cynicism at the top and bottom of America's hierarchies, creating widespread mistrust and hostility throughout business and industry. Recent studies have demonstrated that over 50% of survey respondents described themselves as cynical (Hochwarter et al., 2004), and that cynicism is significantly present across national boundaries (Brandes et al., 2007). In an organizational

setting, cynicism reflects a belief that the target of interest (e.g., organization, leadership) lacks integrity, is deceitful, and cannot be counted on to keep its word (Dean et al., 1998; Brandes et al., 2007).

This conclusion regarding a lack of integrity often results from perceived violations of expectations (Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, 2003), whether personally experienced or vicariously observed. For example Bateman et al. (1992) conducted a cross-cultural study of attitudes toward General Motors after having subjects view the documentary, “Roger and Me.” The authors empirically demonstrated that subjects’ cynical attitudes towards specific business/organizations could be influenced based on their perceptions of fair treatment of other employees (i.e., General Motors employees).

Although cynicism appears closely related to the construct of trust, cynicism has several distinguishing characteristics that are worth identifying. First, specific forms of cynicism, such as organizational cynicism, almost always are based on experiences (Dean et al., 1998), while trust can be established without it (i.e., swift trust). For example, low levels of trust may be due to a lack of experience with another party, whereas low levels of cynicism reflect an experienced based attitude (Dean et al., 1998; Rotter, 1971). Second, trust, by definition, requires vulnerability to another party (Mayer et al., 1995), whereas cynicism does not. Dean and colleagues (1998) argued that one can be cynical without being vulnerable, whereas trust has no meaning in the absence of vulnerability (James, 2005). Next, trust represents a forward-focused belief or expectancy, whereas cynicism is an attitude made up of an affective component (i.e., hopelessness and disillusionment) as well as a belief (Andersson, 1996). Dean et al. (1998: 348) clarified, “There is an intensely emotional aspect to cynicism that is lacking in trust.” Finally, Wrightman (1974) demonstrated that cynicism and trust are only weakly related, sharing 10% common variance.

Cynicism has evolved significantly since its origins in the Cynic school of ancient Greece in the 5<sup>th</sup> century, where cynics pursued an exemplary life of high standards of ethics and morality, scoffing at the pursuit of superficial ends by their fellow beings (Andersson, 1996). More contemporary cynics focus less on the requirement for exceptional morality, and, instead, “detach themselves from the evils which they believe society endorses” (Andersson & Bateman, 1997: 449). Cynicism consistently has been associated with feelings of frustration, contempt, hopelessness, and mistrust, (Andersson, 1996; Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, 2003), and has been

associated with a number of negative, and even positive outcomes (Abraham, 2000). Despite the concept and interest of cynicism having been around for centuries, the systematic study of cynicism has been scant (Andersson, 1996) and remains in its infancy (Wanous et al, 2000). For example, with the exception of a few studies (e.g., Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, 2003; Andersson, 1996), organizational cynicism has not developed a model of the cynicism process.

Cynicism has been conceptualized in the literature as a personality trait (e.g., Hochwarter et al., 2004), an emotion (Meyerson, 1990), and most consistently, as an attitude composed of beliefs, affect, and behaviors (Dean et al., 1998). As an attitude, cynicism represents a learned belief that develops as a result of unfavorable experiences (Andersson, 1996; Andersson & Bateman, 1997). In addition, cynicism can reflect a broad philosophy about human nature, while on other occasions, it can be directed at specific targets. Dean et al. (1998) and Abraham (2000) consolidated these different themes in the cynicism literature and identified five unique clusters of focus: personality-focused cynicism (i.e., stable, trait-based), societal/institutional cynicism (i.e., reflecting failed promises of modern organizations to improve social life), occupational cynicism (i.e., targeting the broader organization and the people they serve; i.e., police cynicism), cynicism focused on organizational change, and employee/organizational cynicism.

Organizational cynicism refers to “attitudes related to one’s employing organization, characterized by negative beliefs, feelings, and related behaviors in response to a history of personal and or social experiences susceptible to change by environmental influences” (James, 2005: 7). The target of organizational cynicism is the organization in general, executives, or other workplace objects (Andersson, 1996), which is consistent with the notion that supervisors often are seen as representatives of the larger organization (Pfeffer, 1981), and that employees tend to assign personal qualities to higher level organizational units (Dean et al., 1998)

Typically, the negative beliefs, feelings, and behaviors associated with cynicism are considered dysfunctional in the workplace. However, Abraham (2000) acknowledged several beneficial roles that cynicism may play in an organizational context. First, cynicism may act as a sense-making screen for information and events, preventing employees from blindly participating in activities that deserve caution. Indeed, the cynic may represent the only voice of reason in a room clouded by groupthink and optimism. Andersson and Bateman (1997) found a negative relationship between cynicism and willingness to comply with unethical requests made by managers. Second, it may serve to protect employees from unpleasant thoughts, offering a

defense mechanism during confusion in the environment. Finally, cynicism may serve as a stress-reducing coping mechanism that allows the employee to deal with issues of incompetence (Cordes & Dougherty, 1993).

A number of antecedents to cynicism have been identified in the literature. Andersson and Bateman (1997) identified several industry-level and business environment factors, such as layoffs, workforce reduction, poor organizational performance, and high executive pay as contributing to cynicism. Similarly, factors associated with injustice (i.e., contract violations, perceived unfair treatment of employees) and perceptions of organizational politics also increased cynicism (James, 2005; Johnson & O'Leary-Kelly, 2003). Conversely, perceptions of favorable elements, such as organizational support and trust are inversely related to cynicism (Treadway et al., 2004).

Several studies have focused on antecedents of cynicism specifically about organizational change. Given that organizational cynicism may reflect experiences associated with change initiatives, as well as other factors, these change-specific studies can be useful in identifying possible antecedents of the broader construct of organizational cynicism (Dean et al., 1998). Wanous et al. (2000) conducted a longitudinal study over 21 months investigating the antecedents and correlates of cynicism about organizational change (CAOC). In addition to finding no support for a dispositional basis for CAOC in terms of negative affectivity, they demonstrated that CAOC was associated with a lack of employee participation in decision-making, ineffective leadership ratings, and little change previously experienced.

In addition, Shapiro (1995) suggested that employees respond to official slogans and mission statements that are unsupported by actual reward systems by becoming frustrated and cynical. This insight ties in closely with Simons (2002, 2008) conceptual argument suggesting that organizational change initiatives and management fads have a tendency to promote actual and perceived word-deed misalignment and negatively impact BI. To that end, Albrecht (2002) tested a model with three key trust-related antecedents of cynicism toward change: perceptions of integrity, competence, and trust in senior management. They found that only perceptions of managers' integrity and trust in managers were associated with COAC (no relationship for managers' competence), with these two antecedents accounting for approximately 40% of the variance in cynicism.

Finally, personality characteristics have received very limited attention in the cynicism literature, apart for research focused specifically on trait cynicism (James, 2005). Only a handful of studies have investigated variables such as need for achievement, work locus of control, spirituality (James, 2005), and negative affectivity (Reichers et al., 1997; Treadway et al., 2004), with mixed results.

With regard to consequences of cynicism, the list is more extensive. The appeal of cynicism as a research target lies in its potential to influence numerous organizational and individual outcomes (Abraham, 2000; Andersson & Bateman, 1997). Specifically, cynicism has been shown to influence attitudinal, stress-related, and behavioral outcomes, such as job satisfaction (Abraham, 2000; Reichers et al., 1997), commitment (Treadway et al., 2004), absenteeism, organizational identification (Bedeian, 2007), counterproductive work behaviors (James, 2005), emotional exhaustion (Johnson & O'Leary-Kelly, 2003), burnout, job tension (James, 2005), and intentions to engage in OCBs (Andersson & Bateman, 1997).

The relationship between cynicism and commitment has generated some interesting insights. For example, Treadway et al. (2004) found that organizational cynicism fully mediated the relationship between trust and commitment. In addition, Abraham (2000) demonstrated that the type of cynicism determined the relationship directionality with commitment. Specifically, societal cynicism was positively related to commitment (and job satisfaction), while employee/organizational cynicism was negatively related to commitment (and job satisfaction).

Cynicism's role in influencing attitudinal and behavioral outcomes often is inconsistent in the literature. For example, Johnson and O'Leary-Kelly (2003) demonstrated that cynicism partially mediated the relationship between psychological contract breach and attitudinal outcomes (job satisfaction and commitment), but did not mediate the relationship between psychological contract breach and behavioral outcomes. This distinction appears inconsistent with Andersson and Bateman (1997) and others, who found that cynicism contributes to both attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Finally, James (2005) found that cynicism related to stress-related outcomes (i.e., job tension and teacher burnout), and showed significant relationships with some behavioral outcomes (i.e., citizenship behaviors, counterproductive work behaviors, compliance, organizational performance), but not others (i.e., individual performance). The current study attempts to clarify the relationship between cynicism and both attitudinal and behavioral outcomes.

## **Organizational Commitment**

Commitment, generally defined as a willingness to persist in a course of action (Cooper-Hakim & Viswesvaran, 2005), has a long history in psychological literature, but more recently has emerged as a central construct in organizational contexts. Organizational success depends largely on the ability to maintain an effective work force, and given that individuals can anticipate changing jobs over five times in their careers (Kransdorff, 1997), improving organizational commitment of its members can represent a significant competitive advantage for a firm.

Organizational commitment has been defined as the “strength of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a particular organization” (Porter, Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974: 604). Steers (1977) proposed that organizational commitment includes three factors: (1) a belief and acceptance in the organization’s values and goals; (2) a willingness to exert substantial effort for the organization; and (3) a strong desire to maintain membership in the organization.

Over its 35 years of examination, a number of forms of organizational commitment have been identified (see Cooper-Hakim & Viswesvaran, 2005; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; and Morrow, 1993 for reviews of the taxonomies of work commitment). The most recognized and utilized framework includes the following dimensions: attitudinal organizational commitment (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979), calculative organizational commitment, and normative commitment (Meyer, Allen, & Smith 1993). Attitudinal (also referred to as affective) organizational commitment reflects an emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in the organization, and is proposed to be more stable than job satisfaction (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002; Mowday et al., 1979). Calculative (also called continuance) organizational commitment occurs when a person commits to an organization because leaving the organization would be associated with unacceptable costs. Finally, normative commitment reflects a perceived obligation to remain because they feel that is how they ought to behave (Allen & Mayer, 1990). Other dimensions, such as job commitment, career commitment, work ethic endorsement, and even union commitment have been identified (e.g., Cooper-Hakim & Viswesvaran, 2005).

Mathieu and Zajac (1990) conducted an extensive meta-analytic review of the antecedents, correlates, and consequences of organizational commitment (i.e., conceptualized as

attitudinal and calculative commitment dimensions). Their analysis demonstrated that a number of organizational, personal, and job characteristics, as well as group-leader relation factors, and role states (i.e., ambiguity, conflict, and overload), all were significantly correlated with organizational commitment. Similarly, commitment was significantly related to key outcomes, such as performance ratings, intention to search, intention to leave, and turnover. These relationships often differed as a function of the commitment type (i.e., attitudinal or calculative).

A meta-analysis by Meyer et al.'s (2002) extended this line of research by adding normative organizational commitment as a third dimension of the organizational commitment analysis. They found that all three forms of commitment demonstrated negative relationships with withdrawal cognitions and turnover, and each dimension was differentially associated with a number of antecedents and consequences (e.g., only affective commitment correlated [negatively] with absenteeism). In addition, affective and normative commitment correlated positively, and calculative commitment correlated negatively with job performance and OCBs. Finally, affective commitment was negatively related to stress and work-family conflict, while calculative commitment was positively related.

Other antecedents to organizational commitment also have been identified in both meta-analytical and individual research. These include factors such as position tenure, locus of control, perceived organizational support, justice perceptions, leader behaviors, and skill transferability, leader-member exchange, trust, BI, and job satisfaction (see Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Hulin & Judge, 2003; Meyer et al., 2002). Similarly, low commitment has been related to additional outcomes such as cynicism (Reichers et al., 1997) and deviant behavior (Haarr, 1997).

### **Job Satisfaction**

Interest in the relationship between job satisfaction and work behaviors can be traced back to the landmark Hawthorne studies of the 1920s (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939). It remains one of the most used variables in organizational research, with estimates through just the year 2000 of over 11,000 articles including job satisfaction as a key construct (Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002). Despite the abundance of literature, conclusive findings regarding both antecedents and consequences of job satisfaction remain surprisingly elusive (Yee, Yeung, & Chang, 2008).

Locke (1976: 1304) described job satisfaction as “a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job or job experiences.” As such, job satisfaction

serves as an evaluative judgment (i.e., an attitude) of the discrepancy between expected and actual job elements (Brief, 1998). Whereas some additional definitions identify this attitude as strictly an affective or emotional response (e.g., Cranny, Smith, & Stone, 1992), Weiss (2002) argues strongly for the need to distinguish between affect and attitudes as separate constructs, specifying that job satisfaction is an attitude only, representing cognitive beliefs and evaluations.

Debate also has surrounded the notion of stability of job satisfaction. Evidence has been presented to suggest that job satisfaction can be consistent in individuals over time and across different jobs, locations, and positions (Staw & Ross, 1985). Staw, Bell, and Clausen (1986) added to this position by demonstrating that childhood temperament was statistically related to job satisfaction across a 40-year span. Others have demonstrated evidence of a genetic component of job satisfaction, by showing that identical twins reared apart demonstrated statistically similar job satisfaction levels (Arvey, Bouchard, Segal, & Abraham, 1989).

These results appear conceptually consistent with other research on the dispositional antecedents that suggest that job satisfaction is significantly related to stable personality dimensions, such as core self-evaluations (Judge & Bono, 2001), internal locus of control, Type-A personality, positive affectivity (Agho, 1993), and a number of “Big 5” personality factors. This line of reasoning would suggest that job satisfaction is a stable trait simply by its reflection of the stable personality factors serving as its antecedents. This argument is reflected in Judge, Bono, and Locke’s (2000) study showing that core self-evaluations (i.e., a higher-order personality construct comprised of self-esteem, generalized self-efficacy, locus of control, and low neuroticism) in childhood and early adulthood were associated with job satisfaction in middle adulthood.

Critics of the dispositional approach of job satisfaction (i.e., Davis, Blake & Pfeffer, 1989) argued that, in addition to faulty assumptions in the earlier studies, the strength of the organizational context can create a strong situation (Mischell, 1977), thereby limiting the influence of the disposition on attitudes and behaviors. Indeed, Arvey et al. (1989) suggested that up to 30 percent of the variance in job satisfaction is genetically based, still leaving 70 percent unaccounted for. Although the debate regarding the importance of a dispositional/genetic appreciation for job satisfaction continues (See House, Shane & Harold, 1996; Dormann & Zapf, 2001), a more interactional approach has emerged, acknowledging both dispositional and situational antecedents of job satisfaction (i.e., Saari & Judge, 2004).



In addition to personality dimensions (see Judge et al., 2000 for review), a number of situational antecedents have been identified as significantly relating to job satisfaction. For example, job satisfaction has shown a significant relationship with factors such as job characteristics (Fried & Ferris, 1987; Hackman & Oldham, 1976), flexible work hours (Scandura & Lankau, 1997), justice perceptions (Judge, Scott, Ilies, 2006), perceptions of politics (Ferris, Adams, Kolodinsky, Hochwarter, & Ammeter, 2002), accountability demands (Breaux et al., 2008), and perceptions of control (Bond & Bunce, 2003). Similarly, factors that reflect the relationships associated with the workplace environment also have been associated with job satisfaction. Factors such as trust (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), leader-member exchange quality (Gerstner & Day, 1997), perceived organizational support (Treadway et al., 2004), perceptions of manager's integrity (Prottas, 2008), psychological contract fulfillment (Johnson & O'Leary-Kelly, 2003) are all positively related to job satisfaction. Finally, Hofstede (1980) highlighted the importance of cultural factors (e.g., orientations about individualism/collectivism or risk-taking/risk-avoidance) in consideration of job satisfaction formation.

With regard to outcomes, research has demonstrated a positive relationship between employee satisfaction and individual work behaviors (i.e., performance, effort, compliance), life outcomes (e.g., life satisfaction and low stress), and, on occasion, organizational outcomes such as firm profitability, customer satisfaction, safety rates, and unit productivity (Harter et al., 2002; Yee et al., 2008). In addition, job satisfaction has been negatively associated with such outcomes as withdrawal behaviors (e.g., absenteeism, turnover, lateness) and deviant behavior (i.e., sabotage, drug use) (see Judge, Thoresen, Bono, and Patton, 2001 and Hulin & Judge, 2003 for reviews of antecedents and consequences).

The curiously inconsistent relationship between job satisfaction and individual performance has attracted so much attention that it has been alluded to as the "holy grail" of organizational relationships (Judge et al., 2001). In their broad review of the literature surrounding the relationship between job satisfaction and performance, Judge et al. (2001) proposed a reciprocal relationship, whereby satisfaction contributes to increased performance, just as performing well (individually or organizationally) contributes to favorable job satisfaction. Overall, they demonstrated a correlation of .30 between job satisfaction and performance (compared to the .17 correlation found in an earlier review by Iaffaldano and

Muchinsky, 1985). This finding was encouraging to much of the research field, but is not without its critics, who argue the findings are spurious (Bowling, 2007; Fisher, 2003).

Overall, job satisfaction remains an important construct in organizational research. Scholars continue to clarify both causes and consequences, and its utility as a target for strategic human resource and operational managers also has been highlighted. For example, Harter et al. (2002) conducted a multi-year study from more than 100,000 employees in 36 companies across 12 industries, finding that business units with higher ratings on statements relating to favorable work attitudes (e.g., satisfaction) had consistently higher profits, productivity, employee retention, and customer loyalty. Cascio (2006: 48) suggested that, “unlike pay issues, which most managers and workers have no control over, every individual team member can do something to help create these beliefs.” Understanding what contributes to and results from these beliefs can only improve our ability to maximize the organizational benefits.

## **Performance**

By their very nature, organizations represent social entities comprised of individuals working toward a common purpose, goal, or objective (Ahearn, et al., 2004; Katz & Kahn, 1978). As such, individual performance serves as the fundamental element of which organizational performance is comprised (Barnard, 1938). Performance has been defined as “those actions and behaviors that are under the control of the individual and contribute to the goals of the organization” (Rotundo & Sackett, 2002: 66). In addition, Weiss (2002) suggested that individual performance is the result of the fit between a person’s behaviors and the demands of the job or task. Performance appraisals, by extension, represent an evaluation of employee behaviors that contribute to organizational goal accomplishment (Campbell & Furrer, 1995).

Performance has been conceptualized as a global construct with several important sub-dimensions, often including in-role and extra-role components (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; see Rotundo & Sackett, 2002, for list of job performance taxonomies). In-role or task performance reflects the ability to execute the specific obligations of the task or role (Katz & Kahn, 1978), contributing directly or indirectly to the organization’s technical core (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993). Some scholars have further delineated this dimension to include things such as task and communication proficiency (Campbell & Furrer, 1995).

By contrast, extra-role performance (also called contextual performance by Borman & Motowidlo, 1993) refers to actions that support the social and psychological context in which the

organization's technical core is embedded (Van Dyne, Cummings, & McLean-Parks, 1995). This concept borrows heavily from the notion of organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) (Bateman & Organ, 1983), which represents helping or supportive behaviors that are not role-prescribed, and are directed at other co-workers or the organization as a whole. LePine, Erez, and Johnson (2002) identified five sub-dimensions of citizenship (i.e., altruism, sportsmanship, civic virtue, courtesy, and conscientiousness) all of which showed significant relationships to outcomes of interest (e.g., job satisfaction, commitment). These behaviors are similar to what Brief and Motowidlo (1986) describe as pro-social organizational behaviors, which are performed "with the intention of promoting the welfare of individuals or groups to whom the behavior is directed" (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997: 100), but can be either role-prescribed or extra-role, and may be part of the reward system.

Just as extra-role or pro-social behaviors reflect important dimensions of performance, some scholars have suggested that counterproductive performance is a necessary element to consider as well (e.g., Spector, Fox, Penney, Bruursema, Goh, & Kessler, 2005). For example, Rotundo and Sacket (2002) demonstrated that the different aspects of performance are valued (and therefore, weighted) differently for different types of raters. They found that task performance was most heavily weighted for the majority of machine operators, while counterproductive performance was a dominant performance consideration for the majority of administrative assistants and nurses. The majority of retail cashiers and accountants assigned equal weights to counterproductive and task performance. Counterproductive (deviant) performance is discussed in more detail in the following section as the final dependent variable of interest.

Other frameworks have been offered to capture the domain of possible performance dimensions, to include the "soldier effectiveness model" (Borman, Motowidlo, Rose, & Hanser, 1985 as described by Borman & Motowidlo, 1997). This model highlighted performance elements deemed relevant to first-tour soldiers that fall outside of the traditional technical proficiency requirements. It includes concepts such as organizational socialization, commitment, and morale, which are grouped into broader performance categories of "allegiance," "teamwork," and "determination" (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997: 101).

Scholars long have believed that individual performance across all dimensions can impact group or firm-level outcomes – a proposition firmly championed by the field of strategic

human resource management. Huselid (1995) demonstrated that high performance work practices that targeted employee skills, motivation, and performance-enhancing organizational structures significantly impacted turnover, productivity, and ultimately short- and long-term measures of firm financial performance. Similarly, Nielsen, Hrivnak, and Shaw (2009) found a significant positive correlation ( $r = .29$ ) between individually-performed OCBs and group performance in a 38-sample meta-analytical review of the OCB literature.

Finally, individual-level trust between managers and employees has been shown to influence communication, problem solving, and adaptability – all of which contribute to overall performance in organizations (Davis et al., 2000). This relationship has been demonstrated by Simons and McLean-Parks (2007), who used path analysis to show that trust in managers influenced affective commitment, discretionary service behavior, customer satisfaction, and ultimately, business unit profitability.

### **Deviant Behavior**

As mentioned above, one important dimension of organizational performance is counterproductive behaviors which detract from the goals of the organization (Hollinger, Slora, & Terris, 1992; Rotundo & Sackett, 2002). The consequences of workplace deviance are obvious and significant. The annual cost of workplace violence alone is estimated to exceed \$4.2 billion; workplace theft to range from \$40 to \$120 billion; and other delinquent behaviors to approach \$200 billion (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Studies suggest that 33% to 75% of all employees have engaged in behaviors such as workplace theft, fraud, absenteeism, sabotage, and vandalism (Harper, 1990, as cited by Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Despite the huge impact and the prevalence of this phenomenon in the lives of so many workers (i.e., as victims or perpetrators), surprisingly little empirical work has been done to examine the antecedents and correlates of deviant behavior (Aquino, Lewis, & Bradfield, 1999).

Employee deviance is defined as a voluntary behavior that violates the norms of an organization, and, in doing so, threatens the well-being of the organization, its members, or both (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). This term has been used synonymously with counterproductive work behavior (Spector et al., 2006), antisocial behavior (Judge, Scott, & Ilies, 2006), and in some instances, with unethical behavior (Jones & Kavanagh, 1996). Others clarified that unethical behaviors (i.e., defined as “behaviors that have a harmful effect upon others, and are either illegal or are morally unacceptable to the broader community” [Beu & Buckley, 2004: 68])

represent right/wrong as viewed in terms of justice, law, social guidelines, or systems of absolute moral standards. By contrast, deviant behaviors focus on violations of organizational norms or roles (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Although a behavior can be both deviant and unethical, they are not automatically linked. For example, ethical acts (e.g., declining bribes) may go against some organizational norms, just as some unethical acts may align with an organization's formal or informal policies (Robinson & Bennett, 1995).

Researchers often have approached the study of deviant behavior by organizing and clustering checklists of behaviors into different frameworks. For example, Robinson and Bennett (1995) introduced a two-dimensional typology with behaviors assigned to categories based upon (1) the seriousness of the offense, and (2) the target of the deviant behavior. Four deviance types emerged from this framework: production deviance (e.g., wasting resources, setting unrealistic expectations regarding performance, intentionally working slowly); political deviance (e.g., undercharging customers, compromising company secrets, gossiping); property deviance (e.g., theft, padding expense accounts, intentionally wasting resources); and personal aggression (e.g., sexual, physical, or verbal harassment or contact). By comparison, Raelin (1994) classified deviant behaviors as being related to work processes (e.g., unethical practices, absenteeism, working only to the letter of the job description), internal actions (e.g., alienation, apathy, flaunting external offers), or career-related actions (e.g., premature external search).

Other frameworks simply have indicated whether the deviant behavior was directed at people or the organization (e.g., Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Fox & Spector, 1999). Spector et al. (2006) expanded on Robinson and Bennett's (1995) framework to create a "finer-grained" collection of categories of behaviors (i.e., abuse to others, product deviance, sabotage, theft, and withdrawal behaviors). It is also reasonable to assume that unique contexts may identify deviant behaviors not captured in the existing literature. For example, military organizations may identify "tolerance" of an integrity or regulatory offense (i.e., not turning someone in for violating a rule or norm) as a deviant behavior.

Finally, Rotundo and Sackett (2002) reviewed the taxonomies present in the literature and grouped the clusters of actions into four themes. First, was the cluster associated with substance abuse or poor self discipline, which included personal deviance, downtime behaviors, and behaviors linked to maintaining personal discipline. The second cluster reflected behaviors that destroy company property or equipment. Third, taxonomies of political deviance, personal

aggression, or unruliness all were associated with negative actions that harm coworkers. Finally, behaviors relating to compliance and useful personal behavior were categorized as those linked with following rules and regulations (see Rotundo & Sackett, 2002 for a list of counterproductive behavior taxonomies).

Regardless of the taxonomy used, the thrust of the research has focused on the causes that would encourage otherwise honest employees to engage in deviant behaviors. The list of possible antecedents includes factors such as low trust, justice violations, dissatisfaction, role modeling, thrill-seeking, unjust treatment, executive job demands, anger, stress, boredom, abusive supervision, and perceived peer behavior (Bennet & Robinson, 2000; Beu & Buckley, 2004; Breaux et al., 2009; Hambrick et al., 2005; Jones & Kavanagh, 1996; Judge et al., 2006; McCabe, Butterfield, & Trevino, 2006; Spector et al., 2006).

Similarly, Beu and Buckley (2004) suggested that individual responses to ethical dilemmas are a function of individual thought processes (i.e., to include one's stage of moral development), gender, salience of the moral issue, and the environmental context. Other personality factors (i.e., Machiavellianism, external locus of control, negative affectivity) have also emerged as being predictive of deviant behavior (Aquino, Lewis, & Bradfield, 1999; Jones & Kavanagh, 1996). Related research on perpetrators of white collar crime (i.e., volitional self-serving actions to further private interests, perhaps on behalf of the organization) demonstrated that low behavioral self-control, hedonism, high narcissism, and even high conscientiousness were associated with such inappropriate behaviors (Blickle, Schlegel, Fassbender, & Klein, 2006; Collins & Schmidt, 1993).

A helpful organizing framework was offered by Robinson and Bennett (1995), who suggested that six triggers (i.e., aside from personality) tended to emerge for deviant behavior. Specifically, they were (1) the compensation/reward structure, (2) social pressures to conform, (3) negative and untrusting attitudes, (4) ambiguity about job performance, (5) unfair treatment, and (6) violating employee trust. Many, if not most, of the antecedents identified in the deviance literature and in several other areas (e.g., accountability, trust, executive job demands) can arguably fit into one of these areas. For example, Frink and Klimoski (1998: 33) commented on the strength of peers as an accountability audience, noting that "acts of unethical or illegal behavior often occur in clusters, in certain locations in organizations." They suggested that "micro-climates" exist, creating strong normative pressures which occasionally direct behavior

in a direction that is unfavorable for the organization. This social force clearly aligns with the “social pressure to conform,” and even an informal reward structure within the subgroup culture.

Likewise, research in several areas has consistently demonstrated that low trust and perceptions of injustice are strong predictors of deviance. Jones and Kavanaugh (1996) experimentally demonstrated that when people are in a work environment where they perceive they are treated poorly, they are more likely to act unethically than if they are treated well. This compliments the propositions by those in the trust literature. For example, Davis et al. (2000: 564) suggested that, “In climate of low trust, employees vent frustration and aggression by attempting to break management rules and ‘get away with it,’ or by setting inappropriate goals which are not conducive to firm performance.” Others have demonstrated that employees react to a perception that supervisors distrust them “by double-crossing the supervisor whenever the opportunity arises” (Kruglanski, 1970: 215), leading to more opportunistic behavior by the employee (Zaheer & Vankantraman, 1995).

In addition, the role of justice perceptions on deviant behavior has been a dominant theme in the literature on deviant behavior. Deviant acts often are “provoked by a specific event, such as inequitable or unjust treatment, and are directed toward the parties to blame” (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Aquino et al. (1999) examined the impact of different justice dimensions on organizational and interpersonal deviance. They found that perceptions of interactional justice (i.e., defined as the “quality of interpersonal treatment a person receives from the target during the enactment of organizational procedures”) represented a stronger predictor of both organizational and interpersonal deviance than were distributive or procedural justice perceptions (focusing on the process of distribution of rewards) (Aquino et al., 1999: 1076).

Similarly, other researchers empirically have demonstrated that interpersonal justice (i.e., reflecting the component of interactional justice associated with dignified treatment and fairness, as opposed to the quality of information flow) was more strongly related to deviance than distributive, procedural, or informational justice (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; Judge et al., 2006). These findings underscore the very personal nature of relationship quality (i.e., BI, trust) and deviant responses. These findings on interactional and interpersonal justice are particularly important when considering the potential role of “person specificity” as a mechanism explaining behavioral and attitudinal outcomes.

Finally, Huberts, Kaptein, and Lasthuizen (2007) highlighted an important link between perceptions of the supervisor (i.e., BI ascriptions) and subordinate behavior. In their study of the impact of three leadership styles on integrity violations committed by police officers, they found that role modeling was significant in limiting or enhancing unethical conduct by subordinates. They stated that “employees appear to copy the leader’s integrity standards in their daily interaction with one another” (Huberts et al., 2007: 587). Therefore, if a subordinate feels that unethical or deviant behaviors represent “how things work around here,” then they are likely to imitate that behavior for survival or success aspirations. In a unit or organization where this perception is widely present, the resultant culture of systemic deviance will reflect significant negative organizational outcomes.



## CHAPTER THREE

### MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

This dissertation attempts to improve our understanding of the antecedents as well as both the proximal and distal consequences of subordinates' BI perceptions. Specifically, this paper proposes that managers' levels of accountability intensity negatively relate to subordinates' perceptions of managers' BI, whereas managers' political skill positively relate to perceptions of BI. In addition, an empirical investigation tested the assertions that BI perceptions relate positively to trust, which impact both attitudinal outcomes (i.e., cynicism, job satisfaction, commitment) and behavioral outcomes (i.e., performance, deviant behavior). These relationships, presented in Figure 2, expand upon the limited existing empirical work in the BI domain, and test theory-driven hypotheses intended to develop a more informed understanding of the BI construct and its consequences.




Figure 2: Proposed and hypothesized model relationships

Two theoretical models are discussed in this dissertation: An expanded model that includes potential antecedents to BI perceptions, and a subset model that is the focus of the empirical portion of this study (shown within the dashed box). Including the discussion and propositions associated with the expanded model (i.e., with accountability and political skill) is

useful for two reasons. First, this process identifies broader contextual factors that contribute to our understanding of resultant BI consequences, such as trust formation. Second, the discussion offers a theoretical basis for future empirical testing. Again, this dissertation only tested the model identified within the dashed box. Consequently, propositions are offered in the following section that reflect the relationships of the proposed antecedents of BI, whereas all relationships represented in the dashed box are indicated by empirically tested hypotheses. In the following section, progression of the model proceeds from left to right, but the central construct of interest remains BI.

### **Theoretical Foundations of the Model**

The proposed relationships are informed by several key theories. The fundamental premise of this study is that relationships are important in an organizational context (Ferris et al., 2009). Frink and Klimoski (1998: 26) articulated that, “much of the variance in behavior is driven by forces rooted in interpersonal relationships.” Consequently, these relationships represent social exchanges (Blau, 1964) that indicate levels of vulnerability and obligations for the respective members. Likewise, because these exchanges occur between individuals in a complex social context, there is a requirement for causal sense-making, especially when investigating the pattern of alignment between words and deeds. Any assumptions and expectations that individuals in those relationships hold regarding exchange requirements for themselves or their partner will impact their attitudinal and behavioral responses.

Although other theories offer important insights into the relationships in question, social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) provides a central, unifying construct to explain the proposed and hypothesized links. For example, role theory (Katz & Kahn, 1978) has been a central framework for explaining how felt accountability manifests itself in interpersonal and organizational processes (i.e., Frink & Klimoski, 1998; Frink et al., 2008), and it is used as such in this dissertation. However, role expectations and role episodes (discussed later) are still immersed in the social context of an exchange relationship. As such, it is important to anchor the social relationship being developed, experienced, and responded to, as the central conceptual unit (Emerson, 1976). It is this exchange relationship, in this social context, which also informs our expectations about fairness, effort, and other key outcomes.

Social exchanges represent voluntary actions by individuals that are motivated by the returns they are anticipated to produce (Blau, 1964), typically motivated by a norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). Foa and Foa (1980) described six resources exchanged in such relationships: love, status, information, money, goods, and services. These resources differ in particularism (i.e., where the value of the resource varies based on the source) and concreteness (i.e., how tangible or specific the resource is), where less concrete resources provide a symbolic benefit (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).

Scholars traditionally have described this reciprocation-based dynamic by using technical economic principles (Blau, 1964) and/or psychological concepts (e.g., Homans, 1974). For example, whereas Blau's conceptualization was primarily framed in an economic context, Homans (1974) took a perspective deeply rooted in psychological operant conditioning to describe how exchange partners respond to fulfillment or failure to fulfill expectations. Specifically, he offered the 'Success Proposition' which stated that, "the more often a particular action of a person is rewarded, the more likely the person is to perform that action (under similar stimulus conditions) (Emerson, 1976: 339). Similarly, the 'Stimulus Proposition' suggests that, "If, in the past, the occurrence of a particular stimulus has been rewarded, then the more similar the present stimuli are to the past ones, the more likely the person is to perform the action, or some similar action, now" (Emerson, 1976: 339).

In the context of this dissertation model, reinforcing (i.e., rewarding) sources may be the audiences to whom the managers are accountable, providing promotion, acceptance, or favorable evaluations in exchange for behaviors that satisfy them. Similarly, the managers themselves may reinforce the behaviors of subordinates by delivering on their promises, thereby satisfying the vulnerability and risk assumed by the subordinates. Consistent with principles of operant conditioning, the recurrence of rewarding or punishing outcomes will strengthen the likelihood of the response (positive or negative). Simons' (2002) definition of BI as a *pattern* of alignment/misalignment between words and deeds captures the importance of such repeated conditioning events.

Blau (1964) clarified that individuals have three types of expectations of social rewards. First are "general expectations," which reflect broad benefits and outcomes of being associated with the exchange relationship. These are often governed by prevailing values and social standards, and can lead to a general satisfaction or dissatisfaction for the individual. By contrast,

“particular expectations” are more directed toward the exchange partner, and indicate the expectations of behaviors and rewards associated with the partnership. These expectations are critically important in the context of trust and BI, in that promises and espoused values made by managers represent the particular expectations by which the relationship is judged.

Finally, “comparative expectations” reflect the profits (rewards minus costs) individuals expect to receive from their social associations (Blau, 1964: 146). This ratio captures the attractiveness of an exchange partner in the future, given the anticipated risk they may have to assume by entering into the relationship.

Exchange requirements often are defined by role-specific expectations, where an economic or social obligation is established in return for some level of service or performance. For example, Blau (1964:97) identified the “character of the relationship” as one of the key conditions that affect the social exchange process. Obviously, the perceived roles of the exchange partners (i.e., manager versus accounting audience, or manager versus subordinate) can impact assumptions and expectations about appropriate behaviors, risks, rewards, and available resources for exchange.

Role theory offers a useful framework for understanding how the comparison of expectations and observations can contribute to potential behaviors such as conformity, avoidance, negotiation, rejection, and selective attention (Frink & Klimoski, 1998). All of these responses may contribute to perceptions of word-deed misalignment over time, as well as the associated outcomes by subordinates. The foundation of role theory is grounded in the premise that organizations are contrived social systems that have mechanisms in place to encourage reliable, predictable behavior by its members (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Role theory is concerned with patterned and characteristic social behaviors, parts, or identities that are assumed by social participants, and scripts or expectations for behavior that are understood by all and adhered to by performers (Biddle, 1986). These patterns of behaviors, called “roles,” often are defined as clusters of related and goal-directed actions that are characteristic of someone within a specific situation (Biddle, 1986). Such roles can develop from formal or informal processes, and can be explicit or implied (Frink & Klimoski, 1998).

In traditional conceptualizations of role theory, one or more role senders (e.g., supervisors, customers, peers) communicate certain expectations to a focal person (e.g., subordinate), who, in turn, responds with some level of behavior in a social exchange labeled a

“role episode” (Katz & Kahn, 1978). This example of the focal person receiving and responding in kind to the role expectation reflects a reactive “role taking” scenario. Other scholars have argued that workers may be “role makers,” proactively shaping the expectation of their job duties, or may participate in a balanced role development process of mutual influence (Frink & Klimoski, 1989; Morrison, 1993). In still other cases, role expectancies can be prescribed by higher-level organizational values or statements (i.e., annual reports, media releases, organizational culture) or by social/organizational norms (i.e., the captain should go down with the ship) (Simon, 1945). Regardless of whether roles are developed through reactive role taking, proactive role making, or a combination, this occurs through an iterative social exchange and reinforcement process (Frink et al., 2008).

Similarly, the role expectations that define the exchange relationship can be driven by, and reflective of, organizational or individual values, regardless of whether they were generated by an external source or by the focal person. For example, a role expectation of “relentless pursuit of quality” as espoused in a corporate mission statement signals to the role performer and even outside observers that certain behaviors, such as attention to detail, are more important than others. Taken together, role expectations can exhibit an important impact on perceptions of managers’ BI, and will set the stage for proximal and distal outcomes. These expectations, defined by roles or through other avenues, will establish the exchange requirements and obligations for the relationship. Over ongoing, iterative exchange events, a pattern of fulfillment or failure informs the partners about the favorability of the other as an attractive future exchange partner.

### **Antecedents of Behavioral Integrity**

Behavioral integrity is an ascribed evaluation of managers’ pattern of alignment between their words (i.e., espoused values and promises) and their deeds, reflecting subordinates’ perceptions (Simons, 2002). As such, it is important to investigate not only antecedents that contribute to actual word-deed misalignment by managers, but also variables that contribute to the perception of misalignment, whether the actual behavior is present or not. Managers’ felt accountability intensity and political skill are two such variables that arguably demonstrate a significant effect on BI.

## **Accountability Intensity**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, scholars have acknowledged that managers often are placed in an environment where they are accountable to multiple audiences with competing expectations for performance (e.g., Frink et al., 2008; Frink & Klimoski, 1989; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000). In order to maintain a favorable image in the eyes of high-value audiences, managers must reinforce those audiences with appropriate behaviors and attitudes. Failure to do so will result in the audience(s) withholding exchange resources as a punishment for deviation from the exchange expectations (Homans, 1976). Indeed, Homans (1976: 602) found that subjects were highly willing to change their opinions to match those of highly attractive audiences. “If you think that the members of a group can give you much—in this case—liking—you are apt to give them much—in this case, a change to an opinion in accordance with their views—or you will not get the liking.”

Romzek and Ingraham (2000) identified the values and behavioral expectations associated with different types of accountability relationships, and used this framework to describe how accountability “cross-pressures” can lead to often negative outcomes. In such conditions of high accountability intensity, managers find themselves attempting to satisfy an unmanageable number of often competing role expectations. Subordinates often spend much of their time monitoring the actions of managers, due to the high level of dependency in their work relationship, and therefore, are highly sensitive to actions that appear inconsistent or hypocritical (Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007).

Over time, the audiences to whom the managers are accountable change or modify their expectations. In doing so, the ability of managers to respond in a way that satisfies these audiences, yet sends consistent behavioral cues to their subordinates, becomes more difficult (Tsui & Ashford, 1994). As long as these audiences represent attractive partners with appealing rewards, the managers will make adjustments to satisfy those partners. In the broader context of the exchange relationship, the standard of performance to which managers must perform (i.e., in the eyes of subordinates) is, to a large degree, determined by the expectations the subordinates hold about the managers’ roles.

Frink and Klimoski (1998, 2004) expressed the value of viewing accountability through a role theory perspective. Specifically, they noted that both the role and accountability constructs emphasize expectations for performance in an interpersonal relationship, and highlight the

importance of the consequences of compliance or lack thereof. Subordinates' perceptions of managers' BI can likewise be articulated using these and similar components, with one important conceptual adjustment. Whereas Frink and Klimoski (1998, 2004) described role expectations as *representing* the accountability requirements, this dissertation argues that the managers' accountability requirements actually *create* the role expectations, as communicated through the managers. Said another way, in traditional models of accountability, managers and subordinates interact to identify the role expectations for which the subordinates will be accountable. However, in this study, managers articulate (through a number of methods) the expectations for the role of "manager" to their subordinates, reflecting accountability requirements under which they (i.e., the managers) are placed.

Accountability mechanisms of any sort convey values, preferences, and goals to both the accountable agent as well as others (Frink et al., 2008). For example, if bus drivers are accountable for passenger safety, that value is apparently important to their supervisors as the evaluating audience. Just as these mechanisms communicate the audience's values and other informational cues to the agent, then the agent (e.g., bus driver, manager) conveys value-based information to other observers (e.g., passengers, subordinates) by responding in accordance with those accountability demands. If managers behave in line with the "win at all costs" accountability demands under which they are placed (i.e., in order to satisfy their boss), then that behavior sends cues about the manager's values to the subordinates. The more accountability intensity managers experience, the higher number of values their behaviors must represent. In attempting to prioritize new and conflicting accountability demands, managers are more likely to communicate inconsistent values over time to their subordinates.

Managers consider a number of factors when responding to multiple audiences, especially with competing demands. Tetlock (1999) suggested that managers consider their approval motive strength, audience power (i.e., relative to themselves and other audiences), degree of tolerance the audience has about the accountable issue, knowledge of the audiences' preferences, and the costs of misalignment with the audience preferences. In the end, the responses that managers choose indicate certain value propositions to their subordinates. In doing so, they explicitly or implicitly espouse values against which they will be judged. This signaling or communication process establishes the expectation of the managers' role in the eyes of their subordinates.

As such, managers in this downward-directed context are both role senders and role makers about their own roles. By espousing certain values, they are clarifying “what you can expect from me,” thus, proactively shaping the expectations their subordinates should have about future interactions (Frink & Klimoski, 1998). Subordinates evaluate managers’ performance relative to that expectation, noting discrepancies. A pattern of such discrepancies serves as the basis for BI perceptions.

The mechanisms by which managers communicate their values are critically important to understanding BI. Perceived word-deed alignment requires some espousal of the values or promises against which managers’ behaviors will be compared. One option for espousal (i.e., and the one primarily used in the traditional BI literature) occurs when the words/values are overtly articulated by the manager (i.e., via personal correspondence or statements) or by the organization whom they represent (e.g., through mission statements or policies). Another option exists where the subordinates assume the values of the managers through an implied espousal process. This can occur via nonverbal or symbolic actions, norms, precedent (i.e., past promises indicate likely current promises), and through the prototypes and schemas held by subordinates about values linked to the role of manager. Although this list of sources is not exhaustive, it serves to highlight the key mechanisms by which managers’ value-based role expectancies are communicated to subordinates.

**Overtly articulated values/promises by managers.** In its purest form, managers can (and sometimes do) explicitly state their values. Countless supervisors have announced, “I have an open door policy,” or “Failure is something we should celebrate,” only to demonstrate that this was hardly the case by killing the messenger or risk-taker. Managers’ words, be they simple promises or inspiring goals, indicate their part of an exchange relationship which they will be expected to uphold. Mayfield and Mayfield (in press) suggested that communication is interpreted through behavioral settings, and managers who use language to motivate employees toward key outcomes will be unable to do so, without word-deed congruence. The classic Ohio State leadership studies point to leader speech as the main communication channel for the central factors of initiating structure and consideration, and are the major paths for sharing vision, culture, and engendering employee trust (Mayfield & Mayfield, in press). President George H.W. Bush’s infamous campaign slogan, “Read my lips, no new taxes” became a painful



example of the weight and lifespan of espoused values in the eyes of others, ultimately costing him re-election.

Apparent inconsistency can result from managers simply being unaware of (or unconcerned with) the link between their values and behaviors, or from knowing the link, but having to act in accordance with a new program, policy, or environmental factor that is not aligned with the values represented in the previous program, policy, or environment. This second issue corresponds with what Simons (2008: 137) described as the “middle manager’s dilemma,” where middle managers often are asked to implement and champion policies with which they disagree. Of particular interest is Simons’ (2008) qualitative finding that senior executives strongly expected that their middle managers support their superiors’ decisions, and that these managers “come out of the (conference) room with one message that goes out to the world” (Simons, 2008: 140). Aside from the fact that these “messages” may change over time, the notion of accountability intensity reminds us that the senior executives are but one valued audience with whom the managers want to maintain their favorable identity (Tetlock, 1985; Tsui & Ashford, 1994).

**Implied values/promises by managers.** The age-old adage that actions speak louder than words certainly may be appropriate in an organizational context. Managers often intentionally or unintentionally espouse values, and thereby, role expectancies, indirectly through actions or symbolic communication (Dabos & Rousseau, 2004). For example, a manager who stands up for unionized employee rights in contract negotiations will be perceived as representing certain values by observers. With that perception comes the expectation that they will demonstrate similar labor-friendly decisions and behaviors in the future, or risk being perceived as being inconsistent. Every behavior, from a politician’s voting record to a boss giving employees a turkey in lieu of an end-of-year bonus, indicates values – often unintended – against which they will be evaluated. To the degree that these evaluators (e.g., voters, employees) are exchange partners who possess some exchange resources that the manager finds valuable (e.g., votes, productivity), this inconsistency can be problematic indeed.

Similarly, symbolism implicitly can communicate information about values or expectations. For example, managers who display religious symbols in their office or exhibit looks of displeasure with tardiness in a staff meeting may create certain value-based expectations from subordinates. In an attempt to satisfy competing demands from accountability audiences,

there is an increased chance that some behavior apparently will violate the expected standards indicated by the symbolic signal. Managers may be held to task for values/promises that they never intended to espouse. For example, the managers in the previous examples may be perceived as exhibiting low BI if they act in traditionally non-religious ways or show up late to subsequent staff meetings, even though they never formally intended to establish that expectation.

**Values espoused by the organization.** Likewise, organizations explicitly can espouse values or implicitly indicate intentional or unintentional values through symbols or actions.

Katz and Kahn (1978) described social systems as patterned interdependent activities of human beings, characterized by roles, which themselves are characterized by norms and values.

System norms and values offer cognitive maps for members that facilitate their work and provide justification for system activities (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Values can represent either transcendent, moral beliefs or more pragmatic conceptualizations, but at the organizational level, indicate a cognitive framework for evaluating right from wrong (Katz & Kahn, 1978).

Much like personal values, organizational values can be espoused in formal communication (e.g., newsletters, annual reports, commander's calls), or can be reflected in the organizational culture and policies (De Chernatony, Cottam, & Segal-Horn, 2006; Simons & McLean Parks, 2007). Not surprisingly, the formally stated values often can differ from the perceived or implemented values at the organizational level (Cording & Simons, 2006; Harshman & Harshman, 1999), creating a dilemma for managers in impression management. The organization's espoused values establish role expectations for managers, who often are perceived by subordinates as symbolic representatives of the organization (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).

Here, the organization is another "role maker" for managers, defining the expectations of their roles, to then be evaluated by the subordinates. Managers' behaviors that are inconsistent with these values, due to competing audience accountabilities (e.g., policies, pressures) or even personal values conflicts (i.e., accountability to ones' self; Schlenker & Wiegold, 1989), will be perceived by subordinates as reflecting low BI. For example, one of Enron's (circa 2001) corporate values formally reads: (we espouse) "Integrity: We work with customers and prospects openly, honestly and sincerely. When we say we will do something, we will do it; when we say we cannot or will not do something, then we won't do it" (Press Release Newswire, "Can You

Pass the Enron Test?": <http://www.prwebdirect.com/releases/2006/2/prweb342169.htm>). The assumption is that, by assuming the role of "Enron management," you have adopted the expectation of that role. To offer a monumental understatement, a number of Enron executives behaved inconsistently with the espoused organizational values.

**Values derived from prototypes/schema.** Finally, role expectations often reflect the cognitive schema held by the audience. For example, stereotypes, prototypes, or other cognitive structures contain a perceiver's expectancies about some group of individuals (Chung-Herrera & Lankau, 2005). Prototypes may be particularly informative when investigating BI in that subordinates may evaluate their managers based not on explicitly espoused values, but on values the subordinates assume represent a prototypic manager.

Lord, Foti, and DeVader's (1984) leader categorization theory suggests that people from the same culture tend to reflect a common set of categories that fit the image of a "prototypical leader" (Howell & Shamir, 2005: 103). People observe the actions of the target individual, and compare them against this prototype. If the behavior matches the prototype, the target is more readily classified as "a leader," is perceived as more powerful, and is given more credit for work outcomes (Lord et al., 1984).

In this instance, subordinates' prototypes define the expectation for the manager's role. As such, the subordinates assume the position of "role senders," although they may never communicate their expectations to the managers. For example, Gerstner and Day (1994) described a manager prototype as a cognitive summary of traits, skills, and abilities that people attribute to the category of "manager." For as much as prototypical manager characteristics of aggressiveness, industriousness (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994), desire for advancement and task orientation (Eagly & Karau, 1991) can qualify as values, then the subordinates' prototypes will serve as their basis for comparing managers' behaviors. These standards for evaluation align with Blau's (1964: 147) "particular" expectations for exchange relationships, in that the targets' conduct is evaluated against an "accepted social standard" as perceived by the evaluator.

In sum, managers often are immersed in a "web of accountabilities" (Frink & Klimoski, 1998), where they must prioritize and respond to competing requirements in an effort to maintain or improve their identity with key audiences, thereby receiving some valued reward from the exchange relationship (Tsui & Ashford, 1994). In doing so, their responses will directly or indirectly espouse certain values that establish role expectancies against which their subordinates

will evaluate them. As managers' accountability requirements shift, their need to align with new policies or philosophies that are at odds with previous ones may not correspond with what subordinates see as consistent with espoused values or appropriate for prototypical managers.

Whatever the source of the perceived espoused values, having increased accountability intensity will increase the likelihood that the managers will be unable to maintain a perception of consistent word-deed alignment over time. Simons and McLean-Parks (2007: 10) clarified, "in environments where managers must please diverse stakeholders, norms may easily develop among management to ignore word-action matches as they attempt to manage impressions among multiple, diverse constituencies." This attempt to simultaneously serve many masters will increase the likelihood that subordinates' role expectations for their managers will be violated, negatively influencing perceptions of BI.

*Proposition 1: Managers' felt accountability intensity will be negatively related to the subordinates' perception of the managers' behavioral integrity.*

### **Relationship of Political Skill to BI**

Considering that BI is a subjective evaluation of the managers' pattern of word-deed alignment, it is important to investigate those factors that influence the subordinates' perception of the words and the deeds for comparison. In particular, the ability of managers to frame the impression of their messages and behaviors, or to manage the interpretation of the potential misalignment, will directly impact subordinates' BI conclusions and subsequent outcomes. Consistent with Tetlock's conceptualization of people as "intuitive politicians" (2002: 454), managers have a vested interest in maintaining a favorable image with their subordinates. Political skill may be an influence mechanism to serve this goal.

Political skill is defined as the "ability to effectively understand others at work, and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one's personal and/or organizational objectives" (Treadway et al., 2004: 495). From a social exchange perspective, this skill represents one's effectiveness in managing the exchange partner's evaluation of exchange fulfillment and ultimately, in enhancing ones' attractiveness as an exchange partner.

Political skill is presented less as a singular theory, but more as a "comprehensive pattern of social competencies, with cognitive, affective, and behavioral manifestations, that have both direct effects on outcomes and moderating effects on predictor-outcome relationships" (Ferris et

al., 2007: 291). As such, it integrates a number of theoretical frameworks relating to social influence, impression management, and attribution.

Political skill enables individuals to adapt to situational constraints to effectively execute certain strategies for a specific result. The manner with which leaders express their behaviors contributes to the interpretation of these behaviors by others (e.g., subordinates), and helps frame perceptions of their effectiveness (House & Aditya, 1997; Tsui & Ashford, 1994). Indeed, Treadway et al. (2004: 494) stated that “we implicitly judge our leaders as much by their style they display in communicating their decisions as we do by the decisions themselves.”

The dimensions of social astuteness, interpersonal influence, networking ability, and apparent sincerity allow politically skilled managers to be sensitive to situations that may impact BI perceptions, and then to respond convincingly in a way that can minimize apparent misalignment. Tsui and Ashford (1994) highlighted the importance of such skills in their discussion of adaptive self-regulation. Specifically, they described how managers’ effectiveness often is based on their ability to not only understand the expectations of their constituents, but also how their constituencies (i.e., audiences) perceive any discrepancy between that expectation and the managers’ performance. This insight requires managers to engage in discrepancy detection activities, such as soliciting feedback from constituents and attending to informal social cues from other sources (Tsui & Ashford, 1994). In response to observed or perceived discrepancies, effective managers employ discrepancy reduction techniques. These include having the “offending” managers modify their behavior, changing the expectations of the constituent, changing the constituent’s *perceptions* of the managers’ behavior, providing rationale for the offending action to the constituent, or altering the constituent “set,” thereby changing the audience.

Both the discrepancy detection and reduction actions are enhanced by managers’ social astuteness, perceived sincerity, interpersonal influence, and their ability to form and exploit a personal network. Similarly, Tsui and Ashford (1994) explained that confidence in one’s ability to control ambiguous social environments increases the likelihood of adaptive self-regulation. As such, politically skilled individuals approach such ambiguous situations with a heightened ability to “tune into cues regarding constituents’ expectations, and thus readily detect discrepancies in expectations and evaluations” (Tsui & Ashford, 1994: 106). This skill allows

such managers to anticipate, identify, and manage potential BI problems that less politically skilled individuals may miss.

In addition to perceived managerial effectiveness, successful influence of value-deed perceptions can influence impressions such as organizational justice and fairness, which, in turn, can be predictive of BI perceptions. As evidence of this relationship, Treadway et al. (2004) demonstrated that managers' political skill predicted subordinates' perceptions of perceived organizational support (POS), which itself is an outcome of fairness/justice perceptions (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002). Additionally, Simons et al. (2007) found that perceptions of interpersonal justice were significantly related to ratings of managers' BI.

Ferris et al. (2007) identified a number of dispositional antecedents of the distinct dimensions of political skill. The disposition of perceptiveness, defined as the ability of individuals to monitor and regulate their own behavior, was highly related to personality traits of high conscientiousness and self-monitoring, and served as an important influence on social astuteness. Individuals who demonstrate this ability are known to keep their focus on the environment and others, which allows them to "keep a healthy gauge on their accountability of both self and others" (Ferris et al., 2007: 296).

Just as Blau and others (e.g., Foa & Foa, 1980) have identified resources exchanged in relationships, Hobfoll's (1989) Conservation of Resources (COR) theory offers a useful complimentary framework for understanding the motivating mechanism of resource protection, especially in conditions of high accountability intensity. COR theory suggests that individuals seek to acquire, maintain, and protect certain resources, and that the loss or threat of those resources can be stressful to the individual (Hobfoll, 1989). Resources can include not only physical supplies and information, but also conditions such as identity and status, as well as personal characteristics, such as self-esteem. These resources provide value to individuals and access to other resources (Grandey & Cropanzano, 1999; Hobfoll, 1989).

These resources are at risk when managers are in positions of high accountability intensity, and also are threatened when managers are perceived as possessing low BI by their subordinates (Hall et al., 2004). Political skill is yet another resource that can facilitate the protection of identity and self-esteem (Ferris et al., 2007). Highly politically skilled managers have at their disposal the tools by which to position themselves most favorably in the eyes of

their subordinates by espousing values or explaining behaviors (e.g., apparently inconsistent decisions) in ways that minimize the perception of word-deed incongruence.

Knowing that acting inconsistently with previously espoused values can result in negative consequences, politically skilled managers will be adept at either communicating the values or the misaligned behaviors/decisions in ways that minimize the perception of incongruity. Indeed, a number of other dispositional antecedents of political skill offered by Ferris et al. (2007), such as affability (i.e., being seen as likeable, outgoing, and interpersonally pleasant) and control (i.e., individuals' perception about control over themselves and their environment), are associated with effective interpersonal influence and social capital creation to potentially impact subordinates' perceptions of word-deed alignment.

These abilities become particularly useful for managers in their ability to influence the attributions subordinates make when forming their BI perceptions, thereby protecting their status as attractive exchange partners. Attribution theory (Kelley, 1967) suggests that people use certain dimensions when interpreting causality for specific events. These factors reflect antecedents to attribution formation, and include the consistency of the event (i.e., how frequently did this individual demonstrate this over time), consensus (i.e., how prevalent was this behavior among others in a similar situation), and distinctiveness (i.e., how unique was this behavior across situations for this individual).

By contrast to Kelley's (1967) antecedents, Weiner (1986) identified three attributional outcomes: locus of causality, controllability, and stability. Locus of causality determines whether the cause was generated internal or external to the actor; controllability refers to the degree to which the actor had volitional control over the outcome; and stability reflects the degree to which the cause fluctuates, indicating what to expect in the future (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Given that responsibility of behaviors often are attributed to individuals in leadership positions (Lord & Smith, 1983), leaders are well served to the extent that they can manipulate attributions for unfavorable outcomes or behaviors to external, uncontrollable, or unstable causes (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009).

To that end, managers have four types of social accounts at their disposal to potentially influence the causal attributions assigned by subordinates prior to BI perception formation (Weiner, 2000). First, denial represents a claim by the actor that there was no transgression (i.e., word-deed inconsistency), or that they were not the perpetrator. The goal of this account is to

assign external attribution to the event (i.e., “I didn’t do it”). An excuse, by contrast, attempts to minimize one’s responsibility by highlighting extenuating circumstances that emphasize an uncontrollable element to the event.

The third accounting technique is an apology, whereby the offender confesses responsibility, acknowledging (at most) that the outcome was internal and controllable, but by promising that it won’t happen again, emphasizes the unstable nature of the offense. For the concept of BI, this allows the offender to derail the perception that this offense represents a “pattern” of behaviors, and is only a one time offense. Finally, justification allows the offender to communicate the reasons that the outcome (i.e., apparently inconsistent behavior/decision) is legitimate and actually consistent with previously stated values. Interestingly, successful justification reverses the attribution to one that is favorably internal, controllable, and stable (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009).

Regardless of the accounting technique used, the ultimate goal is one of impression management, and therefore protection of one’s status as a favorable exchange partner, worthy of reinforcement with some valued reward/resource. In this case, managers may utilize accounts to influence subordinates’ impressions of behaviors which are apparently misaligned with espoused values. Successful management of these impressions depends largely on the effective delivery of the accounting technique. Treadway et al. (2004) suggested that the leader-follower relationship “provides an opportunity for politically skilled leaders to manipulate their subordinates’ perceptions of organizational support to achieve organizational objectives.” In turn, followers reciprocate this support with increased support, citizenship behaviors, and liking.

With regard to manipulating BI perceptions, politically skilled managers are more able to recognize which actions may be perceived as inconsistent with values, and adjust their behavior appropriately. Alternatively, they will have the skills to frame and “spin” even inconsistent behaviors so as to still appear to be in line with espoused values. In particular, they may be able to convince subordinates that the values espoused are still supported by this behavior, that the previously espoused value was misinterpreted, or that the new behavior reflects an even more attractive value position. Additionally, politically skilled managers are able to deliver information about the external, uncontrollable, and unstable attributions in a manner perceived as very sincere. Finally, because these managers are skilled at social influence and building



interpersonal networks, they also are likely to have earned an idiosyncrasy credit “account” (Hollander, 1958) that will lessen the negative impact of even undeniable integrity violations.

Political skill can help managers increase communication quality or frame situations (and the resultant behavior) a priori or post hoc in ways that successfully minimize the ownership subordinates will assign to them for negative outcomes (Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987). Specifically, their social astuteness, interpersonal influence, apparent sincerity not only will make them more sensitive to potential high-threat situations, but also will enhance their ability to communicate the desired attribution message in a convincing manner, preserving their status in a desired exchange relationship.

*Proposition 2: Managers’ political skill will be positively related to perceptions of BI.*

### **Consequences of Behavioral Integrity**

Although the BI literature is relatively limited, evidence has emerged demonstrating a strong relationship between BI and key outcomes. A meta-analysis of the effects of perceived BI of managers on employee attitudes revealed a strong positive relationship ( $r = .48, p < .001$ ) for job satisfaction, organizational commitment, satisfaction with leader, and affect toward the organization (Davis & Rothstein, 2006). Significant results also have been found for outcomes such as life satisfaction, stress, health, absenteeism (Prottas, 2008), transformational leadership behaviors (Parry & Proctor-Thomson, 2002), self-reported deviant behavior, OCBs (Dineen et al., 2006), trust, customer satisfaction, and organizational profit (Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007).

Most of these studies represent initial investigations regarding the BI concept, and do not explore the presence of other mediating variables as mechanisms underlying the relationships. Although BI and trust have been associated with both attitudinal and behavioral outcomes, no research to date has examined the mediating roles of trust and cynicism on the relationship between BI and key outcomes. Similarly, in their interdisciplinary review of social exchange theory, Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005:886) stated that, while trust has been identified as an identifying outcome of favorable social exchanges, the evidence in the literature has been “promising, but...sparse.”

## **Behavioral Integrity and Trust**

Trust continues to be regarded as a fundamental element of social interaction, and is essential to success at many levels (Davis et al., 2000; Tan & Tan, 2000). The positioning of BI as an antecedent of trust aligns with many conceptualizations present in the trust literature, most of which include integrity as a key dimension of trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995). Similarly, McClelland (1987) argued that an inconsistency between managerial words and actions breeds mistrust.

Initially, a tautological relationship appears to exist when considering that behavioral integrity is considered as an antecedent of trust, which contributes to the integrity dimension of trust. As mentioned earlier, the distinction between these constructs lies in their directional focus. Specifically, BI is described as a trait ascribed to the target (i.e., manager) in the present, drawn on an evaluation of past espoused words and actions, describing a pattern of alignment (Prottas, 2008). As such, BI is a backward-focused evaluation of consistency between words and deeds. Conversely, trust is defined as a forward-looking construct, based on expectancy, anticipated risk, and future decisions (Hall et al., 2004; Prottas, 2008; Simons, 2002).

This concept of turning one's head from past to future is consistent with several definitions that identify trust as an evaluative component of past performance necessary for consideration of future relations. For example, McAllister (1995: 25) described cognition-based trust as being based on "what we take as 'good reasons,' constituting evidence of trustworthiness" and justification for accepting vulnerability-based risk. In addition, Mayer et al.'s (1995) review of the trust literature identified multiple forward-looking themes that enabled the willingness of the focal member to be vulnerable to another. Dimensions of predictability (Rempel et al., 1985), probability (Tyler & Kramer, 1996), intent (Bigley & Pearce, 1998), reliability (McAllister, 1995) and dependability (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) are present in multiple conceptualizations of trust.

In each of these cases, the probabilistic expectation of behavior must be based on an evaluation of past performance. For this reason, BI perceptions are expected to be related to, but distinct from, trust (Davis & Rothstein, 2006; Simons, 2002). Granted, there may be times when individuals trust each other without the benefit of past experience. For example, in swift trust conditions (Meyerson et al., 1996), newly acquainted team members may be required to trust

each other, with no history of performance upon which to establish a basis for evaluation (Hall et al., 2004).

Similarly, Weber, Malhortra, and Murnighan (2005) described an attribution-based process of trust formation that accounts for the observation that people often engage in “irrational” trust, whereby people sometimes engage in large, highly risky trusting acts early in relationships. Examples of such non-incremental trusting actions may include companies that fund expansions prior to working out all the contract detail, or managers who delegate important, sensitive duties to new employees (Weber et al., 2005). Although interesting, such contexts are outside the scope of interest in the currently proposed dissertation. Instead, this dissertation focuses on relationships between subordinates and supervisors, and the formation of subordinates’ trust toward managers based on real or perceived word-deed alignment input. This information can be based on subordinates’ own experiences of those or others, but some history of exchanges is assumed.

Again, social exchange theory (Blau, 1964: 94) is particularly salient when explaining the relationship between BI and trust, in that “only social exchange tends to engender feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and trust.” Indeed, “trust is essential for stable social relationships,” such as those between subordinates and managers, and these exchange obligations promote trust (Blau, 1964: 99). These expectations of future rewards are based on the personal experience of exchange fulfillment for themselves, or even through learning what benefits others have obtained (Blau, 1964). This notion of generating trust evaluations based on the exchanges of *others* is an important concept that serves to distinguish BI from the more restrictive concept of psychological contracts.

Psychological contracts are an “individual’s beliefs regarding the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between that person and another party” (Rousseau & McLean-Parks, 1993: 19). Although this definition appears to be synonymous with the exchange relationship that frame BI perceptions, psychological contracts focus specifically on the employee’s perception of the fulfillment of obligations specific to *them* (Simons, 2002). By contrast, BI reflects a broader, more inclusive evaluation of word-deed alignment extending beyond the boundaries of the expectancies specific to the employment relationship, and based on the treatment of one’s self or others (Simons, 2002). In this respect, BI corresponds to Blau’s

(1964: 97) description of trust formation that can occur when “neighbors tell other neighbors” about a third person’s failure to honor obligations.

A critical exchange component for the BI-trust relationship can be found in Mayer et al.’s (1995) popular definition of trust as a willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable to another party based on the expectation that the trustee will perform in a certain way. Central to this definition of trust is the requirement of the trustor to knowingly assume some level of risk regarding a meaningful incentive (Davis et al., 2000). The degree of risk deemed acceptable reflects the probability that the trustee will perform as promised. Past behaviors serve as signals of quality and reliability (Spence, 1974), much like the signaling benefits that warrantees have on the purchase intentions of uncertain products. Such effective signals of reliability have been shown to reduce the perception of risk in future exchanges in contexts such as insurance and product sales (Erevelles, Roy, & Yip, 2001; Shimp & Bearden, 1982).

A demonstrated history of satisfying exchange obligations offers evidence that those individuals are worthy of future risk (i.e., trustworthy). Therefore, building trust reflects a “gradual expansion of exchange transactions,” where individuals demonstrate a pattern of discharging obligations, thereby making them an attractive partner to the other (Blau, 1964: 98). Previous exchange experiences serve as data to estimate the willingness to be vulnerable (i.e., assume risk) in the future. Consequently, perceptions regarding previous misalignment between espoused values and actual performance indicate a threat to future exchange relationships. In contrast, high degrees of word-deed alignment provide evidence for a high probability estimate of future cooperation (Tyler & Kramer, 1996). This supports Lewicki and Bunker’s (1996: 118) notion of deterrence-based trust (i.e., also referred to as calculus-based trust), which is based on constancy of behavior, reflecting that people “do what they say they are going to do.”

In sum, BI will provide the assessment to help formulate the integrity-based dimension of trust identified in the Mayer et al. (1995) framework. The historical record regarding managers’ abilities to satisfy previous expectations, whether a function of subordinates’ own experience or through the experiences of others, will identify the degree of risk and vulnerability subordinates will be willing to accept from managers. Existing empirical evidence also supports the conceptualization of BI as an antecedent to trust (e.g., Love & Kraatz, 2009; Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007; Simons et al., 2007). For these reasons, it is reasonable to propose that behavioral integrity perceptions will be highly and positively related to trust in managers.

*Hypothesis 1: Subordinates' perception of managers' behavioral integrity will be positively (and highly) related to their ratings of trust in the managers.*

### **Trust – Organizational Cynicism**

Although modern interest in cynicism has existed for centuries (Dean et al., 1998), the formal investigation of the construct is still in its infancy. Definitions of organizational cynicism have taken many forms, but Dean et al. (1998: 345) offered a multi-dimensional conceptualization that has been adopted by many cynicism scholars as, “a negative attitude towards one’s employing organization comprising three dimensions: (1) a belief that the organization lacks integrity; (2) negative affect toward the organization; and (3) tendencies to disparaging and critical behaviors toward the organization that are consistent with these beliefs and affect.”

The three components of affect, belief, and behaviors are particularly important in understanding the relationship of BI and trust to cynicism. First and foremost, Dean et al.’s (1998) definition emphasizes cynicism as being “state” based as opposed to stable, cross-situational trait. As such, it allows for the attitude to change in response to external conditions, such as the actions of the exchange partner. Given that the exchange relationship is a gradual, reciprocal process, opportunities exist for perceptions of managers’ BI and trustworthiness to redirect subordinates’ resulting level of cynicism.

Second, similar to trust, cynicism is conceptualized as ‘anticipatory’ in nature (Andersson, 1996). Cynicism represents a belief that employers, when given the chance, will exploit the contributions of employees (Andersson & Bateman, 1997; Kanter & Mirvis, 1989). As an outcome of exchange-based trust, cynicism arguably establishes a protective stance when considering the likelihood for future vulnerability situations. The very fact that cynicism is conceptualized as an attitude, which is “a disposition to respond favorably or unfavorably to an object, person, institution, or event” (Azjen, 1994: 114), suggests that the value of the disposition lies in its usefulness in preparing for subsequent actions.

Finally, the belief-based dimension of cynicism only can be created based on an evaluation of past events or information. Consistent with this premise, a number of scholars have suggested that organizational cynicism is a “learned” belief (Andersson, 1996; Andersson & Bateman, 1997; Dean et al., 1998; Wanous et al., 2000). As such, cynicism is the outcome of

previous perceptions regarding actions reflective of the integrity of the individual or the organization. This study suggests that cynicism directed toward organizations is reflective of perceptions of BI at the level of subordinates and managers, and the mechanism of trust directs attention from past to future.

The focus of the organization as the target of the cynical attitudes is consistent with Azjen's (1994) "institutional" definition of attitudes, as well as other scholars who have demonstrated that people hold attitudes about organizations as acting agents (Bateman et al., 1992; Levinson, 1965). In addition, although it is reasonable for individuals to hold certain levels of trust and cynicism about other individuals, there are some perceptions upon which cynical attitudes are based that may be difficult to assign to a specific person (e.g., policies, processes, systemic elements of the org) (Dean et al., 1998). For example, McCabe et al. (2006) suggested that graduate schools with an honor code they do not enforce are worse off than if they did not have one at all. This inconsistency between espoused value-based standards and enforcement of those standards is seen as "window dressing," and creates cynicism towards the organization as a whole (McCabe et al., 2006: 304), since no one individual typically can be identified as the "owner" of the honor code. In the end, the pattern of word-value incongruence (low BI) that leads to low trust in managers also identifies the organization as a poor exchange partner in future contexts.

*Hypothesis 2: Subordinates' trust in supervisors will be negatively related to subordinates' cynicism toward the organization.*

### **Organizational Cynicism – Attitudinal Outcomes**

One outcome of this proposed study is to examine an inconsistency in the cynicism literature regarding attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. As mentioned earlier, Dean et al.'s (1998) multi-dimensional framework of affect, belief, and behavior is one of the most commonly referenced conceptualizations of cynicism. However, in one of the few process-focused empirical articles on cynicism, Johnson and O'Leary-Kelly (2003) demonstrated that unique characteristics underlying social exchanges should lead to an expectation that organizational cynicism is not associated with work-related behaviors.

Specifically, they argued that attitudinal versus behavioral outcomes occur as a function of the “person specificity” of the violation (i.e., defined as “the degree to which a social exchange involves perceived promises to the individual from the employer, versus generalized expectations that develop from varied and multiple sources,” Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, 2003: 630). Scholars have argued that all psychological contract breaches are considered violations of personal trust (Robinson, 1996), but violations that are not person-specific will be partially mediated by cynicism. Because cynicism generally is considered an apathy-based attitude (Andersson, 1996), it is typically associated with attitudinal and intent-based outcomes. By contrast, violations that are considered personal in nature (i.e., high person-specificity) generate strong emotional reactions and a “readiness for action” (Morrison & Robinson, 1997: 231), and, therefore, are associated with behavioral outcomes.

The empirical cynicism literature also appears to compliment Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly’s (2003) argument in that the vast majority of organizational cynicism outcomes are strictly attitudinal or intention-based. For example, cynicism has been found to predict outcomes such as perceived organizational support (Treadway et al, 2004), organizational identification (Bedian, 2007), job satisfaction, commitment (e.g., Bedeian, 2007; Wanous et al., 2000), intent to perform OCBs (Andersson & Bateman, 1997), feeling of alienation (Abraham, 2000), and emotional exhaustion (Johnson & O-Leary-Kelly). Upon closer inspection, most of the behavioral outcomes described in many models represent a stated ‘tendency’ toward negative actions, not the actual enactment of the work-related behavior (Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly). Similarly, other cynicism outcomes that appear to be behavioral are, in fact, measures of intent. For example, Andersson and Bateman (1997) showed that cynicism was predictive of the intent to refuse to comply with unethical requests from the organization, not the performance of non-compliant behaviors, *per se*.

However, some recent work by James (2005) and her colleagues (Brandes et al., 2007) presented evidence of cynicism relating to behavioral outcomes (i.e., counterproductive work behaviors, compliance, effort), but again the items were either self-report or reflected intentions. Finally, Wanous et al. (2000) included the number of grievances filed as an objective outcome measure, but their predictor variable was cynicism specifically regarding organizational change.

Consistent with Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly’s (2003) conceptualization, this study proposes that organizational cynicism will partially mediate the relationships between trust and

only the attitudinal outcomes of this study. Again, Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly focused on psychological contract breach as the antecedent, and did not investigate the role of trust as a mediating variable. This dissertation includes both a breach-related perception (BI) and trust in the causal chain that includes cynicism and key outcomes. The direct relationships between trust and these outcomes are discussed shortly.

**Organizational cynicism – organizational commitment.** Organizational commitment refers to the strength of the individual’s identification with and involvement in an organization (Porter et al., 1974). This identification represents a reciprocal degree of support for the exchange partner to whom one is obligated-- in this case, the organization (Mize, Stanforth, & Johnson, 2000). As part of the traditional employment exchange relationship, when organizations promise or provide certain rewards or obligation-triggering outcomes, subordinates will respond in ways that demonstrate their commitment and dependence on the relationship.

Relative to the dimensions of commitment typically conceptualized (Porter et al., 1974), cynical attitudes can cause subordinates to question their belief in the organizations’ goals or values, especially if the cynicism is the result of management’s history of poor value-action alignment. Additionally, if the organization has breached its contract with employees personally or generally, there will be a decreased willingness for subordinates to exert effort that may not be reciprocated (Blau, 1964). Cynical attitudes will be associated with a low desire to maintain membership in an organization that is not considered a trusted exchange partner (Blau, 1964). Finally, empirical research supports the notion that cynicism is inversely related to organizational commitment (e.g., Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, 2003; Treadway et al., 2004, Bedeian, 2007; Abraham, 2002).

*Hypothesis 3: Subordinates’ cynicism will be negatively related to their organizational commitment.*

**Organizational cynicism – job satisfaction.** In conceptually distinguishing cynicism from many other constructs, Dean et al. (1998) clarified that job satisfaction is distinct from cynicism in that it focuses on the job, per se, as opposed to one’s employing organization. Job satisfaction is defined as a “pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job or job experiences” (Locke, 1976: 1300). Affective events theory (Weiss &



Cropanzano, 1996) suggests that triggering events, or multi-event episodes, initiate affective reactions, which results in either affect-driven behaviors or an attitude/evaluation (e.g., job satisfaction), ultimately leading to judgment-driven behaviors. Specifically, these authors defined job satisfaction as an evaluative judgment of one's job, acknowledging that individuals' affect and evaluations can be influenced by their environments. In addition, they argued that job satisfaction is the result of affective experiences and belief structures.

In the context of this study, a pattern of word-deed alignment or misalignment (i.e., affective experiences) initiates a series of belief structures in the form of trust in managers and cynicism toward the organization. Considering that the low cynicism generates emotional feelings of contempt, distress, disgust, and frustration (Dean et al., 1998), it is reasonable to suggest that such attitudes are inconsistent with the pleasurable or positive state described by the aforementioned definition of job satisfaction. Additionally, multiple empirical studies have demonstrated that cynicism is inversely correlated with general job satisfaction (e.g., Bedeian, 2007; Lester, 1984; Treadway et al., 2004).

*Hypothesis 4: Subordinates' cynicism will be negatively related to their job satisfaction.*

### **Trust – Attitudinal Outcomes**

As discussed earlier, cynicism is proposed to only partially mediate the relationship between trust and attitudinal outcomes. As such, a direct effect is expected to be present as well. Whereas the cynicism literature is in its infancy and loosely connected (James, 2005), the trust literature is broad and populated with many models and conceptualizations. Within this expanse of research, some areas of consistency exist. A conclusion in Dirks and Ferrin's (2001: 455) review of research on trust in organizational settings was that, "In general, the evidence is highly supportive of main effects of trust on attitudes, perceptions, and other cognitive constructs." Their meta-analysis the following year identified significant corrected mean weighted correlations between trust in leadership and organizational commitment ( $r = .59$ , 40 samples), and job satisfaction ( $r = .65$ , 34 samples) (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002: 618). This evidence provides an encouraging foundation upon which to make the following theoretical arguments.

**Trust – organizational commitment.** Conceptualizations of trust describe a willingness to be vulnerable in the future, based on perceptions of past exchange experiences. It has also

been described as an optimistic expectation about an often uncertain event, requiring some degree of risk (Hosmer, 1995). Tan and Tan (2000: 243) further clarified that trust in one's supervisor is "the willingness of a subordinate to be vulnerable to the actions of his or her supervisor, whose behavior and actions he or she cannot control." This inability of control is particularly important in that the power differential present in the supervisor-subordinate relationship is tipped in favor of supervisors, who can easily take advantage of the vulnerable subordinates.

Given this precarious social exchange position, the degree to which supervisors honor their obligations will (1) define a level of reciprocity that is appropriate for that degree of obligation fulfillment, and (2) solidify the justification for subordinates to remain in the exchange relationship. Blau (1964: 98) stated that a subordinate's commitment to the relationship "make[s] it disadvantageous for him to abandon the partnership in favor of another, [and] gives the other additional reasons to trust him not to evade his obligations in the relationship."

In addition, a number of dimensions of organizational commitment (see Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001) represent both risk-reward considerations (e.g., calculative commitment) and identification with values of the organization (e.g., value commitment, moral commitment, affective commitment). Given the importance of both satisfying risks for subordinates and honoring value-espoused expectancies, it is reasonable to expect that trust is directly aligned with commitment to the exchange partner. Additionally, since supervisors may be perceived as being symbolic representatives of the organization, trust in supervisors should be associated with commitment to the organization (Tan & Tan, 2000).

For these reasons, and with consistent empirical support in the trust literature (e.g., Connell et al., 2006; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Mize et al., 2000; Tan & Tan, 2000), it is reasonable to expect the following:

*Hypothesis 5: Subordinates' trust in managers will be positively related to their organizational commitment.*

**Trust – job satisfaction.** This relationship is particularly relevant in the context of BI. Subordinates' perceptions of managers' BI reflect the degree to which managers' have met their

expectations, as defined by espoused values/promises or role expectations. A pattern of violations of those expectations will result in low BI perceptions, and result in an evaluation that these managers represent high-risk exchange partners in the future. Schoorman et al. (2007) emphasized that violations of trust are likely to be negatively emotional events for the trustor. As such, they establish not only another data point for the reformulation of BI perceptions, but also impact the emotional states of the violated audience. Conversely, Blau (1964: 199) stated that, when standards of fairness are met or exceeded “by the magnanimity of others,” people express their appreciation with approval and satisfaction, as opposed to the anger associated with unjust treatment.

As described earlier, job satisfaction reflects a “pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job or job experiences” (Locke, 1976: 1300). Individuals who find themselves in mandatory employment exchange relationships with partners with whom they have established a perceived pattern of negative experiences will be unable to attain a positive emotional state. Again, Affective Events Theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) helps to explain the process by which exchange events (i.e., managers’ word-deed alignment behaviors) can initiate belief structures regarding the trustworthiness of managers. These structures inform the evaluative attitude regarding subordinates’ satisfaction with their jobs.

Empirical evidence also supports this proposed relationship. For example, Dirks and Ferrin (2001) reviewed 12 studies investigating this relationship (albeit with various facets of workplace satisfaction), and all 12 studies demonstrated significant effects. Consequently, trust is expected to be positively related to job satisfaction.

*Hypothesis 6: Subordinates’ trust in managers will be positively related to their job satisfaction.*

### **Partial Mediation of Cynicism in the Trust-Attitudinal Outcome Relationship**

The partial mediation of cynicism examined by Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly (2003) was based on psychological contract breach as the independent variable. The current study proposes a similar partial mediation using trust as the independent variable (i.e., relative to the outcome variables). This argument is based on two points. First, psychological contract breach and perceptions of low BI both involve assessments that managers have failed to meet expected

obligations in the past (Davis & Rothstein, 2006). However, BI is more inclusive in that it also can be based on non-work-related exchanges, as well as perceived breaches experienced by others (Parry & Proctor-Thomson, 2002; Simons, 2002). As such, BI subsumes the perceptions of psychological contract breach.

Second, the assertion in this dissertation is that trust is the mechanism by which backward-looking BI postures subordinates for future exchange relationships. This transition from “past to future” was not specified in Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly’s (2003) model, and the current study suggests that trust represents a useful construct in explaining the link between such violations and organizational cynicism. Therefore, trust is argued to be an appropriate mediating bridge between BI, cynicism, and both attitudinal and behavioral outcomes.

Granted, some of the evidence of the partially mediated relationship is inconsistent. In their study of employee reactions to leaders’ political skill, Treadway et al. (2004) demonstrated that cynicism *fully* mediated the path from trust to organizational commitment. As such, additional empirical research in a different context can potentially add clarity to the boundary conditions surrounding this issue.

To date, only the Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly (2003) study has examined the unique relationship of cynicism for attitudinal but not behavioral outcomes, and only in the context of psychological contract breach. The mechanism they described has gone unexamined in the trust and BI literature, despite BI and trust having demonstrated significant relationships with both attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. This proposed causal path deserves more empirical attention, and the inclusion of BI as a broader concept of perceived violations, and trust as a mediating variable, will better specify the model.

It is reasonable to expect that violations of word-deed alignment that are seen as more global (i.e., low person-specificity) will be associated with the enactment of cynical attitudes, thereby influencing organizational commitment and job satisfaction. By contrast, word-deed misalignment that is considered more personally egregious will have a higher degree of person specificity (i.e., your preacher divulges sensitive information about your friend to a third party), and this will trigger a more behavioral response process. Some support for this argument is found in the justice literature, where deviant behaviors were associated with low interactional and interpersonal justice perceptions (Aquino et al., 1999). Each of these dimensions of justice arguably reflect highly person-specific violations.

Emotion theorists have suggested that, when people perceive a demeaning act against themselves (or someone with whom they are closely connected), they respond with anger and an action tendency (Lazarus, 1991). Subordinates' reactions to highly person-specific BI violations will include highly emotional trust evaluations, leading to action-based outcomes, independent of cynicism (Johnson & O'Leary-Kelly, 2003).

*Hypothesis 7a: Subordinates' cynicism toward their organization will partially mediate the relationship between their trust in managers and (1) organizational commitment and (2) job satisfaction.*

*Hypothesis 7b: Cynicism will not partially or fully mediate the relationship between subordinates' trust in managers and (1) performance or (2) deviant behavior.*

### **Trust – Behavioral Outcomes**

Cook and Wall (1980: 39) stated that “there is no single variable which so thoroughly influences interpersonal and group behavior as does trust.” As with attitudinal outcomes, the literature is rich with research on the direct effect of trust on a number of behavioral outcomes, but the results are inconsistent. In addition to the “relatively small but significant” meta-analytic evidence for the relationship between trust and individual job performance ( $r = .17$ , 21 samples) (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002: 618), the research on the relationship of trust to performance at the unit level is inconsistent at best (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001).

Again, social exchange theory offers a useful framework for exploring the trust-behavioral outcome relationship. Specifically, Gouldner (1960) suggested that negative and positive norms of reciprocity may exist in exchange relationships. Specifically, he and others (e.g., Liden, Sparrowe, & Wayne, 1997; Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003) argued that, just as positive norms create an exchange emphasis based on the obligated return of benefits, negative norms of reciprocity can emphasize the return of injuries in kind. Interestingly, Uhl-Bien and Maslyn (2003) demonstrated that groups with negative norms of reciprocity were associated with lower performance and conscientiousness as rated by the managers. Therefore, a pattern of favorable or unfavorable integrity episodes can initiate a reciprocal exchange relationship that may manifest itself in positive or negative behaviors.

**Trust – task performance.** For decades, organizational theory has acknowledged the need for coordination of human action in order for firms to succeed. For example, Barnard (1938) suggested that a formal organization simply reflected any consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more individuals. Success of the firm depends upon elements such as effective communication, a willingness to cooperate, and having employees willing to direct effort toward a common purpose (Barnard, 1938). This final factor is a function of inducements and sacrifices that represent the employee-organizational exchange. Others have emphasized the importance of influence via supervisory authority and subordinate loyalty (Simon, 1945), the role of leadership and character as aspects of institutionalization (Selznick, 1957), and the inherently political nature of organizations (Mintzberg, 1985).

In their own way, each of these scholars highlighted the importance of relationships between individuals, primarily employees and managers, for successful organizational operations. BI and trust are fundamental to these relationships. Research on leader-member exchange (i.e., Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000) has identified that factors impacting justice perceptions can influence both leader-member exchange quality and individual performance. Erdogan and Liden (2002: 75) summarized this relationship by stating, “the degree to which leaders engage in behaviors that are perceived by members as being fair translates into the extent to which members reciprocate with currencies of value, such as loyalty or job-related behaviors.”

Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) directly espouses the notion that employees who trust their managers will contribute to the exchange relationship by placing “at risk” personal contributions, such as performance, positive attitudes, and extra effort. In a dyadic exchange relationship, managers often respond reciprocally to such contributions by providing subordinates with access to valuable resources and motivating inducements. In addition to the subordinates’ initial input of performance and effort, the access to resources only enhances their future performance potential. In relationships with a demonstrated basis of trust, subordinates become increasingly confident that their invested “costs” (e.g., inputs, effort) will be met with the appropriate “reward,” ultimately reinforcing future cost investments (Emerson, 1976: 349).

Such dynamics also have been described at higher levels of analysis as well. Firms that have trusting relationships, specifically between management and employees, are thought to have advantages over other firms (Davis et al., 2000). Specifically, trust reduces the need for

formal contracts, decreases or eliminates the opportunistic behavior, and reduces the need for hierarchical control (Frink & Klimoski, 1998; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). In addition, Davis et al. (2000) argued that trust appears to meet all of Barney's (1991) criteria for sustained competitive advantage, such that trust adds value by reducing transaction costs, manager-subordinate trust is rare, and trusting relationships are hard to imitate.

Trust permeates multiple processes that contribute to individual and organizational performance beyond simply the effort or performance of the individual. Dirks and Ferrin (2001) reviewed the main effects of trust on workplace outcomes, and found evidence for the relationship of trust with many mechanisms associated with organizational success beyond individual performance (which was consistently significant). For example, trust was shown to relate positively to OCB, communication, involvement in decision making, resource exchange between units, intent to remain with employer, satisfaction, perceptions regarding accuracy of information, compliance, goal and decision acceptance, and was negatively related to individual and team conflict (see Dirks & Ferrin, 2000 for specific studies). For these reasons, the role of trust as a mediator between BI and performance is particularly useful, in that it captures the degree to which BI-based trust evaluations influence a host of critical processes enhancing individual and unit performance.

Two studies lend support to the proximal and distal relationship of BI-trust and unit performance. Davis et al. (2000) conducted a multi-study investigation of the effect of subordinates' trust in restaurant general managers (GMs) on unit performance outcomes associated with competitive advantage. Using Mayer et al.'s (1995) ability, benevolence, and integrity framework for trust, they found that trust in managers was significantly related to sales, profits, and turnover. Using 3-year longitudinal information about manager turnover, the authors were able to demonstrate that trust was based more on the relationship with the GM, and less with the performance of the restaurant, providing evidence for directionality of the trust-performance relationship (Davis et al., 2000). Interestingly, the integrity dimension was most highly correlated with the aggregate trust measure, and was the best predictor of all three unit performance measures.

Simons and McLean-Parks (2007) examined the hypothesized relationship of managers' BI on business unit profitability across 76 hotels. The direct relationship was significant, as was the relationship with the mediating variables of trust in manager, employee affective

commitment, employee discretionary service behavior, and hotel guest satisfaction with service. A significant negative relationship also was found for the partial mediation of employee turnover between commitment and unit profitability. This study is particularly noteworthy in that it provided evidence of a causal path from BI perceptions to other individual-level outcomes, and it established a relationship between those individual outcomes and firm performance. Although this study advanced the empirical support for the BI construct, several aspects of the study distinguish it from the contributions presented in this dissertation.

First, Simons and McLean-Parks (2007) did not examine the role of cynicism as a variable of interest, which may have masked unique relationships with attitudinal outcomes (i.e., commitment) and behavioral outcomes (i.e., turnover, discretionary service behaviors). Second, it did not test the direct link from trust to performance, although the correlation was significantly positive ( $r = .32$ ). Third, similar to Davis et al.'s (2000) study, Simons and McLean-Parks (2007) used only a financial measure for performance, collected only at the unit level. Finally, the construct most closely associated with individual performance (discretionary service behavior) reflected extra-role performance dimension, as opposed to in-role performance, and was collected by self-report measures.

In summary, trust represents the willingness of the trusting agent to be vulnerable to the trusted agent. Exchange relationships in the workplace are based on the reciprocal inducements and contributions associated with role-based expectations (Blau, 1964). As such, in-role or task performance of individuals is particularly important in satisfying the fundamental expectations of the exchange. In this scenario, the trusting subordinate invests effort and other performance inputs to the exchange relationship at the risk of having that contribution go unreciprocated. As subordinates' trust in their managers increases, subordinates will contribute more to the relationship in order to satisfy their exchange partner.

*Hypothesis 8: Subordinates' trust in managers will be positively related to individual performance.*

**Trust - deviant behavior.** Low trust in supervisors creates a condition where employees can easily justify behaviors that run contrary to the best interest of the unit. "In a climate of low trust, employees vent frustration and aggression by attempting to break management rules and



‘get away with it,’ or by setting inappropriate goals which are not conducive to firm performance” (Davis et al., 2000).

Both equity theory (Adams, 1965) and social learning theory (Bandura, 1977) can inform hypotheses regarding this relationship. Equity theory is based on individuals’ cognitive evaluation of the ratio of outcomes they receive relative to the inputs they have invested. This ratio is then compared to that of a referent other, with whom the focal person expects to be situationally comparable. Situations in which the focal person (i.e., subordinate) feels they are under-rewarded relative to the referent other will motivate them to seek equilibrium. Multiple options exist, to include decreasing ones’ inputs (e.g., less effort), increasing ones’ outcomes (e.g., theft), changing the referent other, cognitively or physically manipulating the inputs or outcomes of the referent other (e.g., loafing, stealing, sabotage), or removing oneself from the situation.

Here too, social exchange theory encompasses these justice-related processes. Blau (1964: 144) offered the following insight about justice perceptions in exchange relationships:

*Human beings learn not only from their own experiences, but also by acquiring knowledge through symbolic communication. Individuals compare themselves with others like themselves whom they know or whom they know about, in their own groups and sometimes also in groups to which they aspire to belong, and their knowledge of the rewards these others receive in social life affect the level of social reward they expect to be able to claim.*

Subordinates compare themselves to similar others, but also to any referent group (including the manager) who risked less and received the same or more reward. Their invested input of effort, affect, or even the vulnerability inherent in the trust episode must be perceived as appropriate for the outcome, compared to that of the manager of some other referent group.

In an employment context, subordinates may perceive inequity as a result of an exchange in which the partner did not meet their promised or espoused obligations. For example, Greenberg (1990) found that when manufacturing workers’ pay was temporarily cut by 15% without reasonable justification from management, employee theft rose significantly. This represents an example of employees attempting to re-capture more “outcome” for the amount of input they have contributed.

Dineen et al. (2006) found that BI moderated the relationship between supervisory guidance, defined as “the extent to which supervisors instruct their employees regarding the enactment of positive behaviors and avoidance of negative behaviors,” and the outcomes of OCBs and deviant behaviors (i.e., steal, gossip, let other take blame for their error, call in sick when well, overstate mileage on expense account, and use bank calling card for personal calls). They found a significant positive relationship between guidance and OCBs when subordinates perceived their managers had high BI. Conversely, when subordinates thought their managers were low BI, increased guidance by the managers resulted in significantly fewer OCBs and more deviant behavior.

Although trust was not a construct of interest in their study, it is reasonable to conclude that when trust in managers is low, the experiences leading to that evaluation will create a condition where subordinates feel they are being short-changed in their exchange relationship. Even when violations leading to the low trust happened to someone else, subordinates can rationally seek behavioral solutions that punish the managers or the organization they represent (i.e., referent other) by adjusting inputs and outcomes in their favor.

The role of trust as a mediating variable between accountability and deviant behavior also can inform predictions. Researchers have suggested that highly trusted leaders are frequently relieved of accountability oversight just when their responsibilities become most ambiguous, thereby increasing the probability for dysfunctional behaviors (Hall et al., 2004), such as reckless risk taking, groupthink, and deviant conformity (Ammeter et al., 2004). By contrast, Mitchell et al. (1998) found a negative correlation between strong accountability systems and illegal activity.

Another interesting social dynamic identified in the literature reflects when subordinates mimic what they perceive as questionable behaviors from their leaders. “Trickle-down” deviance has been demonstrated empirically in several studies, where subordinates report higher levels of unethical behaviors when their superiors are perceived as engaging in unethical behaviors (Jones & Kavanaugh, 1996; Simons et al., 2007). Huberts, Kaptein, and Lasthuizen (2007) demonstrated that employees appear to copy their supervisors’ standards of integrity in their daily interactions.

Social learning theory directly aligns with these findings, in that individuals learn through modeling and imitation (Bandura, 1977). This is especially likely to occur when the object commands attention through their power, position, status, competence or control over rewards.

In the politically charged organizational environment (Ferris et al., 2007), subordinates look to their supervisors for informational cues about how to navigate the environment for success. These observations also may serve as a basis for calculating equity comparisons, by signaling an input-to-outcome ratio of a referent other. For example, an employee may observe a manager engaged in embezzlement, only to conclude, “If they are making the big money (i.e., high outcomes) for hardly any work (i.e. low inputs), and I’m working my tail off (high inputs), I deserve a lot more than I’m getting (i.e., higher outcomes).” Similarly, subordinates may mimic inappropriate managerial behavior that apparently is rewarded by the system (e.g., an abusive supervisor who is promoted), as a sign that those behaviors are “how the game is played.”

Simons et al. (2007: 655) found that managers “behaviorally emulate the word-deed alignment they see in their supervisors.” Their empirical study of 107 different hotels demonstrated that BI perceptions can indeed trickle down from one level of managers to another. Middle managers’ perceptions of their senior managers’ BI transferred down to be reflected in how line employees perceived the middle manager. Said another way, if middle managers believed that their superiors did not keep promises, they were more likely to break promises themselves (Simons et al., 2007).

Trust evaluations are based on evaluation of previous actions of managers, whether directly observed or not. Subordinates will use this evaluation to establish strategies for rectifying any inequities regarding their exchange relationship with their supervisors. If subordinates perceive that certain inappropriate actions have resulted in managers gaining advantage or favorable exchanges in the organizational environment, subordinates likely will imitate those behaviors. These modeled behaviors are more likely to be traditionally unfavorable (i.e., deviant) when subordinates have formed perceptions of low trust in their supervisors. Conversely, when subordinates perceive their managers to be trustworthy, the actions they are likely to model will be associated with traditional pro-organizational behaviors.

Again, the level of analysis will be at the individual, reflecting documented deviant acts, such as formal rules violations and honor code violations. Granted, there are likely to be an abundance of deviant acts that cannot be identified, but that underrepresentation is expected to occur similarly across all individuals in the study sample. Horning (1970, as reported by Jones and Kavanaugh, 1996) found that employee deviant behavior is often group supported.

In conclusion, deviant acts represent a lack of willingness to be vulnerable to another party. Indeed, these acts are arguably an attempt to exploit the vulnerability of the other party and pursue self-interested outcomes in anticipation of, or in response to, exchange violations by the other party. Subordinates with high trust in their managers will minimize such actions, and will act in ways that satisfy the premises of integrity and benevolence toward their exchange partner.

*Hypothesis 9: Subordinates' trust in managers will be negatively related to deviant behaviors.*

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **METHOD**

This chapter presents the methodology employed to test key hypotheses in this dissertation. In particular, it provides a description of design considerations, samples, questionnaires used to measure participant perceptions and both attitudinal and behavioral outcomes, and the data analysis tools employed to test the hypothesized relationships found in Chapter 3.

Consistent with the recommendations of Rosnow and Rosenthal (1989), several features were incorporated into the methods and measures to increase confidence in the validity of the findings. These features include the selection of a data collection site with many natural controls, standardized instructions, and the emphasis of confidentiality of responses from subordinates.

Finally, mitigations and controls were used to reduce the incidence and effects of common method bias and confounds (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Common method bias represents one of the primary sources of measurement error that threatens the validity of research conclusions (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Self-report surveys are particularly prone to artifactual findings (Hinkin & Schriesheim, 2009). So, in an effort to proactively address common method concerns, this study introduced a number of precautions in questionnaire design and administration recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003). These included assuring participant confidentiality, collecting data from different sources, introducing temporal lags in variable measurement, and using different questionnaire sections, instructions, and response scales for different measures. Also, a pilot test was used to ensure that scale items were properly interpreted.

#### **Participants and Procedures**

*A priori* sample size calculations typically are not conducted for Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) analysis, especially with a large number of manifest indicators in a complex model. Instead, general guidelines exist that recommend appropriate sample sizes based on scale

complexity, number of variables, or the number of indicators. For example, Bentler and Chou (1987) suggested five to ten cases per parameter estimate, whereas Anderson and Gerbing (1988) suggested a minimum number of 150 cases to test structural models in order to avoid nonconvergence and improper solutions. By contrast, Hu and Bentler (1999) noted that samples with less than 250 cases may be subject to an increased risk of Type I error rates.

Cohen (1992) stated that sample size is a function of the willingness to accept a Type I error ( $\alpha$  level), the estimated effect size of the relationship, and the power needed to properly reject a null hypothesis. The literature associated with the constructs of interest in this study suggests the presence of moderate to strong effect sizes across the model. For example, correlations between BI and trust consistently approach .70 (e.g., Hinkin & Schriesheim, 2009), and a meta analysis on the consequences of trust (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002) demonstrated correlations with attitudinal outcomes well above .50. These relationships correspond to medium to large effect sizes classified by Cohen (1992), requiring a smaller sample than would be necessary if the relationships were weaker. This study had a final sample size of 159 subjects with useable time1 and time 2 survey pairs. This number exceeds Anderson and Gerbing's (1988) guidance of a minimum of 150 cases for proper model convergence.

### **Participants**

Freshman and junior undergraduate students from a military university were electronically surveyed. The student population at this university was remarkably standardized in their age (ranging from 18 to 24), organizational experiences, and high degree of academic performance prior to entry. For example, the university admissions website stated that the freshman class to be surveyed had an average SAT score of 1300, all students entered the university on the same day, went through an identical socialization process, ate the same meals, and had similar academic and non-academic schedules. No students at the university are allowed to have dependents, be married, or have any serious medical condition. This environment obviously created a natural system of controls on many key variables (so much so that the university is often called a "leadership laboratory"). Due to university entry requirements, all subjects could speak and read English at an advanced level, and were very familiar with electronic survey administration.

The university is divided into 40 operational 120-student units called squadrons, each with its own formal student chain of command. Students are randomly assigned to their

squadrons upon entry their freshman year, and remain there for the entire four-year program. These squadrons and their internal hierarchy are responsible for military and physical training, discipline, and administrative operations. Within each squadron are three sub-units called flights, made up of three “elements.” The element is the smallest operational unit in the hierarchy, each one with a designated element leader in charge (9 elements per squadron).

The element leader position is held by a junior, who is personally responsible for the element’s performance, as well as the welfare and performance of up to nine other freshman, sophomore, and junior cadets. The relationship between element leaders and their subordinates represents the heart of the squadron operations. Each element leader is accountable for and evaluated on his or her ability to mentor, discipline, motivate, and administratively manage these other students. At any one time, the school has 320 element leaders, and approximately 2,500 element members.

By contrast, the squadron commander position is held by a senior cadet, with each squadron having one commander. This position oversees all operations of cadet activities, and directly supervises a staff of ranked and unranked junior cadets, who, in turn, oversee, the next level of cadets, and so on. As such, all junior cadets report to one of 40 squadron commanders.

All leadership roles change each semester with no repeat position holders. Because freshmen at this school are in the lowest organizational positions, they all occupy only the role of an element member, and must adhere to very standardized levels of performance in areas of knowledge, military decorum, bearing, room and uniform standards, and fitness. Junior cadets are evaluated on equally specific leadership-focused outcomes and standards in addition to decorum, bearing and inspection performance. In the organizational hierarchy, the power distance, interaction frequency, and familiarity between freshmen cadets and their element leaders is comparable of that between junior cadets and their squadron commanders.

Subjects for this study were recruited from a research subject pool populated by students in a freshmen-level psychology and junior-level leadership courses. Voluntary participation was rewarded with an extra credit percentage point in their respective courses.

## **Procedures**

**Pilot study.** To ensure that the survey instructions, measures, and technologies operated as expected, 40 undergraduate students enrolled in a sophomore-level military (ROTC) class at a large state university were approached for participation in a pilot study. This sample

organization mirrored the military university's organizational structure in many ways, and had four sub-units (flights) that paralleled the squadrons in the primary study. Thirty-one subjects participated in the study, reflecting a 77.5% response rate. The pilot sample was large enough to ensure a sampling of subordinates from across all four flights, and was reasonable for reliability calculations.

All sophomore cadets were informed during class about a voluntary opportunity to participate in an upcoming 2-part survey. Interested subjects were given the experimenter's e-mail address. Upon making contact with the researcher, subjects were sent a link to the electronic survey, which included the informed consent information, and explanation of the second phase of the process (survey 2). Subjects had 3 days to complete the first survey (Appendix D). One day after the closeout date of the first survey, the compiled e-mail distribution list was used to send the subjects survey 2 (Appendix E). Again, subjects had 3 days to complete survey 2. A self-reported performance measure (fitness test score) was included in the Time 2 survey. A deviant performance measure was not gathered, since no demerit program existed at the pilot study site. Upon submitting the second survey, subjects were directed to a screen that informed them about the purpose of the study, and provided contact information for any questions they had.

Results of the pilot test identified strengths as well as opportunities for improvement in the measures and methodology. The means, standard deviations, scale reliabilities, and Pearson product correlations are presented in Table 1. Results indicated that the scale reliabilities were satisfactory, ranging from .79 to .96, and construct means were within a reasonable range on a 5-point scale. The correlation between BI and trust ( $r = .82, p < .01$ ) was slightly higher than the relationship typically found in the BI literature ( $r = \sim .73$ ), increasing concern about discriminant validity. As a result, the two measures were physically separated in the main survey (in the pilot test, they were sequentially positioned), and a more conceptually appropriate trust measure was selected for the main study. Specifically, Schoorman and Ballinger's (2006) trust scale was modified to emphasize a more future-oriented expectation of trust. The majority of the correlations were in the expected direction, with the exception of trust and performance having a



Table 1: Pilot test results: Means, standard deviations, and Pearson product correlations.

	Mean	Std Dev	$\alpha$	BI	Trust	Cynicism	Job Sat	Commit
<b>BI</b>	3.89	.81	<b>.96</b>	--				
<b>Trust</b>	3.16	1.17	<b>.93</b>	.82**	--			
<b>Cynicism</b>	2.16	.68	<b>.84</b>	-.61**	-.38*	--		
<b>Job Sat</b>	4.16	.53	<b>.79</b>	.13	.05	-.44*	--	
<b>Commitment</b>	4.10	.63	<b>.83</b>	-.16	-.17	-.24	.64**	--
<b>Performance</b>	89.2	6.82	--	-.31	-.41*	.04	.28	.27

\*  $p < .05$

\*\*  $p < .01$

negative correlation. This finding was arguably more a function of the performance measure (i.e., physical fitness test score from the beginning of the semester) than an indicator of leader-influenced task performance.

**Main study.** The actual study also included a longitudinal (Time 1 and Time 2) data collection format, with each portion taking approximately 15 minutes to complete. Freshmen students were notified about the research opportunity by their respective instructors and the research subject pool coordinator. Interested subjects obtained a tear-off sheet from a research volunteer board which instructed them to e-mail the researcher for the link to the first survey (Appendix F). Students had two weeks in which they could volunteer and e-mail the researcher.

Upon e-mailing the researcher, volunteers received a response e-mail thanking them for their interest and directing them to the survey website. After logging into the survey site, participants were presented with informed consent information, which required subjects to select an option indicating their consent. Participants provided their personal “laundry code” (first initial and last 4 digits of their social security number) as a way to link Time 1 and Time 2 survey data, as well as the performance scores, while masking the subjects’ identity. Subjects also answered the survey questions regarding the BI of their element leader, trust in element leader, and trait cynicism, as well as several other measures for exploratory research.

After completion of the survey, subjects were directed to a screen that notified them that a second survey link would be e-mailed to them in approximately 1 month. A reminder e-mail was sent out to all volunteers to remind those who had not completed the survey that they must do so prior to the end of the two-week window.

Six weeks after the closeout of the first survey date, an e-mail was sent to all initial volunteers with a link to the second survey (Appendix G). This survey again asked for the

“laundry code,” the number of demerits they have been awarded (regardless of amnesty) in the current semester, scales on job satisfaction, organizational commitment, demographic information (i.e., race, squadron number), and scales related to variables for exploratory research. After completion, subjects were directed to a debriefing screen which described the purpose of the study, provided contact information, and presented a certificate for one credit point for participation. Subjects had 1 week to complete the second survey, and the e-mail list was again used to remind volunteers when the timeline was ending.

The objective measure of individual performance was made available through the university’s data collection system at the end of the school year. Specifically, at this institution, individuals are evaluated each semester on overall military performance by a multi-dimensional Military Performance Average (MPA) score. This rating has a significant impact on immediate and distal outcomes for the students, such as probationary status, class order of merit, pilot slot assignments, and career field selection order. The MPA score reflects both subjective and objective evaluations, targeting clearly defined competencies expected of each student at their respective point in their university experience. The subjective MPA component reflects ratings by the students’ supervisor, mentor, coaches (if applicable), 3 randomly selected peers in their unit, and instructors. By contrast, the objective component of the total MPA score includes grades from inspections and proficiency tests. These inputs are weighted and calculated by the university, with each student receiving a single MPA score every semester.

A list of study participants’ laundry ID codes was provided to the university data manager, who matched the codes to the individuals’ respective MPA scores. All data was transferred to an SPSS database stored on a password-protected computer in the researcher’s secured office 1,619 miles from the data collection site. Once all data was collected and matched (i.e., Time 1-2 data, MPA scores), the identifiers (i.e. laundry ID#s) were removed from the records to ensure participant anonymity. At no time did the researcher know the identity of the subjects.

## **Measures**

A number of the measures in this dissertation required minor modifications to reflect unique terminology of the data collection site. For example, the word “manager” was replaced with “flight commander” or “squadron commander,” and “work group” with “flight” or

“squadron.” Similarly, certain scale items (e.g., relating to changing organizations) were deemed to not be applicable. For example, military enlistment commitments often leaving an organization in protest an unlikely option. All changes were made to preserve the intent of the item. All scales used in this study were adapted from previously tested and validated measures found in empirical research studies, with demonstrated reliability exceeding Nunnally’s (1978) recommended threshold of .70.

### **Behavioral Integrity**

Subordinates’ perceptions of their managers’ BI were measured using a modified version of the 8-item measure developed and validated by Simons et al. (2007). The items are scored on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1=*strongly disagree*, 4=*neither agree nor disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*). Sample questions include, “There is a match between my manager’s words and actions,” “My manager does what he/she says he/she will do,” and “When my manager promises something, I can be certain that it will happen.” Evidence of scale validity and reliability were demonstrated across cultures and multiple studies (e.g., Hinkin & Schriesheim, 2009; Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007).

### **Trust in Manager**

An adaptation of Schoorman and Ballinger’s (2006) 7-item trust scale was used on the first survey. This scale was highlighted by Schoorman, Mayer and Davis (2007: 348) in their major review of trust literature, calling it “the most promising trust measure to date.” Items were re-framed in the future tense in order to emphasize the “forward looking” operationalization of trust relative to the “backward looking” BI construct (Simons, 2002). This adjustment also highlighted the important issue of risk and vulnerability associated with having the leader as a future exchange partner. Finally, references to “supervisor” were changed to “element leader” or “squadron commander,” as appropriate. Sample questions were, “My supervisor will keep my interests in mind when making decisions,” and “I can be comfortable being creative in the future because my supervisor understands that sometimes creative solutions do not work.” Responses were scored on a 7-point Likert scale (1=*strongly disagree*, 4=*neither agree nor disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*).

### **Organizational Cynicism**

A seven-item measure of subordinates’ organizational cynicism, adapted from the scale developed by Wilkerson, Evans, and Davis (2008), was used for this study. Since there does not

appear to be a standard organizational cynicism scale, Wilkerson et al. (2008) created the scale to reflect the prominent conceptualization of organizational cynicism as an employee attitude comprised of beliefs and expectancy. Previous examination of this scale demonstrated unidimensionality and favorable reliability ( $\alpha=.86$ ) (Wilkerson et al., 2008). All items used a 7-point Likert-type response scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). A sample question is, “Any efforts to make things better around here are likely to succeed” [reverse coded].

### **Job Satisfaction**

For subordinates’ ratings of job satisfaction, a five-item subscale adapted from Brayfield and Rothe’s (1951) index was used. Sample items included, “Each day of work seems like it will never end” [reversed coded] and “Most days I am enthusiastic about my work.” Scale responses ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). This subscale has been used in other studies (e.g., Breaux et al., 2008), and has demonstrated favorable reliability.

### **Organizational Commitment**

Due to the limitations of military subjects to leave their organization, continuance and normative commitment were determined to not be appropriate. Instead, this study focused on affective commitment to the organization (Meyer et al., 1993). In addition, in their meta-analysis of the dimensions of commitment, Meyer et al. (2002) found that affective commitment had the strongest and most favorable correlations with organization- and employee-relevant outcomes. An adaptation of Meyer et al.’s (1993) 6-item scale was used, including 3 reverse-coded items. Items were scored on a 7-point scale (1= *strongly disagree* and 7 = *strongly agree*), and included statements such as “I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to this organization” [Reverse coded], and “This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me.” This scale has demonstrated evidence of validity in previous studies (e.g., Allen & Meyer, 1996).

### **Individual Performance**

As discussed earlier, at the end of the semester, each participant received an MPA score, comprised of objective and subjective components from a number of different sources. The rating scale ranged from 0 (lowest performance) to 5.0 (highest performance), with scores rounded to the nearest tenth of a point. Objective ratings included inspection scores, knowledge

tests, and fitness scores, whereas subjective ratings included ratings from officer, enlisted, and cadet raters representing their immediate chain of command, faculty, peers, coaches, and club advisors. These dimensions were combined to produce an overall MPA score.

### **Deviant (Counterproductive) Behaviors**

Students at this university who fail to meet certain standards of performance or violate rules receive formally documented demerits, along with other punishments, from their chain of command. All punishments are accompanied by demerits, with more egregious offenses having higher associated demerits. The university has established demerit thresholds, above which students are placed in probationary status, and face restricted privileges and possible removal from the university.

Demerit counts were collected in this study in the Time 2 e-mail survey. Six weeks after the closeout day of the initial (Time 1) survey window, subjects were e-mailed a follow-up survey question and asked, “Please state the number of demerits you have been awarded for offenses that occurred in the current semester.” Due to a strict honor code at the university, and the public nature of the demerit awarding process, there was little reason to expect this self-report to be inaccurate.

As a method to check the accuracy of this self report, the demerit totals for 4 cadets were evaluated against the cadets’ probation status (provided by the institution, and identified only by laundry ID number to protect cadet anonymity). Although limited in its detail, this comparison would have identified obvious inconsistencies with the self-reports. In all four cases, those cadets who reported an exceptionally large number of demerits were, indeed, on an appropriate probationary status. By contrast, cadets who reported no demerits did not show up on a probation list. These results provided some confidence in the accuracy of the demerit reports.

### **Control Variables**

As mentioned above, the data collection site in this study included many natural elements of control. For example, students are randomly assigned to squadrons in which they spend their next four years, with a consistent gender combination (~20%) ensured across units. Due to federal requirements for commissioning, age for the total student population ranges from 18 to 24, with freshmen students typically ranging from 18 to 21 years old. All students must be

unmarried, have no dependents, and may not have any major physical or psychological handicaps.

Certain regulations even minimize socioeconomic status factors, especially at the freshmen level. For example, all freshmen are paid the same amount in a monthly stipend, are permitted to wear only issued clothing, are not allowed to have cars, televisions or radios, and are significantly restricted in their ability to leave the university. Entry requirements to the university are extremely rigorous, with most students having been in the top 5% of their high school class, a member of student government, and a varsity sport letter winner.

With regard to their experience with their respective element leader or squadron commander (i.e., relationship tenure), all freshmen enter the university on the same day, and are introduced to their upperclassmen in a similar fashion. Because element leader and squadron commander positions change every semester, all subordinates have reasonably similar formal relationship tenures with their respective leaders.

Despite that, several controls were included in this study to mitigate rival explanations for dissertation findings. Certain variables have been identified in the relevant literature as significantly relating to one or more variables of interest in this study. Controlling for their effect on variables in the model will minimize their confounding effects and enhance the internal validity of the study inferences (Schwab, 2005).

### **Race**

Simons et al. (2007) demonstrated that there were racial differences in BI perceptions and resultant ratings of trust and attitudinal outcomes, with Black subordinates rating their Black managers more harshly on BI than they rated white managers and more harshly than white subordinates rated their managers. As a result, all subjects identified their racial category as a control measure.

### **Trait Cynicism**

Trait cynicism represents an innate tendency to possess a general negative perception of human behavior (Abraham, 2000). Because trait cynicism is conceptualized as a personality characteristic, it is expected to affect individuals' reactions to a wide variety of circumstances (Hochwarter, James, Johnson, & Ferris, 2004). Individuals high in trait cynicism experience a deep-rooted mistrust based upon the perceptions that the world is fraught with individuals that are dishonest, conniving, and selfish. This consistent predisposition has obvious implications

for the measurement of organizational cynicism perceptions, and, therefore, must be controlled. Individual trait cynicism was measured using a modified version of the scale developed by Kanter and Mirvis (1989;  $\alpha = .82$ ). “People pretend to care more than they actually do” is a representative item. A seven-point response format (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*) was used.

**Mindless response.** To identify possible mindless responses, a question was placed half-way through each instrument to mitigate programmed responses. The item read “Please do not answer this question if you are paying attention to this survey.” Any response to these items resulted in all the data associated with this subject being removed from consideration for analysis.

### **Exploratory Variables**

Several additional variables were collected for future analyses. These constructs are discussed briefly in the “exploratory analyses” portion of the analysis and discussion sections, identifying potential areas for future research. The scales were included in the same surveys used in the primary study. Specifically, the variables collected in survey one included task ambiguity and managers’ political skill (as rated by subordinates). Survey two included additional scales to measure subordinates’ ratings of their work tension, effort, a self-rating of political skill, leader-member exchange (LMX) quality, and an alternate measure of trust.

## **Analysis**

A total of 232 students sent e-mails indicating interest in the study, and received links to the surveys. 171 (74%) subjects completed both time 1 and time 2 surveys pairs, including useable ID codes and no responses to the mindless scoring questions. Comparative analysis indicated that there were no significant differences in responses for those who completed both time 1 and 2 surveys, compared to those who completed only the time1 survey ( $p > .90$  for all time 1 constructs).

Responses were then reviewed at the item- and scale-level for normality. In addition, scatter plots and boxlots were used to identify outliers and influential cases, and cases with standardized residuals in the trust-BI relationship exceeding 3.0 were examined for removal on a case-by-case basis, using techniques outlined by Schwab (2005). Finally, during the measurement model phase of analysis, case Mahalanobis d-squared values with a  $p$ -value below

.01 were examined for scoring peculiarity and removed, if appropriate. In the end, 159 useable time 1 and 2 survey pairs were available for analysis, representing 69% of those students who initially indicated interest in the study.

## Subjects

Subject volunteers were sampled from two undergraduate courses at a military institution. After removing unuseable data and eliminating outliers as described above, 77 freshmen cadets and 82 junior cadets participated in the study, with all 40 cadet squadrons being represented by at least one participant. The respondents included 8 (5%) African American, 10 (6.3%) Asian, 129 (81.3%) Caucasian, 8 (5%) Hispanic, 1 (.6%) Native Americans, and 3(1.9%) “other” subjects. As shown in Table 2, the ethnic profile of the sample was fairly consistent with the demographic makeup of the current total student population (per the university’s admissions office website).

Table 2: Comparison of study participant and student population racial representations

Demographic Group	Study Participants	University Population
African American	5.0% (8*)	6.0%
Asian	6.3% (10)	6.6%
Caucasian	81.3% (129)	77.0%
Hispanic	5.0% (8)	9.5%
Native American	0.6% (1)	0.9%
Other	1.9% (3)	NA

\* Actual number of subjects in study are shown in parentheses

## Measurement Model

Psychometric soundness of the scales and overall model quality were evaluated using the 2-step approach recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). Specifically, in the first step, the measurement model used confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS 18.0 to assess the item and scale reliabilities, convergent validity, and discriminant validity.

Item reliability was assessed by examining the individual item loadings on their corresponding constructs. Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggested a cutoff of .70 or greater for item loading, indicating items that have more explanatory power than error variance. However, in this study, some items with loadings below this threshold were maintained in order to preserve the conceptual intent of the construct, so long as the final construct reliability (CR) exceeded .70. Table 3 presents the standardized loadings for each item on its respective construct.



Table 3: Initial and revised scale analysis

	Survey 1			Survey 2		
	Behavioral Integrity	Trust	Trait Cynicism	Org Cynicism	Job Satisfaction	Commitment
Item 1	.79	.76	.54	.72	.84	.47*
Item 2	.88	.62	.73	.77	.44*	.41*
Item 3	.82	.42*	.51	.77	.89	.90
Item 4	.88	.57	.58	.54*	.45*	.85
Item 5	.81	-.14*	.55	.63	.77	.87
Item 6	.83	.40*	.59	.66		.67
Item 7	.86	.59				
Item 8	.91					
Construct Reliability **	.95	.74	.76	.83	.87	.89
Average Variance Extracted **	.72	.42	.34	.50	.70	.68
* Items removed in the revised scale						
** Statistics reflect revised scales						

Poorly loading items in each scale were identified for potential removal (indicated with an asterisk in Table 3). Such items were present in the trust, organizational cynicism, job satisfaction, and commitment scales. Consideration was given to ensure that the remaining items still captured the intent of the construct as described in this dissertation. Not surprisingly, several weakly-loading items (i.e., trust items 5 and 6, organizational cynicism item 4, and job satisfaction items 2 and 4) were negatively-worded items. Items with loadings below the .70 cutoff were retained in the trust, organizational cynicism, trait cynicism, and commitment scales in order to preserve the scale intent and, in the case of trust and trait cynicism, their removal had a negative impact on the CR and overall model fit. CR, AVE, and overall fit statistics were calculated for the original and modified scales. Table 4 presents the items included in the final, revised scales for each construct. Negatively worded items remained as such in the actual scale, but were recoded for analysis, and were rephrased in Table 4 to indicate the recoded intention of the items.

Table 4: Final scale items for main study constructs.

Behavioral Integrity	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. There is a match between my El/Ldr's* words and actions.</li> <li>2. My El/Ldr delivers on promises.</li> <li>3. My El/Ldr practices what he/she preaches.</li> <li>4. My El/Ldr does what he/she says he/she will do.</li> <li>5. My El/Ldr conducts him/herself by the same values he/she talks about.</li> <li>6. My El/Ldr shows the same priorities that he/she describes.</li> <li>7. When my El/Ldr promises something, I can be certain that it will happen.</li> <li>8. If my El/Ldr says he/she is going to do something, he/she will.</li> </ol>
Trust in Leader	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. My El/Ldr will keep my interests in mind when making decisions.</li> <li>2. I would be willing to let my El/Ldr have complete control over my future in the squadron/wing.</li> <li>3. I can be comfortable being creative in the future because my El/Ldr understands that sometimes creative solutions do not work.</li> <li>4. If I had my way, I WOULD** let my El/Ldr have any influence over future decisions that are important to me.</li> </ol>
Organizational Cynicism	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Any efforts to make things better around here are NOT likely to succeed.</li> <li>2. USAFA leadership is NOT good at running improvement programs or changing things in our "business."</li> <li>3. Overall, I DO NOT expect more success than disappointment in working at USAFA.</li> <li>4. Suggestions on how to solve problems around here won't produce much real change.</li> <li>5. USAFA as an organization DOES NOT meet my expectations for quality of work life.</li> <li>6. USAFA leadership is more interested in its goals and needs than in its cadets' welfare.</li> </ol>
Job Satisfaction	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Most days I am enthusiastic about my work at USAFA.</li> <li>2. I feel real enjoyment in my "work" at USAFA.</li> <li>3. I feel fairly satisfied with my present "work experience" at USAFA.</li> </ol>
Organizational Commitment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. I DO feel a strong sense of "belonging" to this institution (USAFA).</li> <li>2. I DO feel "emotionally attached" to USAFA .</li> <li>3. I DO feel like "part of the family" at USAFA.</li> <li>4. USAFA has a great deal of personal meaning for me.</li> </ol>
Trait Cynicism	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. In general, people pretend to care more than they actually do.</li> <li>2. Most people will tell lies if they can gain from doing so.</li> <li>3. Unselfish people are often taken advantage of.</li> <li>4. In general, most people are not honest by nature.</li> <li>5. For the most part, people feel put out when asked for help by others.</li> <li>6. If there is money at stake, personal ethics are thrown out the window.</li> </ol>

\* Surveys for junior cadets had "Squadron Commander" in place of Element Leader

\*\* All fully capitalized words (except for "USAFA") represent rewording of negative items

Items Scale reliabilities were calculated for each construct as the ratio of standardized item loading to measurement error, using the following equation:

$$CR = \frac{(\sum \lambda)^2}{(\sum \lambda)^2 + \sum \epsilon}$$

where  $(\sum \lambda)^2$  is the squared sum of the standardized item loadings, and  $\sum \epsilon$  represents the measurement error, calculated as 1 minus the squared standardized loading ( $\lambda^2$ ).

Average variance extracted (AVE) was used to calculate convergent validity and estimate discriminant validity, specifically by showing "convergence in measurement" and

“differentiation in constructs” (Bagozzi, 1981: 376). The difference between calculation of reliability and AVE is that, in the latter case, the lambda loadings are squared before summing, as is indicated in the following equation:

$$AVE = \frac{\sum(\lambda^2)}{\sum(\lambda^2) + \sum\epsilon}$$

AVE in excess of .50 demonstrates evidence of convergent validity in that the variance due to measurement error is less than the variance due to the construct. Although dropping poorly loading items can potentially increase the AVE, consideration must be given to ensuring that the remaining items reflect the construct domain. Prior research has argued that AVE below .50 can still be acceptable, provided the CR is strong and the item-to-total correlations exceed .40 (Bettencourt, 2004).

Evidence of discriminant validity was obtained by comparing each factor’s AVE to the shared variance of pairs of factors (Fornell & Larker, 1981). Specifically, the AVE of a construct should exceed shared variance ( $r^2$ ) between itself and all other variables in the model. Given the expected strong relationships between certain constructs in the proposed model (e.g., BI and Trust), discriminant validity was demonstrated using a “constrained phi” approach (Joreskog, 1971). In this test, the reference factor lambda was released, and the factor variances were each set to 1. The correlation (ksi) was then constrained to equivalence, indicating that the factors represent the same construct. The chi-squared ( $\chi^2$ ) for that model was compared to a model with no such constraints (i.e., the constructs are free to covary). A significantly better fit of the “freed” model to the data indicates evidence of discriminant constructs. As an added measure, a rotated (i.e., oblique promax) factor analysis was conducted to demonstrate that the items loaded naturally and distinctly on their respective constructs.

Overall measurement model fit was assessed via  $\chi^2$  statistic, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Tucker & Lewis index (TLI), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). Since  $\chi^2$  has been shown to be particularly sensitive to sample size, these additional fit indices offer “triangulated” evidence of fit while also being relatively robust to sample size (Bentler & Hu, 1996; Garver & Mentzer, 1999).

### **Measurement Invariance Testing**

Because two groups of subjects were sampled for this study, it was important to demonstrate that the scales were interpreted similarly across groups, and any differences in

results were not the result of the measures themselves. Initial measurement quality analysis was conducted for each group of subjects (i.e., freshmen, juniors) to identify any scale items that loaded poorly across both groups of respondents. Specifically, an initial measurement model analysis similar to that recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) was conducted to identify potentially problematic scale items. Items identified as particularly detrimental across both groups were removed, so that only scales of reasonable quality were analyzed for invariance across the groups.

For this particular study, invariance testing was accomplished by establishing a baseline, multi-group model with no initial constraints on the parameters ( $\chi^2 = 411.4$  df = 232). Next, constraints were added to all parameters that were required to be equal across the groups, and the model was estimated ( $\chi^2 = 437.5$ , df = 246). A  $\chi^2$  difference test was used to examine the significance of the difference between the constrained and unconstrained models, with non-significance supporting the case for full metric invariance. In this case, the difference ( $\Delta \chi^2 = 26.1$ , df = 14) exceeded the critical value (CV = 23.69 for  $p < .05$ ), indicating a lack of full metric invariance. In response, each parameter was individually constrained and released in an attempt to identify which specific items contributed to the variance. For each construct, at least one item, in addition to the reference item, was shown to be invariant, providing evidence for partial metric invariance.

A similar method was used to demonstrate factor variance invariance (i.e., consistency of latent factor variances across groups), in order to compare standardized measures of association, such as correlation coefficients and standardized regression coefficients. Specifically, latent construct variances were set to equality, and then unconstrained to provide a  $\chi^2$  difference test. The  $\chi^2$  difference test demonstrated full factor variance invariance (unconstrained = 411.4, constrained model = 413.5;  $\Delta \chi^2 = 2.1$ , df = 3), well below the critical value (CV = 7.82 for  $p < .05$ ). This evidence supported the case for combining the data across the groups.

### **Structural Model**

Having demonstrated adequate validity and reliability, the structural model was again tested using a number of different fit indices, to include  $\chi^2$ , TLI, CFI and RMSEA. Hu and Bentler (1999) suggested that TLI and CFI levels close to or exceeding .95, and RMSEA close to or below .06 indicate favorable model fit. Good fit suggests that the covariance matrix represented by the proposed model aligns closely with the actual covariance matrix of the data.

Trait cynicism was entered into the model as a control variable relative to the variance in organizational cynicism. To accomplish this, a path was added in the structural model between trait cynicism and organizational cynicism, with covariation allowed between trait cynicism and behavioral integrity (i.e., the two exogenous variables).

### **Mediation Testing**

In order to test the mediation effects proposed throughout the model, Baron and Kenny's (1986) 4-step approach was employed. In each of the mediation tests that included organizational cynicism, the model also included trait cynicism as a control variable. A path from this construct to organizational cynicism was modeled, and trait cynicism was allowed to covary with the other exogenous variables in the mediation model (i.e., BI, trust).

The first condition needed to demonstrate evidence of mediation is satisfied if the independent variable significantly ( $p < .05$ ) affects the proposed mediator (path A). The second condition is satisfied if the mediating variable affects the dependent variable (path B). Structural equation modeling allows for the simultaneous investigation of these relationships by modeling the three variables as the hypothesized model.

The third condition is satisfied if the independent variable has a significant direct affect on the dependent variable, in isolation from the mediator variable paths (path C). It is important to note that this third condition is not universally accepted as a fundamental necessity for mediation testing. For example, Iacobucci, Saldanha, and Deng (2007) described the controversy surrounding this issue. Although some scholars have argued that the significance of path C is imperative (e.g., suggesting the absence of significance means there is no relationship to mediate), others have proposed that if the mediation is complete through a single or multiple mediators, "then the direct path may be properly insignificant" (Iacobucci et al, 2007: 142).

Finally, Baron and Kenny's (1986) fourth condition for mediation is satisfied by testing the full model. Evidence for mediation exists if the path from the independent variable to the dependent variable (path C) becomes non-significant or is significantly reduced after the introduction of the mediator into the model. Partial mediation is indicated if path C is only reduced slightly in the full test. Sobel (1982) provided an approximate significance test for the indirect effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable via the mediator. The Sobel test statistic ( $z$ ) offers further support for the significance of the indirect effect of the mediator.

Partial mediation is indicated if both the Sobel  $z$ -score and path C are significant or if the  $z$ -score is not significant, but paths A, B, and C are (Iacobucci et al., 2007).

## CHAPTER FIVE

### RESULTS

The following section presents the results associated with the study measures and analysis, as described in the previous chapter. This chapter begins with the measurement model step of Anderson and Gerbing's (1988) two-step approach. Next, having established evidence for the factorial structure of the scales, the descriptive statistics and intercorrelations are presented, as well as a short discussion about control variables. Then, the structural model results are discussed, addressing the specific hypotheses of the study, to include hypotheses regarding the mediation of key variables. Finally, results of a number of analyses for exploratory variables related to BI are offered.

#### Measurement Model

An item-level measurement model was used to demonstrate that the scale items properly loaded on their respective, distinct constructs. The results of the measurement model are shown in Table 5. The scales presented include only those items remaining after the initial revisions discussed in the previous chapter.

Table 5: Convergent and discriminant validity tests

Variable	Scale Construct Reliability	Mgr BI	Trust	Org Cynicism	Job Sat	Commit	TraitCyn
Mgr Behavioral Integrity	.95	<b>.72</b>					
Trust in Leader	.74	.56	<b>.42</b>				
Organizational Cynicism	.76	.02	.07	<b>.34</b>			
Job Satisfaction	.87	.04	.05	.29	<b>.50</b>		
Commitment	.89	.01	.11	.22	.26	<b>.68</b>	
<i>Trait Cynicism (control)</i>	.83	.04	.14	.04	.06	.00	<b>.50</b>

Shared variances are depicted below the diagonal;  
Average Variance Extracted is depicted in bold on the diagonal

## Convergent Validity

As is evident in Table 5, the revised scales' CR levels ranged from .74 to .95, well in excess of Nunnally's (1978) recommended .70 cutoff. The revised trust and trait cynicism scales did not reach the recommended .50 AVE threshold, although they both demonstrated high CR (i.e., .74 and .76, respectively). Consistent with previous research (e.g., Bettencourt, 2004), it was decided that shortening the number of items further in pursuit of improved AVE was not necessary, considering the high CR, the fact that all item-to-total correlations exceeded .40 (i.e., trust items ranged from .42-.63; organizational cynicism ranged from .52-.72), and that further item loss would impact the reflection of the construct domain. Therefore, the revised scales were deemed acceptable for subsequent measurement model analysis.

## Discriminant Validity

The comparison of factor AVEs to shared variance identified one construct pair that violated Fornell and Larcker's (1981) test of discriminant validity. Specifically, the particularly low AVE of the trust construct (.42) failed to exceed the particularly high shared variance between trust and BI (.56). Although these constructs were expected to be highly related due to their conceptual relationship, it was appropriate to demonstrate that these constructs are, in fact, distinct. Discriminant validity was demonstrated using a "constrained phi" approach (Joreskog, 1971), as described in the previous chapter. Table 6 shows that the constrained versus unconstrained models generated a  $\chi^2$  difference score of 43.2 (1 df), demonstrating significantly better fit for the "freed" model. Although this method is less stringent than Fornell and Larcker's (1981) test, it still provides reasonable evidence for discriminant validity.

Table 6: Constrained phi test results for behavioral integrity – trust discrimination.

		Fixed		Freed		Difference
Factor Pairing		$\chi^2$	df	$\chi^2$	df	(Crit Value =3.84)
Beh Integ	--> Trust	211.8	54	168.6	53	43.2

As further evidence of the distinction between these two constructs, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the items included in these two scales. Table 7 presents the factor loadings for the respective BI and trust items, demonstrating a clear separation across constructs. In addition, the rotated factor analysis extracted only two factors with eigenvalues exceeding 1.0.



Table 7: Behavioral integrity and trust exploratory factor loadings (PROMAX rotation)

Scale Item	Component	
	1	2
My El/Ldr does what he/she says he/she will do. (BI)*	<b>.950</b>	-.091
My El/Ldr delivers on promises. (BI)	<b>.923</b>	-.049
My El/Ldr practices what he/she preaches. (BI)	<b>.874</b>	-.025
If my El/Ldr says he/she is going to do something, he/she will. (BI)	<b>.868</b>	.060
My El/Ldr conducts him/herself by the same values he/she talks about. (BI)	<b>.835</b>	.022
When my El/Ldr promises something, I can be certain that it will happen. (BI)	<b>.831</b>	.046
My El/Ldr shows the same priorities that he/she describes. (BI)	<b>.803</b>	.073
There is a match between my El/Ldr's words and actions. (BI)	<b>.788</b>	.066
I would be willing to let my El/Ldr have complete control over my future in the squadron/wing. (Trust)	-.019	<b>.777</b>
My El/Ldr will keep my interests in mind when making decisions. (Trust)	.138	<b>.725</b>
I can be comfortable being creative in the future because my El/Ldr understands that sometimes creative solutions do not work. (Trust)	-.067	<b>.720</b>
If I had my way, I wouldn't let my El/Ldr have any influence over future decisions that are important to me. (Trust)	.015	<b>.704</b>

\* Scale construct in parentheses

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

## Measurement Model Fit

Fit of the measurement model to the data was conducted on both the original scales and the revised scales within each survey, and combined across surveys. In all cases, the revised scales produced an improved fit over the initial scales, offering further support for the decision to drop the problematic items. Table 8 presents the final measurement model fit statistics for the revised surveys individually, as well as in the combined model. The results indicate good fit of the measurement model to the data.

Table 8: Measurement model fit statistics with and across surveys 1 and 2

Meas. Model Fit*	$\chi^2$	CFI	TLI	RMSEA
Survey 1	277.50 (df = 132)	.90	.91	.08
Survey 2	153.6 (df = 62)	.90	.92	.10
Combined	678.3 (df = 419)	.90	.91	.06
* Statistics reflect revised scales CFI: Comparative Fit Index; TLI: Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA: Root mean square error of approximation				

## Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations

Table 9 provides descriptive statistics and Pearson product correlations of variables in the main study.

Table 9: Descriptive statistics for main study variables.

Variable	Mean	StdDev	Mgr BI	Trust	Org Cynicism	Job Sat	Commit	TraitCyn	DevBeh
Mgr Behavioral Integrity	5.71	1							
Trust in Leader	4.51	1.12	.75**						
Organizational Cynicism	4.13	1.06	-.13	-.27*					
Job Satisfaction	4.74	1.23	.21*	.23*	-.54**				
Commitment	5.01	1.32	.11	.34**	-.48**	.50**			
<i>Trait Cynicism (control)</i>	4.41	.95	-.19	-.37**	.20*	-.25*	.00		
Deviant Behav (demerits)	1.33	6.18	-.25**	-.26**	.05	.12	-.01	.00	
Job Performance (MPA)	3.06	.24	-.02	.00	-.03	.23**	.01	-.03	-.23**

\* Significant at  $p < .05$

\*\* Significant at  $p < .01$

As expected, BI and trust were highly correlated at a level consistent with that seen in the literature ( $r = .75, p < .01$ ). BI also was significantly and positively correlated with job satisfaction ( $r = .21, p < .05$ ), and negatively related to deviant behavior (i.e., the number of demerits received;  $r = -.25, p < .01$ ). Trust was significantly and positively related to both job satisfaction ( $r = .23, p < .05$ ) and organizational commitment ( $r = .34, p < .01$ ), and negatively related to organizational cynicism ( $r = -.27, p < .05$ ), trait cynicism ( $r = -.37, p < .01$ ), and deviant behavior ( $r = -.26, p < .01$ ). Organizational cynicism correlated significantly in the expected directions with trait cynicism ( $r = .20, p < .05$ ), job satisfaction ( $r = -.54, p < .01$ ) and organizational commitment ( $r = -.48, p < .01$ ). Job satisfaction was significantly and positively related to commitment ( $r = .50, p < .01$ ) and performance ( $r = .23, p < .01$ ), and negatively related to trait cynicism ( $r = -.25, p < .05$ ). Deviant behavior, although related to BI and trust as stated earlier, was not significantly related to organizational cynicism. However, it was inversely related to performance ( $r = -.23, p < .01$ ). Performance was positively related to job satisfaction and negatively related to deviant behavior.

### Common Method Bias Consideration

Common method bias always should be given consideration, especially when independent and dependent variables are collected from the same self-reporting source. In addition to a number of proactive measures taken to reduce the effect of common method bias (e.g., longitudinal measurement, multiple sources, emphasized anonymity, pilot testing), statistical evaluation was also conducted. The presence of correlations among variables within and across the two surveys that equaled zero (i.e., role ambiguity, tension) indicated that no downward adjustment of the remaining correlations (per Lindell & Whitney, 2001) was necessary to account for a common method effect. These results, in concert with the proactive measures, offer evidence that common method bias is not a significant concern in this study.

### Control Variable Consideration

In addition to trait cynicism, subjects' race also was measured as a control variable, since Simons et al. (2007) found evidence that African American subordinates rated managers' BI significantly differently than their white counterparts. Table 10 presents an analysis of variance (ANOVA) table testing the significance of mean BI ratings across racial groups.

Table 10: T-test comparisons of behavioral integrity ratings for primary group (Caucasians) and other racial groups.

Racial Group Comparison	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant) Caucasian	5.67	.09		63.89	.00
vs African American	.00	.37	.00	.01	.99
vs Asian	.44	.33	.11	1.35	.18
vs Hispanic	.19	.37	.04	.52	.60
vs Native American	.21	1.01	.02	.21	.84
vs "Other"	.33	.59	.05	.56	.57

Each racial category was dummy coded (0 or 1), with k-1 groups represented. Because the "Caucasian" category was the most represented group, it was used as the comparison. Table 10 shows that, for this sample, racial subgroup did not significantly affect the ratings of BI. Specifically, comparisons of Caucasian BI responses with all other racial subgroups produced no significance differences close to  $p < .05$ . Similar analyses were conducted on all other variables in the main study, and no significant racial group differences emerged. As such, including racial group as a construct in the model was deemed unnecessary.

## Structural Model

The conceptualized paths were tested in a single structural model, again using AMOS 18. Trait cynicism was modeled as a control variable for organizational cynicism, in an effort to capture variance in organizational cynicism that was, in reality, a trait-based effect. Including trait cynicism as a control for all other variables in the model was determined to be theoretically unjustified, and would only diminish model parsimony.




Figure 3. Structural model results

\* =  $p < .05$

\*\* =  $p < .01$

The overall hypothesized model demonstrated reasonable fit to the data ( $\chi^2 = 812$ ,  $df = 487$  [normed  $\chi^2 = 1.67$ ]; TLI = .88; CFI = .89; RMSEA = .07). All paths were in the predicted direction, and, with the exception of the paths from trust to both job satisfaction and performance, all proposed paths were significant to at least  $p < .05$  (see Figure 1). The following section reports the results of the study relative to the specific hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** *Subordinates' perception of managers' behavioral integrity will be positively (and highly) related to their ratings of trust in the managers. Supported: ( $\beta = .74, p < .01$ ).*

**Hypothesis 2:** *Subordinates' trust in supervisors will be negatively related to subordinates' cynicism toward the organization. Supported ( $\beta = -.21, p < .05$ ).*

**Hypothesis 3:** *Subordinates' cynicism will be negatively related to their organizational commitment. Supported ( $\beta = -.46, p < .01$ ).*

**Hypothesis 4:** *Subordinates' cynicism will be negatively related to their job satisfaction. Supported ( $\beta = -.55, p < .01$ ).*

**Hypothesis 5:** *Subordinates' trust in managers will be positively related to their organizational commitment. Supported: ( $\beta = .18, p < .05$ ).*

**Hypothesis 6:** *Subordinates' trust in managers will be positively related to their job satisfaction. Not supported. Although trust in manager was positively and significantly correlated with job satisfaction ( $r = .23, p < .05$ ), the regression path did not reach significance in the full model ( $\beta = .12, p = .14$ ).*

**Hypothesis 7a and 7b:** The conclusions regarding Hypotheses 7a and 7b reflect mediation tests presented in Table 11. The hypothesized premise is that organizational cynicism only mediates the relationship between trust and attitudinal outcomes, and not behavioral outcomes. Because organizational cynicism was a variable in the mediation tests, all mediation models included trait cynicism as a designated control variable, with a path linking it to the organizational cynicism construct.

Table 11: Tests for the mediating role of organizational cynicism with attitudinal versus behavioral outcomes

Standardized Path Regression Weights											
<i>Path A</i>	<i>MEDIATOR</i>	<i>Path B</i>		Path A	Path B	Path C (direct)	Path C (full model)	Sobel z Stat	<i>p</i> -value	Mediation Conclusion	
Trust	-->	Org Cyn	-->	Commit	-.26*	-.47**	.33**	.22*	2.52	.01	Partial
Trust	-->	Org Cyn	-->	Job Sat	-.24*	-.54**	.25*	.11 (ns)	2.56	.01	Full
Trust	-->	Org Cyn	-->	Demerits <sup>a</sup>	-.23*	.05 (ns)	-.25**	-.27**			None
Trust	-->	Org Cyn	-->	Performance <sup>a</sup>	-.23*	.02 (ns)	.00	.01			None
a. Study hypothesized no mediation											
* <i>p</i> < .05											
** <i>p</i> < .01											

**Hypothesis 7a(1):** Subordinates' cynicism toward their organization will partially mediate the relationship between their trust in managers and organizational commitment. Supported (Path C significance decreased in full model but remained significant; Sobel  $z = 2.52$ ,  $p < .01$ ).

**Hypothesis 7a(2):** Subordinates' cynicism toward their organization will partially mediate the relationship between their trust in managers and job satisfaction. Partially supported. The path between trust and job satisfaction was fully, not partially, mediated by organizational cynicism (Path C went from significant to non-significant in full model; Sobel  $z = 2.56$ ,  $p < .01$ ).

Because no significant relationships were proposed from organizational cynicism to behavioral outcomes in the hypothesized model, additional paths needed to be drawn in order to test the mediation (or lack thereof). Therefore, modeled paths were introduced from organizational cynicism to deviant behaviors and performance (i.e., "path B" in the mediation test), and the 4-step Baron and Kenny (1986) approach was conducted.

**Hypothesis 7b(1):** Cynicism will not partially or fully mediate the relationship between subordinates' trust in managers and performance. Supported. Table 11 shows that the paths from cynicism to performance (path B) and the direct path from BI to performance were not significant, when controlling for trait cynicism. Consequently, a Sobel test was not needed to determine that there was no mediation effect at all.

**Hypothesis 7b(2):** Cynicism will not partially or fully mediate the relationship between subordinates' trust in managers and deviant behavior. Supported. The path between organizational cynicism and deviant behavior [path B] was not significant, when controlling for trait cynicism.

**Hypothesis 8:** Subordinates' trust in managers will be positively related to individual performance. Not supported. ( $\beta = .02$ , ns).

**Hypothesis 9:** Subordinates' trust in managers will be negatively related to deviant behaviors. Supported ( $\beta = -.28$ ,  $p < .01$ ).

### Alternative Model Comparisons

In an effort to demonstrate the value of the proposed model above other reasonable alternatives, the full structural model was tested with paths from organizational cynicism to both deviant behavior and performance. The model fit did not significantly improve ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 1.05$ ,  $df = 2$ ), and only served to diminish the model parsimony, reinforcing the need to eliminate these paths. Additionally, the proposed model in this study identified trust as a key mediating variable in the relationship between BI and all other outcomes. Table 12 shows that trust significantly mediated all relationships from BI to the outcomes of interest, with the exception of performance. In addition, the addition of paths in the structural model from BI directly to any of the outcome variables (including commitment) either diminished or did not significantly improve the overall model fit.

Table 12: Tests of the mediating role of trust with all other variables in the model

Path A	MEDIATOR	Path B		Standardized Regression Weights			Sobel z Stat	p-value	Mediation Conclusion
				Path A	Path B	Path C (full model)			
BI -->	Trust	-->	Org Cyn	.74**	-.19*	-.07 (.18)	-2.45	0.02	Full
BI -->	Trust	-->	Job Sat	.75**	.25*	.21* (.07)	2.36	0.02	Full
BI -->	Trust	-->	Commit	.73**	.29**	.11 (-.32*)	2.76	0.01	Partial
BI -->	Trust	-->	Demerits <sup>a</sup>	.75**	-.28**	-.25** (.12)	-2.77	0.01	Full
BI -->	Trust	-->	Performance <sup>a</sup>	.75**	.29**	-.02 (-.04)			None
a. Study hypothesized no mediation									
* $p < .05$									
** $p < .01$									

## Exploratory Analyses

A number of exploratory relationships were investigated as part of this study. Considering that BI is a fairly new construct in the organizational sciences, these post-hoc analyses are offered to identify interesting areas for further research. In addition, these findings may help illuminate the boundary conditions of BI and related constructs. The means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations of the main and exploratory study variables are presented in Table 13. The shaded cells in Table 13 represent variables from the original study. Additional variables in the exploratory analysis were selected based on their potential relationship to BI. A second trust measure (i.e., “trust #2” in the table), based on a modified version of Cook and Wall’s (1980) scale, was included in the second survey to serve as a basis for comparing the findings associated with the first trust measure. In particular, it served to address common method concerns associated with including the trust scale in the same survey as the BI measure. In the end, the original trust scale was used in the primary study because its measurement at time 1 was consistent with the hypothesized causal relationships, and the overall model fit was the same for both measures.

Table 13. Descriptive statistics and correlations for exploratory variables

Variable	Mean	StdDev	$\alpha$	Mgr BI	Trust	Org Cynicism	Job Sat	Commit	Deviant Beh	TraitCyn	Perform.	Ldr Polit Skill	Subord Polit Skill	Tension	Effort	LMX
Mgr's Behavioral Integrity	5.71	1	0.95	x												
Trust in Mgr	4.51	1.12	0.72	.63**	x											
Cynicism	4.13	1.06	0.84	-.11	-.15	x										
Job Satisfaction	4.74	1.23	0.87	.19*	.14	-.50**	x									
Commitment	5.09	1.31	0.89	.12	.26**	-.45**	.47**	x								
Deviant Behavior (demerits)	1.33	6.18		-.25**	-.20**	.05	-.11	-.03	x							
Trait Cynicism (control)	4.41	0.95	0.75	-.18*	-.31**	.18*	-.20*	-.01	.01	x						
Job Performance (MPA)	3.06	0.24		-.02	-.03	.00	.22**	.01	-.24**	.02	x					
Ldr Political Skill (subord percep)	5.08	1.07	0.97	.75**	.68**	-.16*	.12	.15	-.21**	.19*	-.04	x				
Subord Political Skill (self-rating)	5.56	0.69	0.93	.11	.09	-.12	.30**	.32**	-.15	.01	.05	.18*	x			
Tension	3.31	1.25	0.86	-.05	.05	-.09	-.07	.03	.06	.08	-.11	.04	.03	x		
Effort	5.16	0.97	0.9	.21**	.16*	-.22**	.57**	.33**	-.22**	-.10	.25**	.17*	.43**	-.15	x	
LMX	5.15	1.19	0.96	.70**	.70**	-.18*	.20*	.26**	-.23**	-.20*	-.02	.78**	.22**	.07	.28**	x
Trust #2 (2nd survey)	5.44	1.19	0.94	.72**	.60**	-.11	.21**	.29**	-.30**	-.06	.05	.71**	.18*	-.01	.28**	.84**

\* =  $p < .05$

\*\* =  $p < .01$

Shaded area represents constructs in the main study

## Managers' Political Skill as an Antecedent of BI

As indicated earlier, managers' political skill was identified as a potential antecedent to BI perception formation. Political skill allows managers to identify and diffuse potential word-



deed mismatches before they happen, or allow them to frame and manage subordinates' attributional perceptions, should such a mismatch occur. Relatedly, Cha and Edmondson (2006: 59) offered an interesting qualitative study about how charismatic leaders' strong values are re-interpreted and ideologically expanded by subordinates, leading to perceived word-deed incongruence and disenchantment by followers. Specifically, they stated that "leaders with strong values may be earnest in their intention to behave authentically, but their followers may not perceive them this way." In their study, employees often did not openly raise concerns about inconsistent behavior with the managers, and poorly performing managers were not sensitive to environmental cues or were uncomfortable in actively seeking feedback in a sincere manner from trusted sources.

Politically skilled individuals possess the social astuteness, approachability, and interpersonal network to potentially overcome these pitfalls. In doing so, they may be more likely to identify and prevent actual word-deed misalignments, or mitigate their perception by observers. Blass and Ferris (2007) proposed that leaders' impressions on others, and ultimately their reputations (i.e., a collective perception of BI, among other things), are influenced by such political skill.

The following analyses are based on a measure of managers' political skill that was used for exploratory considerations. The measure was administered during the first survey, and assessed the subordinates' perceptions of the managers' political skill. Although this measure was not ideal in that it was subordinate-rated, evidence exists to suggest that subordinate ratings of managers' political skill are significantly related to managers' self-ratings (e.g., Blickle et al., 2009; Lui et al., 2007).

Despite the high correlation between managers' political skill and BI ( $r = .75, p < .01$ ), and the AVE for political skill (.61) not exceeding the shared variance ( $r^2 = .65$ ), a constrained phi test (Joreskog, 1971) demonstrated that the constructs were, indeed, discriminant ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 413.4, df = 1$ ).

Results show that subordinates' ratings of their managers' political skill explained a significant amount of variance in BI ( $R^2 = .56, p < .01$ ). Further post-hoc analysis (see Table 14) demonstrated that the subdimensions of political skill exhibited widely different effects on BI, with only apparent sincerity ( $b = .54, p < .001$ ) and interpersonal influence ( $b = .22, p < .05$ ) being significant predictors. Interestingly, Table 14 also shows that the political skill

subdimensions differed in their ability to predict BI and trust. Specifically, whereas interpersonal influence predicted both outcomes, apparent sincerity was a unique predictor of BI and social astuteness predicted only trust. These results offer further indications that BI and trust operate in distinct ways.

Table 14. Regression analysis of managers' political skill dimensions as predictors of ratings of managers' behavioral integrity and trust

Dependent Variable:		BEHAV INTEGRITY		TRUST	
		Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
Political Skill Subdimension:	Networking	.01	.94	-.11	.27
	Apparent Sincerity	.54	.00	.11	.25
	Social Astuteness	.11	.29	.36	.00
	Interpers. Influence	.22	.04	.39	.00

Additional evidence of political skill's role as an antecedent of BI also can be found in its ability to predict other relevant dependent variables, when controlling for BI. Table 15 presents three hierarchical, 2-step regression models, each with BI as the predictor in the first step. As the results show, BI explained a significant amount of the variance in trust, as

Table 15. Hierarchical regression analysis of managers' behavioral integrity and political skill on trust and LMX

Dependent Variable:	Trust (Time 1)		Trust (Time 2)		LMX	
	Step 1 $\beta$	Step 2 $\beta$	Step 1 $\beta$	Step 2 $\beta$	Step 1 $\beta$	Step 2 $\beta$
Managers' Beh Integrity	.63	.28	.72	.44	.78	.59
Managers' Political Skill		.48		.37		.25
$R^2$	.40	.50	.52	.58	.61	.64
$\Delta R^2$		.10**		.06**		.03**

\*\*  $p < .01$

measured at time 1 (i.e., the same survey as managers' political skill and BI were measured). Similarly, BI was a significant predictor of trust measured in the second survey (i.e., 1 month delay), which addresses some concerns about common method effect. Finally, political skill explained a significant amount of the variance in LMX, also measured in the second survey ( $R^2 = .40, .52, .61$ , respectively). The second step of the regression shows that managers' political skill explained significant variance beyond that of BI for the initial trust measure ( $\Delta R^2 = .10, p < .01$ ), the delayed trust measure ( $\Delta R^2 = .06, p < .01$ ), and LMX ( $\Delta R^2 = .03, p < .01$ ).

An additional post-hoc test was conducted (not shown), reversing the sequence of entry, in order to demonstrate that the variance explained by political skill did not fully capture that explained by BI. Although political skill did explain a majority of the variance in all three outcomes, the addition of BI in step 2 represented a significant  $\Delta R^2$  (all  $p$  values  $< .01$ ).

### BI as a Mediator of the Manager Political Skill – Trust Relationship

As discussed above, BI is expected to mediate the political skill-trust relationship. Acknowledging the shortcoming associated with a measure of managers' political skill is from the subordinates' perspective, Table 16 demonstrates that BI partially mediated the

Table 16: Tests of the mediating role of behavioral integrity in the political skill – trust relationship

Path A	MEDIATOR	Path B	Standardized Regression Weights			Sobel z Stat	p-value	Mediation Conclusion
			Path A	Path B	Path C (full model)			
Mgrs' Political Skill -->	Behavioral Integrity	--> Trust (Time1)	.80**	.77**	.83** (.61**)	2.27	.02*	Partial
Mgrs' Political Skill -->	Behavioral Integrity	--> Trust (Time2)	.80**	.79**	.75** (.37**)	4.50	.00**	Partial

\*  $p < .05$   
\*\*  $p < .01$

relationship between managers' political skill and subordinates' trust in managers, regardless of the trust measure used. The Sobel test statistic indicated that BI's role in mediating this relationship was significant ( $z = 2.27, p < .02$ ;  $z = 4.50, p < .01$ ), although managers' political skill maintained a significant direct relationship to trust, in addition to the mediated path.

## **BI and Tension**

Prior research has offered political skill as an “antidote” for stress-strain relationships (e.g., Perrewé et al., 2004; Perrewé et al., 2005), suggesting that such skill allows individuals to more confidently and effectively deal with the stress associated with perceived ambiguity and low levels of control. It is reasonable to expect that low BI perceptions can be associated with exchange relationship ambiguity and unpredictability. Consequently, subordinates’ political skill may reduce the strain associated with low BI conditions. Individuals with high political skill are more confident in ambiguous situations, and feel they have the tools necessary to respond to different contingencies. Consequently, political skill can be expected to moderate the relationship between BI perception and tension, with unfavorable BI perceptions resulting in higher levels of tension for those with lower political skill.

The data in this study did not significantly support these hypotheses. Specifically, BI was only correlated  $r = -.05$  with work tension. Although the relationship was in the predicted direction, it did not reach significance.

A moderation test was conducted to examine whether the BI-work tension relationship differed as a function of the subordinates’ political skill, which was grouped into “high” and “low” categories through a median split technique. The baseline model was constrained by setting all of the beta and gamma parameters to equality, and a  $\chi^2$  statistic was calculated. The model parameters were then freed, and the  $\Delta\chi^2$  statistic was evaluated for significance. Again, for this sample, there was no moderation effect of subordinates’ political skill on the relationship ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 2.3$ , critical value = 3.84)

## **Subordinates’ Political Skill as a Moderator for Commitment and Job Satisfaction**

Consistent with the literature, subordinates’ political skill was correlated with job satisfaction ( $r = .30$ ,  $p < .01$ ) and organizational commitment ( $r = .32$ ,  $p < .01$ ). Moderation tests were again conducted by performing a median split on the data based on the subordinates’ political skill scale scores. The constrained baseline model did not significantly differ from the model with the unconstrained BI-commitment ( $\Delta\chi^2 = .8$ , ns) or BI-job satisfaction ( $\Delta\chi^2 = .9$ , ns) paths, indicating that subordinates political skill did not moderate these relationships.

## **BI as a Predictor of Effort**

Effort can be conceptualized as social exchange “currency” offered by subordinates, and a measure of the risk and vulnerability one is willing to accept when trusting another in a future-

focused exchange. A pattern of low BI behavior from managers would be expected to reduce the likelihood that subordinates continue to contribute this critical resource to the exchange. As such, BI was expected to positively relate to effort.

Effort was measured through a self-report scale on the second (time 2) survey, six weeks after the BI scale was administered. The BI-effort correlation of  $r = .21$  was significant ( $p < .01$ ) in the expected direction, with BI explaining 4.4% of the variance in effort. However, Table 17 shows that the effect of BI on effort fell slightly below significance ( $\Delta R^2 = .02$ ,  $p < .07$ ), when controlling for trust.

Table 17. Regression analysis of behavioral integrity and trust on effort

Dependent Variable:		Effort		
Managers' Behavioral Integrity		Step 1 $\beta$	Trust  Managers' Beh Integrity	Step 1 $\beta$
		.21		.16
				.05
				.18
	$R^2$	.04		.03
	$\Delta R^2$	.04**		.03*
* $p < .05$				
** $p < .01$				

Consistent with the hypotheses reflected in the main model of this dissertation, mediation testing demonstrated that trust fully mediated the relationship between behavioral integrity and effort (Sobel  $z = 2.55$ ,  $p = .01$ ).

### BI as a Predictor of LMX

LMX was selected as a useful exploratory construct in that it reflects a critical exchange-based relationship that develops over time (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993). In addition, LMX has been so closely linked to trust that scholars have conceptualized LMX as an antecedent, consequence, and even a subdimension of the trust construct in the literature (see Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). As such, it is important to demonstrate the relationship between BI and LMX. This becomes particularly important when considering that the two members of the LMX dyad often have very different perceptions of their relationship (Dienesch & Liden, 1986; Gerstner & Day,

1999; Sin, Nahrgang, & Morgeson, 2009). BI perceptions, and their antecedents, may represent important mechanisms in the development of these divergent views.

Although the LMX-7 is the most commonly used measure of exchange quality, Liden and Maslyn (1998) offered a useful, validated measure that supported the multidimensional conceptualization argued by Dienesch and Liden (1986). Specifically, Liden and Maslyn (1998) validated the dimensions of affect, loyalty, and contribution. In addition, they identified the validity of a fourth dimension: professional respect. To date, this author is unaware of any studies relating BI to global or dimensional measures of LMX. In order to advance our understanding of BI, it is important to distinguish it from other, related constructs, such as LMX. In addition, one could reasonably argue that BI differentially impacts the subdimensions of LMX.

As expected, BI (measured at time 1) was significantly correlated with LMX (i.e., measured at time 2;  $r = .70, p < .001$ ), explaining 48% of its variance. BI was also significantly and differentially associated with the LMX subdimensions of affect ( $r = .67, p < .001$ ), loyalty, ( $r = .59, p < .001$ ), contribution ( $r = .55, p < .001$ ), and respect ( $r = .66, p < .001$ ).

In addition, a two-step hierarchical regression demonstrated that BI explained a significant amount of the variance in LMX, even after controlling for the effect of trust. Specifically, after accounting for the impact of trust on LMX ( $R^2 = .49, p < .001$ ), BI explained an additional 11% of the variance ( $\Delta R^2 = 10.6, p < .001$ ). With regard to the LMX subdimensions, BI again explained significant yet differential additional variance in LMX components, after controlling for the variance explained by trust. Specifically, BI explained 11% additional variance in the affect dimension, 5% of loyalty, 5% of contribution, and 11% of professional respect (all  $\Delta R^2$  are significant at  $p < .01$ ).

Finally Table 18 shows that the BI-LMX relationship was partially mediated by trust, with a significant direct path remaining ( $\beta = .25, p < .05$ ), after accounting for the significant mediated path (Zobel  $z = 4.99, p < .001$ ).

Table 18. Mediation test for behavioral integrity – LMX relationship

				Standardized Path Regression Weights				Sobel z Stat	p- value	Mediation Conclusion	
Path A	MEDIATOR	Path B		Path A	Path B	Path C (direct)	Path C (full model)				
Managers' Behavioral Integrity	-->	Trust	-->	LMX	.80**	.88**	.73**	..25*	4.99	.00	Partial
* p < .05											
** p < .01											

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **DISCUSSION**

This chapter discusses the results presented in Chapter 5. After reviewing the major contributions of the primary and exploratory results, the author presents study strengths and limitations. This chapter ends with a discussion on the practical implications of the research and some final concluding thoughts.

#### **Contributions**

The findings in this study offer empirical evidence in a unique applied context that BI is a critical antecedent in the formation of trust, and in turn, cynicism and other key outcomes. Given that little research has investigated how trust develops, is maintained, and how it deteriorates (Simpson, 2007; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009), BI represents a critical key to advancing that cause. In addition, BI answers a call by Ragins and Dutton (2007) by providing individuals and organizations with a manageable mechanism for improving critical work relationships.

The role of BI as an antecedent to trust represents the mechanism by which an actor “turns his or her head” from past to future, helping to explain how trust can be built or damaged in new or ongoing exchange relationships. The attractiveness of future exchange partners, and the willingness of subordinates to accept risk/vulnerability in that exchange, largely are dependent on the perceived history of the partners’ word-deed alignment. This perception lays the foundation for relationship development, attitude formations, and contributions in future exchanges. Although not formally tested, this study also introduced felt accountability and managers’ political skill as valid antecedents to BI, further expanding Simons’ (2002; 2008) conceptualization of the BI domain. These constructs represent very real environmental and personal factors that contribute to both actual and perceived word-deed alignment. As such, they offer testable variables for research, and manageable tools for organizational application.



This study demonstrates that subordinates' conclusions regarding their leaders' BI, regardless of the accuracy of the perceptions, have significant attitudinal and behavioral consequences, mediated by trust. For example, Colquitt et al. (2008: 922) reminded us that deviant behaviors "can be quite costly to organizations, even when the base rate for committing them remains low." Recent corporate and military scandals only highlight the gravity of the consequences when subordinates decide to act out against the organization or in their own self-interest.

Individuals often look to their managers as the personification of the larger organization (Pfeffer, 1981). Therefore, violations of promises and espoused values at the individual level can create a lack of willingness to exchange with the individual offender (i.e., the leader), as well as the organization they represent. Hewlin, Cha, and Hewlin (2010) stated that nine out of ten large businesses (globally) emphasize core values, ranging from customer satisfaction to employee respect and environmental responsibility. Incongruence between these lofty values and reality often becomes most apparent at the lowest levels, where managers are evaluated by subordinates regarding their "walk" of the corporate "talk." Of course, managers also may fail to deliver on the promises and values they, themselves, espouse. A pattern of these inconsistencies also can be perceived as indicative of the integrity of the organization as a whole.

This relationship also is relevant in the marketing context. In their book reviewing an expansive study of market research survey data, Beemer and Shook (1998: 90) found that "more than 70% of all Americans view a salesperson in a retail store as *the store* [emphasis in original]. This means their impression of the store - positive or negative - depends on how they were treated by this single individual." Taking a more positive position, this also suggests that individual salespeople's actions have the potential to create a favorable customer impression of trust in the broader organization. Interestingly, Beemer and Shook (1998) also demonstrated that if people did not trust the store (i.e., perhaps as a result of the salespersons' BI), they were less likely to look at or notice the company's advertising.

A leader/salesperson/exchange partner's pattern of violations will, no doubt, create an expectation that the organization they represent will not honor its own word in the future. One need only look at how people respond to values-inconsistent behaviors by individual political, corporate, or religious figures to see this organization-directed cynicism emerge. A single racist

“Tea Party” member, philandering family values advocate, or stockbroker who pushes bad investments undoubtedly will create an army of cynics regarding the offenders’ organizations.

In support of this, the findings in this study clarify that the relationship between BI and key attitudinal and behavioral outcomes must consider the role of trust and cynicism as mediating mechanisms. Organizations that strive for positive outcomes or struggle with negative dynamics such as cynicism are well served to consider how perceptions of managerial word-deed alignment may contribute to those conditions.

Scholars have lamented the absence of empirical process-focused research on cynicism (e.g., Dean et al., 1998; James, 2005). Although the trust literature consistently has demonstrated a significant, positive relationship between trust and favorable work attitudes (e.g., commitment, satisfaction), the role of cynicism often has been left out of the examination as a potential mediating mechanism. Similarly, the empirical studies of cynicism often have shown its negative relationship with attitudes, but have not simultaneously included trust as an antecedent. Considering that so many organizations struggle with cynicism, and strive to improve employees’ work attitudes, it seems critical to clearly understand the relationship among these variables.

This study demonstrated that not only is BI an important construct in cynicism formation, but that cynicism’s contribution to attitudinal and behavioral outcomes may be predicated on the person specificity of the triggering event. Because values and promises are not identical in their significance and personal impact, BI failures will vary across a person-specificity dimension. This study added additional evidence that there is, in fact, a mechanism distinguishing how attitudinal outcomes and behavioral outcomes differ in their processing. Evidence from the justice literature also compliments these findings, suggesting that highly person-specific BI violations may be more associated with interpersonal and interactional justice breaches (Aquino et al., 2009).

When organizational cynicism is present, subjects are understandably pessimistic about remaining in partnerships. The cynical expectations of hopelessness, contempt, and disillusionment regarding future interactions with the organization (Dean et al., 1998; James, 2005) will create unfavorable attitudes about the work experience, and an unwillingness to stay in the relationship. In contrast, low cynicism is associated with an optimistic expectation about future exchanges, creating positive attitudes and willingness to remain with the exchange partner.

This type of organizational commitment indicates a trusting relationship based on a history of successfully reciprocated exchanges, and solidifies the likelihood that the partners will stay in the exchange relationship. In an organizational context, there is obvious uncertainty associated with abandoning a relationship with one organization for another. Therefore, positive BI perceptions can trigger the type of trust that reduces uncertainty and promotes a willingness for continued exchanges. The partial mediation of trust in the BI-commitment relationship demonstrated that some mechanism operates independent of trust. For example, the mere predictability of behavior may serve as a valuable factor when deciding to remain in an exchange relationship. Simons (2002) conceded that even if the target's values and promises are not appealing (i.e., "I plan to look out for number one!"), they still have high BI if they act in accordance with those statements. Similarly, individuals may value the predictability of their managers' behaviors enough to remain in even a low-trust relationship.

The lack of significance in the trust-job satisfaction relationship was, at first, surprising, considering this relationship has been consistently strong in the literature. However, Johns' (2006) challenge regarding the importance of understanding context in our research may be particularly important in interpreting this unexpected result.

This study's sample included cadets from a military university who, in their "job" as cadets, are under extreme military, academic, and athletic demands with very limited social opportunities. Within this culture, there is a significant distinction between the uncomfortable and artificial cadet role and the job they expect when commissioned (i.e., "the *real* Air Force"). As a result, this context may be very similar to asking inmates in a prison how satisfied they are with the job of "prisoner." Locke's (1976: 1300) definition of job satisfaction as a "pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one's experiences" may be understandably inappropriate in this context.

Similarly, the cadets' satisfaction with their jobs is likely a reflection of the emotional response to broad policies and regulations, and not the close relationship they have with their immediate supervisor. The source of these environmental constraints and pressures likely are seen as very far removed from anything controlled by their cadet manager. For example, even if subordinates have very high trust in their element leaders, they will nonetheless be very dissatisfied if the entire cadet population is restricted for being late to a briefing.

Because the cadets' job permeates all aspects of their lives, then job satisfaction, as measured in this study, may have unintentionally tapped into the *regulatory/policy* satisfaction domain, rather than traditional job satisfaction. Perhaps a more specific measure of job satisfaction would have limited the scope of consideration. For example, Hinkin and Schriesheim (2009) found that trust partially mediated the relationship between BI and satisfaction with supervisor, as opposed to overall job satisfaction. Perhaps a more appropriate attitudinal variable for future research in such a context would be satisfaction with the parts of the job influenced by the target manager.

The expected negative relationship between trust and deviant behavior was supported, demonstrating a correlation very similar to that found in Colquitt, Scott, and Lepine's (2007) meta-analysis of this relationship. In an exchange relationship, the resources risked and reciprocated create an opportunity for perceived inequity to emerge (Adams, 1965). Subordinates who feel they have been short-changed may use deviant behavior to balance the equity ratio of inputs to outcomes. Additionally, scholars have demonstrated that unfavorable behaviors (e.g., abusiveness, rule violations, "lashing out," and even low BI actions) may result from a "trickle down" effect attributed to social learning (Bandura, 1977). If managers' word-deed violations are observed and mimicked in order to "play the game," then low trust in managers may reduce the subordinates' concerns associated with not delivering on their responsibilities.

Although performance was significantly correlated with job satisfaction, as demonstrated in previous literature (see Judge et al., 2001), the relationship between job performance and both trust and BI was surprisingly absent. This observation is particularly curious in light of other meta-analytic studies on trust antecedents and consequences (see Colquitt et al., 2007).

Perhaps the complexity and multidimensionality of the MPA measure offers some indication as to this peculiar finding. As described earlier, the MPA score was composed of both subjective ratings and objective ratings. The objective ratings included factors such as room inspections, uniform inspections, knowledge test scores, major training event performance, marching, fitness tests, and spot check on a number of cadet jobs. By contrast, the subjective ratings of performance represented appraisals from multiple sources, including their cadet commander, officer in charge, enlisted advisor, coach (if applicable), teachers (optional), randomly-selected peers, and club liaisons (if applicable). Needless to say, the relationship

between cadets' trust in their commanders and their performance across such a combination of performance domains can get cloudy. Still, the trust scores failed to correlate significantly with even the subset scores, such as the ratings by their cadet commander. In addition, whereas trust was highly correlated with LMX, performance (i.e., to include subjective ratings by their immediate supervisor) was not. Research consistently has demonstrated that such relationships would be expected. Interestingly, the exploratory measure, effort, was significantly correlated with performance.

The results of this study also provide some additional evidence that cynicism has a differential mediating role for attitudinal versus behavioral outcomes. Just as Johnson and O'Leary-Kelly (2003) demonstrated such a distinction in response to psychological contract breaches, this study found that trust operates in a similar manner through cynicism for some outcomes, and not others. With regard to the attitudinal outcomes, there was support for the hypothesized partial mediation of organizational cynicism for the trust and organizational commitment. Conversely, the trust-job satisfaction relationship was fully, as opposed to partially, mediated by cynicism. Although the hypotheses were partially supported, both results indicated that trust operated through organizational cynicism to influence attitudinal outcomes.

By contrast, the influence of trust on the behavioral outcomes did not operate through cynicism, supporting the hypothesized null effect. Specifically, the path from organizational cynicism to deviant behavior (i.e., demerits) was not significant, rendering the mediation test unnecessary. Although cynicism also operated independently from performance, this relationship should be interpreted with caution. The performance measure used in this study may be so unique as to represent something other than true individual task or job performance.

Even though the subjects in the current study did not indicate the "person specificity" of the word-deed violations that contributed to low BI perceptions, it was clear that cynicism played a key role in manifesting attitude formations, but not action-oriented outcomes (i.e., deviance and performance). The inclusion of trust as a mediator between BI (i.e., a broader phenomenon than psychological contract breach used by Johnson and O'Leary-Kelly) and these outcomes helps further specify the nomological network of constructs in this process.

As stated earlier, this attitudinal-behavioral outcome distinction is very new to scientific study, and these results serve to underscore a potential boundary condition that deserves more attention. If nothing else, it may be worth re-evaluating curious findings in previous literature to

see if this new explanatory framework may be insightful. For example, Wilkerson et al. (2008) tested the effects of coworkers' badmouthing of their organization on focal employees' organizational cynicism, and ultimately, their own badmouthing and citizenship behaviors. In accordance with previous studies that showed cynicism to be related to *intentions* to engage in OCBs (e.g., Andersson & Bateman, 1997), they hypothesized positive cynicism-badmouthing and negative cynicism-citizenship relationships. Consistent with these expectations, employee cynicism was associated with self-reported badmouthing. However, cynicism was unexpectedly not related to supervisor-rated citizenship behaviors. Although badmouthing is arguably a behavior, the self-reported measure actually treats it more as a tendency or intention. By contrast, the citizenship measure is more closely aligned with an actual behavior. As such, their findings may align with the attitudinal-behavioral separation found by Johnson and O'Leary-Kelly (2003) and in this study. Other studies also may find utility in examining the person-specificity of BI and trust-related antecedents of cynicism.

### **Discussion of Exploratory Analyses**

No formal hypotheses were presented for the exploratory variables, however, a number of interesting findings emerged that may inform future studies. These results introduce potentially useful constructs that previously have not been examined in the BI literature.

**Managers' political skill.** Subordinates' ratings of their managers' political skill was significantly and positively related to their ratings of the same managers' BI, with political skill explaining 56% of the variance in BI. Further evidence of political skill as an antecedent to BI can be found in the partial mediation of BI in the political skill-trust relationship, and in the finding that managers' political skill explained significant additional variance in trust and LMX beyond that explained by BI. Therefore, subordinates perceived that managers' political skill creates conditions or influence perceptual filters associated with actual or perceived BI status.

The mechanism by which this happens may be indicated by the unique role of the political skill subdimensions on BI and trust formation. These findings may indicate that BI relies on the ability to connect and deliver with exchange partners on a very personal level. In order for someone to be perceived as possessing BI, their pattern of actions must be seen as genuine. This perceived sincerity also may help reframe attributions, should word-deed misalignments occur. In addition, sincerity also may signal that the manager is approachable,

thus increasing the very interaction and feedback that may otherwise result in apparent word-deed perceptions.

Conversely, trusting that exchange partners will deliver on their future promises may require that they have the ability to appropriately read and respond to social cues. Recalling that Mayer et al. (1995) conceptualized trust as being made up of integrity, ability, and benevolence, it may be that a manager's lack of social astuteness is seen as incompetence (i.e., low ability) in a necessary managerial performance domain. That shortfall would understandably make subordinates feel vulnerable and unwilling to place themselves at risk with such exchange partners.

**BI as a predictor of effort.** BI was significantly and positively correlated with effort, with trust fully mediating this relationship. In addition, BI explained a significant amount of variance in effort, although the additional variance beyond that explained by trust was just short of achieving statistical significance. Effort is a resource, similar to performance, which can be directed by subordinates toward organizational or relational goals. As such, a lack of effort may be an indication that trust is absent from the exchange relationship. By extension, attending to those factors that contribute to trust formation (e.g., BI) may serve to improve effort and other related outcomes.

**BI as a predictor of LMX.** LMX long has been described as a trust-based phenomenon (Gerstner & Day, 1997), and, therefore, should be influenced by antecedents of trust. The exploratory data demonstrated that not only was BI significantly related to LMX, but also it explained 11% additional variance in LMX beyond that explained by trust. This effect also was significant for the LMX subdimensions, with BI explaining between 5-11% of additional variance (beyond that explained by trust) for affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect.

BI may represent a useful construct in explaining how and why high- or low-quality LMX relationships develop over time. Considering the important role of attributions in interpreting behaviors, a history of keeping promises and honoring one's word likely will influence future attributions by observers. For example, a failure by someone seen as possessing high BI is more likely to be attributed to external, uncontrollable forces, possibly reframing the violation as something acceptable. Conversely, low-BI partners will receive no such "benefit of the doubt," and their transgressions will only further damage the relationship. In addition, the

differential contribution of BI to the LMX subdimensions may indicate certain boundary conditions or underlying mechanisms that influence this development process.

### **Strengths and Limitations of the Dissertation**

This dissertation demonstrated a number of strengths in its ability to contribute to the existing research. First, the current study was designed to answer multiple calls for new constructs and contexts in the research on trust, BI, and cynicism. For example, Dirks and Ferrin (2002) challenged researchers to examine the process by which trust is developed, maintained, and lost. Similarly, Dean et al. (1998) and James (2005) called for additional research into the causes of cynicism. Simons (2002, 2008) presented theoretical relationships between BI and both antecedents and consequences that begged for empirical testing in new contexts. Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly (2003) also challenged scholars to further examine the unique role of cynicism in predicting attitudinal versus behavioral outcomes. Finally, this study answered a call by Ragins and Dutton (2007) to identify mechanisms that promote positive work relationships. The model presented and tested in this dissertation addresses a number of these issues for the first time, and does so in a context that is distinct from that of previous studies.

A second strength is that the longitudinal design provided a unique opportunity to test causal relationships and address some common method concerns. Cross-sectional measurement of the variables in the model would have significantly restricted the ability to draw any conclusions about the process by which BI influences outcomes. The time lag between BI and trust perceptions and the proximal and distal outcomes adds some validity to the proposed model and the developmental process proposed.

Third, this study used objective measures of behavior that have been absent from much of the previous research. Specifically, demerits, although self-reported, were a reasonably clear proxy for externally-observed deviant behaviors and rule violations. Similarly, the performance measure used in this study (MPA) reflected a collection of student and faculty ratings across a number of performance domains. Although this measure appeared to have significant limitations, it may still serve as a reference for future studies by clarifying some conceptual considerations to which researchers should attend. Together, these measures are a useful contrast to the typical self-reported or financial performance measures previously used in the BI and cynicism literature.



Fourth, using structural equation modeling (SEM) also enhanced the utility of the data and results in this study. This technique allowed for error variance to be modeled, minimizing the attenuating effects of measurement error on the correlations. In addition, SEM allowed for regression paths to be simultaneously estimated, while controlling for the other factors. Although a larger sample size would have been desirable, the results indicate that there was enough power to identify significant effects.

Next, this study is valuable in that it directly tested the mediating role of cynicism between trust and attitudinal versus behavioral outcomes. Consistent with the work of Johnson and O'Leary-Kelly (2003), this study offers additional evidence of this under-investigated mechanism that may explain some of the inconsistent results in the cynicism literature. In addition, it may address the issue raised by Dean et al. (1998), who challenged researchers to create and test models that predict why some people are so much more cynical about their organizations than others. Because BI is such a personal perception, it may help explain variance in cynicism within work groups and organizations.

Finally, a number of exploratory variables and relationships were investigated in order to initiate areas of research in the area of BI. Specifically, its relationships to constructs such as political skill, effort, and LMX were presented as useful areas for further examination. The lack of significant findings for tension and subordinates' political skill do not in any way preclude their value in this discussion. Indeed, further analysis of these and other constructs in new contexts still possess the potential to uncover important relationships.

Of course, the current study is not without limitations. First, the study participants consisted of undergraduate students at a very selective military university. Although arguments have been made as to the costs and benefits of such a population (see Peterson, 2001 for a review), the generalizability of the findings may still be a concern. The benefits associated with a standardized study context such as a military college also create range restrictions that may attenuate certain relationships. For example, it may be that older, non-leadership seeking subjects in a non-structured environment would respond differently to BI violations.

Even generalizing these findings within the military environment should be done with caution. Specifically, this sample included operational units whose operations were not conducted in a wartime environment. However, one could reasonably expect the relationships found in this study would be even stronger in combat or other high-threat contexts. For example,

the consequences for word-deed misalignment may significantly increase in such environments, where the notions of “risk” and “vulnerability” are particularly salient. Follow-on research in non-military units and across different environmental conditions (e.g., high threat, static/dynamic, small/large organizations) definitely would enhance our understanding of the true nature and boundary conditions of these relationships.

Second, although many natural and statistical controls were present in this study, additional control would have been beneficial. Indeed, Colquitt (2008) implored organizational scholars to engage in more laboratory-based studies in order to more strategically test and advance our knowledge and theory. Future research should answer this call by carefully examining the consequences of manipulated antecedents of BI, or even the outcomes associated with manipulations of BI perceptions themselves in a laboratory environment (see Breaux, 2010 for a good example of such research in the area of abusive supervision, and Kim et al., 2006 for an example in trust violation/repair).

A third limitation is that the mechanism of person-specificity was not directly tested in this study. Future research should either manipulate this variable in a laboratory environment, or capture the perceived specificity of the events in order to see if this mechanism, in fact, defines the attitude versus behavioral outcomes as discussed here. It would be particularly useful to examine the person-specificity of *positive* BI events in addition to only promise or value incongruence (i.e., highly personal events where the managers made good on values or promises).

Next, the trust and trait cynicism measures of this study demonstrated low levels of AVE (.42 and .34, respectively), indicating that there was more error than variance explained by the scale. Although the construct reliabilities and item-to-total correlations for each measure were sufficient to continue with the scale, this measurement issue likely influenced the observed relationships. The items used in this study obviously had unanticipated interpretations that other items or other study contexts may have avoided. For example, any items that indicated dishonest behaviors by those around them or a specific target (e.g., “Most people will tell lies if they can gain from doing so” [Trait Cynicism], “If my El/Ldr asked why a problem occurred, I would speak freely even if I were partly to blame” [Trust in Leader]) has obvious implications in an environment with such a firm honor code. Indeed, such questions place the respondent in a unique situation when even toleration of honor violations is itself an offense. Future research

should consider such cultural dynamics when selecting items for measuring these important constructs.

Also, there is no current research on the stability of BI perceptions. Consequently, it is uncertain that the six week period between the first and second surveys (and performance measure) is still short enough to prevent BI perceptions from significantly changing. Liden et al. (1993) demonstrated that LMX can develop in as little as six weeks. BI perceptions may similarly change over the same period of time in a reciprocal episodic exchange. Future research should examine the stability of BI under different conditions.

Finally, increased sample size would have improved the power of the study (Cohen, 1992) and the strength of the scales. Although the 150-subject threshold recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) for structural equation modeling was satisfied, this number is a minimum boundary. Some of the mediation analyses indicated potential instability of the measures (i.e., path coefficients changing signs), so a larger sample size would likely improve the stability of the measures.

### **Directions for Future Research**

Trust remains one of the fundamental components of all relationships (Ferris et al., 2009), and the loss of trust can levy a high cost on individuals and organizations alike. As a result, it is particularly important to identify the factors that contribute to a loss of trust in the first place in order to mitigate these threats. Similarly, given that the long-term benefits of trust-focused teambuilding programs are debatable (Arthur, Bennett, Edens, & Bell, 2003), Colquitt et al. (2008) suggested that targeting trust *antecedents* (e.g., BI) may be critical. Interestingly, research has found that recovering from an integrity breach is even more challenging than ability or benevolence-related transgressions (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009).

In support of this challenge, Colquitt et al. (2008) recommended that integrity-focused training could be particularly effective in addressing the root causes of the relationship. To date, no research has directly described or tested a BI-development process, let alone the factors that mediate its progress. The current study has addressed and expanded on some of Simons' (2002, 2008) propositions regarding the causes of actual and perceived word-deed misalignment. Indeed, the propositions regarding accountability intensity and managers' political skill are

obvious next steps for empirical testing. Future research must continue to identify and test these and other mechanisms by which BI can be influenced, formally and informally.

Just as BI is conceptualized as a manageable phenomenon, so too can political skill serve as a trainable and manageable target for influencing the BI and trust development processes (Ferris et al., 2005a). This study presented exploratory evidence to suggest that managers' political skill is, indeed, a valuable antecedent to BI. Future research must investigate this relationship by measuring the key variables from different sources. In addition, both the BI and political skill literature would be well served by an experimental study of the effectiveness of political skill training/development programs, and the effect of such programs on subsequent BI ratings of the managers. Ferris et al. (2005a) suggested that mentoring, reflection, and even dramaturgical training can enhance political skill, however, no study has formally examined such practices.

A related area for further research is the accuracy of self-perceptions of BI. Scholars long have acknowledged the importance of understanding how one is perceived by external audiences. A lack of such insight can easily lead to unintended consequences and frustration for some, if not all, of the members involved. Dineen et al. (2006) demonstrated that subordinates responded most negatively to leaders who were low BI, but continued to act as if they were not. Specifically, when low BI leaders continued to deliver "guidance" (i.e., hypocritically telling others how to act), it not only decreased the subordinates' extra-role behavior, but actually triggered deviant behavior. Future research should investigate not only the consequences associated with a gap between self and others' perceptions of BI, but also should attempt to identify personality and situational factors that contribute to these disparate perceptions.

Here too, political skill may explain why some individuals are better able to cue in to situational features that alert them when they are acting or may appear to be acting inconsistently with promises or stated values. Given that apparent sincerity is not only a fundamental component of political skill, but was the component most highly correlated with BI in this study, the relation between political skill and leader authenticity may be particularly important in the BI context. This highlights a point of contention (and research opportunity). Simons' (2009) acknowledged that authenticity is not a necessity for BI, but BI is necessary for authenticity. He and others suggested that, in the short term, individuals and organizations can maintain positive BI from a position of inauthenticity, but this inconsistency likely is impossible to maintain over

the long term. This proposition demands some empirical testing. At what point, and under what conditions does inauthentic BI crumble? When it does, are the consequences of having espoused “paper values” and “walked the charade” worse than if individuals had espoused the less palatable values, or simply acted how they truly felt. At the very least, future research should explore the potential for a political skill-authenticity interaction in BI formation over time.

Research has demonstrated that trust repair largely is impacted by the type of technique used, and the type of violation perceived by the observer. For example, Kim et al. (2006) demonstrated that externally-attributed apologies were more successful than internally-attributed apologies for integrity-related transgressions. Although subsequent trust remained significantly damaged by the violation, the experimental “recruiters” in the study were more likely to hire the applicant whose apology attributed the cause to external sources. Politically skilled individuals may appear more sincere and convincing when assigning the cause of some violations to environmental source. It is important to note that Kim et al. (2006: 61) did not justify lying about one’s culpability, but instead, challenged organizations to “do everything possible to avoid such integrity-based trust violations from the beginning.”

Another glaring opportunity for research exists in the fact that the vast majority of the BI literature has treated all promises and espoused values as equal. Only one study to date (i.e., Cording & Simons, 2009) has attempted to distinguish between value types (i.e., customer- vs. employee-focused), and the context of this study was limited to values presented in annual reports. Distinguishing between value/promise types in future research designs can help to clarify the unique role of antecedents and consequences in the BI perception process.

The issue of “person specificity” was discussed by Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly (2003), and in this dissertation, as a possible mechanism for explaining the unique role of cynicism in attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Although this concept offers an emotion-based distinction, future scholars can more deliberately create a taxonomy of value types for systematic investigation. In addition, research may demonstrate that different personality types (e.g., high politically skill, self-monitoring, self-regulating, feedback-seekers, emotionally intelligent) tend to cue into high-cost/benefit BI events differently than other personality types.

Next, the notion of word-deed alignment or misalignment speaks to another potential research area, similar to the under- versus over compensation issue discussed in the equity theory (Adams, 1969) literature. Specifically, do subordinates respond similarly to word-deed

misalignment when the managers deliver more than was initially promised, as opposed to when they under-deliver? Said another way, are individuals more tolerant of misalignment in a favorable direction? In its truest sense, BI is amoral (Simons, 2002), so misalignment should not matter. However, if the espoused value is, “a total disregard for the well-being of subordinates,” yet the manager demonstrates sincere concern for an employee, would we expect the same trust-inhibiting outcome as we would if there was a less favorable misalignment?

Obviously, attributions regarding under/over-delivery on values and promises play a critical role in the BI perception formation. To use a golf analogy, one could be perceived as a “sandbagger” or politically manipulative if the reason for their surprisingly favorable behavior was attributed to internal factors. Over-delivering on a promise can indicate additional effort or consideration, but it also can be perceived as an intentional under-promise in the first place. Such a perception would no doubt require attributional resolution.

To date, Cording and Simons (2009) provided the only study that examined this notion of “over- versus under-delivery,” but it was at the macro level of analysis, and was operationalized in a very unorthodox manner (i.e., values espoused in annual reports relative to actions demonstrated in implemented policies). Future studies should examine the consequences of under and over-delivery, and whether the type of value moderates the relationship.

Another particularly valuable opportunity for research lies in the directional focus of BI studies. Specifically, the preponderance of BI literature (and trust literature, for that matter) is upwardly-directed, examining the subordinates’ perceptions of their leaders. It is reasonable to assume that antecedents (e.g., personality, structural, and environmental factors that contribute to actual and perceived word-deed mismatch) and consequences would differ when considering the BI of a subordinate or a peer, compared to that of a manager. For example, subordinates likely experience very different environmental pressures and resource limitations than their managers. These unique factors may contribute to subordinates’ inability to deliver on promises, which, over time, can result in managers’ low BI perceptions of the subordinate. In this context, BI may serve as one important feature in defining the LMX relationship in the eyes of the manager. In a more positive tone, the successful delivery on these values and promises can enhance LMX and define someone as a “go-to” person, with all the perks that implies. Such outcomes unique to this downward-directed BI process may include network sponsorship by the supervisor, resource access, promotions, and relaxed accountability requirements.

Similarly, unique factors may be involved in lateral relationships between peers and team members. Just as BI was shown in this study to relate to LMX, it likely would have a similar relationship to Team Member Exchange (TMX) in a laterally-directed BI model. However, in this context, antecedents such as social pressures, competition, task interdependence, and informal mechanisms may play an increasingly important role in BI successes and failures. Similarly, outcomes such as cohesion, conflict, and resource-sharing may become important in a way that is not present in the upward- or downward-directed BI research.

Taken together, researchers have the opportunity to create a multi-directional understanding of BI that links together BI, trust, LMX, TMX, resource acquisition/distribution, reputation, accountability, teamwork, leadership, followership, and countless other related research domains. At the very least, it is possible that the different directional relationships prioritize and weight the trust components of ability, benevolence, and integrity differently. As such, BI may demonstrate a more or less significant impact on overall trust perceptions and consequences, depending on whether the relationship is upward, downward, or laterally focused.

This study was designed as a longitudinal path model. As such, it did not consider how the outcomes may, reciprocally, become factors that influence future BI perceptions. Future research may wish to consider how subordinates' levels of cynicism or resultant attitudes influence the BI perception process. For example, Johnson and O'Leary-Kelly (2003: 642) suggested that "once cynicism develops, it may influence perceptions of psychological contract breach." Similar reasoning would predict such a downward spiral of cynicism-BI-trust-cynicism processes. At the very least, experience-based (i.e., not trait-based) organizational cynicism likely would serve to prime the subordinate to look for examples of low-BI, thus confirming the expectations. In fact, cynical individuals may use this cynical expectation as the measure by which to evaluate managers' new promises and espoused values. Clearly, researchers can investigate the role of existing organizational cynicism on BI formation and adjustment.

Finally, just as BI should be investigated in different directions, it is also a useful construct at different levels of analysis. Indeed, BI should be an important consideration in any context where relationships are important. Whether at the dyad, team, organization, or industry level of analysis, external audience perceptions exist as to whether the target lives by the values and promises it espouses. Scholars long have indicated that a firm's perceived character and integrity can create a sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Petrick & Quinn, 2001),

and that firms' survival often is predicated on its being seen as reliable, trustworthy, and accountable (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).

Some initial research has aggregated BI perceptions to the unit or organization level (e.g., Palanski & Yammarino, 2009a; Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007), and even fewer have investigated BI at the macro level (Cording & Simons, 2009). However, the importance of a higher-level BI construct is indirectly acknowledged in a number of fields. For example, Love and Kraatz (2009) demonstrated the negative effect of downsizing on firm reputation, regardless of the firm's performance. Specifically, they showed that downsizing actions were perceived by external audiences as being inconsistent with firms' stated values and commitments, ultimately damaging the firms' reputations. In the end, the authors found that "audiences highly value trustworthiness, and respond negatively to [perceived] opportunistic acts" that appear to renege on previous promises (Love & Kraatz, 2009: 330). Similarly, Emiliani and Stec (2005) described a number of pressures in the supply chain environment that encouraged the manipulation of purchase price variance reporting. Indirectly, their article speaks to the regulatory influences and reinforcing factors that promote behaviors out of sync with what they know they should be doing.

Perceptions of firm trustworthiness undeniably are important in brand formation, corporate partnerships, successful mergers, attracting investors, and other macro-level activities. As such, BI serves as a critical construct in understanding how such perceptions are formed, modified, and managed. Similarly, the ability of teams and work units to successfully interact with other agencies is heavily predicated on its attractiveness as an exchange partner. As BI research continues and matures, it must be represented at levels of analysis beyond the dyad.

The reality of firm-level BI easily can be demonstrated with the example of Enron. This company and its executives became the embodiment of saying one thing and doing another. The corporate and public response to its transgressions was swift and unforgiving, and its ability to rebuild relationships (i.e., had it remained solvent) would have been abysmal. Ironically, all of this happened to a company that had as one of its 2002 corporate values, "When we say we will do something, we will do it; when we say we cannot or will not do something, then we won't do it" (Press Release Newswire: <http://www.prwebdirect.com/releases/2006/2/prweb342169.htm>). BI is present in relationships at all levels of analysis, and its consequences are very real. Researchers should continue to advance the construct into new fields and domains.



## Practical Implications

Kouzes and Posner (1992: 483) noted that “we are more willing to entrust a leader with our careers, our security, and sometimes even our lives, if that person practices what he or she preaches.” Indeed, in any context where relationships are important, across contexts and levels of analysis, BI is a critical foundation of trust. Considering that trust is so hard won and easily lost, it is essential to understand what we can do to facilitate its development and protect it, once formed.

One important note to acknowledge is the natural tendency to frame the BI discussion in terms of *low* BI (e.g., *promise-breaking*, *word-deed violations*, etc), when there are corresponding consequences for positive BI-related actions. Interestingly, this tendency mirrors how the process often occurs in the minds of the perceivers. For example, Reeder and Brewer (1979) and others demonstrated that individuals weigh negative information about integrity more heavily than they weigh positive integrity information. Because of this, it is particularly prudent to be sensitive to this phenomenon, and avoid providing the negative information at all costs.

Kim et al. (2006: 50) further highlighted this point by reminding us that violations cause trust to plunge well below its initial value. They stated, “The challenge in trust repair is that the magnitude of the increase to re-establish trust is greater than what was required to establish trust initially. This must happen at a time when the mistrusted party must not only re-establish positive expectations, but must overcome the salient negative expectations that are likely to have arisen from the trust violation.” Organizations and individuals are well served to maintain a heedful mind regarding BI violations (and successes), and create a culture that will identify integrity threats in advance.

Kouzes and Posner’s (1992) quotation above highlights the importance of BI in the context of leadership development and leader effectiveness. Take the fact that Bass (1985) found that the charismatic leadership dimension of transformational leadership consistently emerged as the strongest single predictor of leadership outcomes. However, Hewlin, Dumas, Burnett, and Helwin (2009) found that, although leader charisma may be strong enough to override the negative effects of factors such as person-organization misfit, it was not able to attenuate the negative effects of managers’ low behavioral integrity. Similarly, Carlson and Perrewé (1995) proposed that consistent delivery on promises and commitments is necessary for

transformational leadership. Taken together, organizations must ensure that their leaders are cognizant of the effects their word-deed alignment has on their effectiveness.

In addition, leadership development programs would be well served to include BI awareness as a fundamental component. 360-degree assessment of BI perceptions, including a comparison with self-ratings, would be particularly insightful. One of the most promising features of BI is that it can be managed (Simons, 2002). Consequently, an opportunity exists for helping target individuals become more aware of the promises they make, how they intentionally and unintentionally communicate their promises and values, and how to identify high-threat or high-benefit BI situations. This recommendation aligns with those made by Tsui and Ashford (1994: 117) in their discussion of the need to promote adaptive self-regulation. Specifically, they recommended “encouraging and reinforcing self-regulation behavior through the creation of norms favoring such behaviors and the promotion of role models by top managers. Top managers can also model the desired behavior and reward other managers that set such an example.”

Mentorship programs could be especially useful in this regard. Considering the evidence that BI perceptions and behaviors can “trickle down” to others (Dineen et al., 2006), mentors and others in high-visibility roles have the opportunity to not only demonstrate high BI themselves, but also to model what “sensitivity to BI” (i.e., “heedfulness” per Weick & Roberts, 1993) would look like. For example, mentors who identify and help process “teachable BI moments” can create a culture whereby “we always make good on our promises and walk our values.” Whether from mentors, supervisors, peers, customers or other sources, such BI-consistent modeling and feedback on how one is behaving relative to their promises and stated values is critically important.

Formal and informal mechanisms also can reinforce such a BI mindset. For example, Ferris et al. (2008) described how performance appraisals serve as an accountability mechanism by which people are held answerable for their actions. If done properly, such a system can include BI as a performance expectation, thus focusing employee attention and behaviors. Informally, group norms may develop that serve a similar purpose. For example, socialization or natural norm development may create a culture where broken promises are strongly punished or “called out.” Schools with honor codes often attempt to create such an environment, but frequently fall short when it comes time to administer consequences for violations. Ironically,

such unenforced ethical “window dressing” creates more cynicism than if no honor code had been in place (McCabe et al., 2006: 304), leading to what Kerr (1975) called “the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B.”

Of course, organizations may find that it is more efficient to select in people who demonstrate high integrity, as opposed to growing them “in house.” Assessment centers or internships may serve as useful personnel selection techniques in this regard. Because BI is, by definition, a pattern of word-deed alignment, then previous examples of such behavior may serve as an indicator of a BI mindset. At the very least, including BI as a factor to consider in processes such as hiring, firing, rewarding, punishing, and promoting, it continues to communicate its importance to others in the organization. Research suggests that the current generation of employees entering the workforce (i.e., “millennials”) overwhelmingly indicate “meaning” and “making a difference” as top criteria for selecting a job (Lancaster & Stillman, 2010). These dimensions are highly value-laden, and would require the organizations, recruiters, or internal agents to communicate and foster a sense of meaning as part of the employment contract. Attracting and retaining talent from this generation depends on how well these agents deliver on their promise of meaningful, difference-making work.

Scholars in positive work identity often have taken a “virtue perspective” to suggest that when individuals’ work-related identities are infused with virtuous qualities (e.g., character, wisdom, courage, and integrity), positive outcomes occur (Dutton, Roberts, & Bednar, 2010). For example, hospital cleaners who framed their work identities to reflect that of a healer or care provider experienced higher satisfaction, job enjoyment, and feelings of meaningfulness (Wrzesniewski, Dutton, & Debebe, 2003). Similarly, research has demonstrated that creating identities constructed with virtuous attributes can foster virtue-consistent behaviors. Dutton, Worline, Frost and Lilius (2006) demonstrated that people in organizations that identify themselves as compassionate frequently engage in spontaneous acts of helping.

Just as influencing identity perceptions can influence behavior, research also has shown that behaviors can influence virtue identities. For example, Grant, Dutton, and Rosso (2008) showed that employees of a *Fortune* 500 retailer adopted more pro-social identities after participating in an employee support initiative. Consequently, organizations that clearly articulate and emphasize integrity as an inherent virtue of the work roles may create conditions that lead to acts of behavioral integrity demonstration. Dutton et al. (2010) proposed that such an

identity will promote identity-consistent behaviors which, in turn, will increase trust and relational respect in the workplace. Organizations may leverage many formal and informal mechanisms, such as the recruiting/selection process, training and socialization, performance appraisals, recognition programs, and appraisal systems to underscore the virtuous element of behavioral integrity as a critical function of role identity.

From an organizational development standpoint, researchers already have shown the ability to quantify the effects of BI on measurable, financial outcomes (e.g., Simons & McLean-Parks, 2007). This dissertation demonstrates yet again that BI perceptions can serve as a “leading indicator” for relevant organizational outcomes. Similarly, in situations where unfavorable outcomes currently exist (i.e., rule infractions, turnover, customer/employee cynicism), the process model included in this study can serve as a diagnostic tool. Indeed, such outcomes potentially can be traced back to unnoticed misalignment between values and actions, or promises made and promises kept. Without such awareness, organizations may implement strategies that do not address the root cause, or worse yet, exacerbate the problem.

Of course, many of these implications can transfer to higher levels of analysis. For example, workgroups’ reputations and their ability to acquire resources depend largely on the way they are perceived by other audiences. Similarly, organizations can damage their perceived BI by implementing policies inconsistent with previously stated values. The degree to which firms are perceived to possess high BI will influence the willingness of other agencies to risk on their behalf, whether through investment, merger, sponsorship, or information sharing. In these and other examples, organizations must consider their BI as perceived by others, and either proactively develop it (e.g., take advantage of high-value BI opportunities) or reactively manage it (e.g., select a new CEO with a history of high BI). Issues such as customer loyalty, corporate social responsibility, and brand identity all speak to the importance of being perceived as trustworthy in the eyes of key stakeholders. For this reason, BI is critically important in building and maintaining that perception.

## **Conclusion**

This dissertation has provided evidence of the importance of BI in trust formation and subsequent outcomes. Trust is the fundamental pillars upon which relationships are built. Too often in today’s world, words and promises are presented, but not honored. Indeed, Kim et al.

(2006: 49) stated, “Of all the difficulties that have plagued organizational life, perhaps the most conspicuous in recent years has been the violation of trust.” A perceived pattern of failure in honoring ones words or promises brings with it undeniable consequences, one of which is the loss of trust. By focusing on BI-impacting events, and understanding how and why we respond to them, individuals and organizations alike can better affect the relationships they need to succeed in today’s world.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY IRB APPROVAL MEMORANDUM**

Office of the Vice President For Research  
Human Subjects Committee  
Tallahassee, Florida 32306-2742  
(850) 644-8673 · FAX (850) 644-4392

APPROVAL MEMORANDUM (for change in research protocol)

Date: 3/24/2010

To: Kevin Basik

Address: 1373 Old Village Rd Tallahassee, FL 32312  
Dept.: COLLEGE OF BUSINESS

From: Thomas L. Jacobson, Chair

Re: Use of Human Subjects in Research (Approval for Change in Protocol)  
Project entitled: Consequences of Behavioral Integrity Perceptions - Main Study

The form that you submitted to this office in regard to the requested change/amendment to your research protocol for the above-referenced project has been reviewed and approved.

Please be reminded that if the project has not been completed by 12/13/2010, you must request renewed approval for continuation of the project.

By copy of this memorandum, the chairman of your department and/or your major professor is reminded that he/she is responsible for being informed concerning research projects involving human subjects in the department, and should review protocols as often as needed to insure that the project is being conducted in compliance with our institution and with DHHS regulations.

This institution has an Assurance on file with the Office for Human Research Protection. The Assurance Number is IRB00000446.

Cc: Gerald Ferris, Advisor  
HSC No. 2010.3815

## APPENDIX B

### AIR FORCE ACADEMY IRB APPROVAL MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR LT COL KEVIN BASIK

FROM: HQ USAFA/XPN


SUBJECT: Protocol FAC20100026H Approved

1. The HQ USAFA Institutional Review Board considered your protocol FAC20100026H – Consequences of Behavioral Integrity Perceptions at its 22 January 2010 meeting. The study and any required changes were approved as minimal risk for a maximum of 300 subjects. The following statements at the bottom of your recruitment material: 'Approved: HQ USAFA IRB FAC20100026H.' 'Expiration date of this protocol is 1 January 2011.' This will inform potential subjects that your research has been reviewed and approved. Please note that the USAFA Authorized Institutional Official, HQ USAFA/CV and the Surgeon General's Research Oversight & Compliance Division, AFMSA/SGE-C review all USAFA IRB actions and may amend this decision or identify additional requirements.

**2. Reminder:** The IRB must review and approve all human subjects research protocols at intervals appropriate to the degree of risk but not less than once per year. **There is no grace period beyond one year from the last IRB approval date.** In order to avoid lapses in approval of your research, please submit your continuation review report at least six weeks before the protocol's expiration date. **It is ultimately your responsibility to submit your research protocol in time to allow for continuing review and approval by the IRB before your protocol's expiration date.** Please keep this letter in your protocol file as proof of IRB approval and as a helpful reminder of your expiration date. Failure to comply with this requirement may result in closure of your protocol and suspension of further research here at USAFA.

3. Any problems of a serious nature should be brought to the immediate attention of the IRB, and any proposed changes should be submitted for IRB approval **before** they are implemented. You **must coordinate** all cadet-wide emails through Cadet Wing Director of Staff.

4. If you have any questions or if I can be of further assistance, please don't hesitate to contact me at 333-6593 or the IRB Chair, Dr. Wilbur Scott at 333-6740.



GAIL B. ROSADO  
HQ USAFA IRB Administrator

## APPENDIX C

### AIR FORCE SURVEY APPROVAL MEMORANDUM



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY  
USAF ACADEMY COLORADO

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ USAFA/CCLP/PP  
Lt Col Joseph Sanders

12 Feb 2010

FROM: HQ USAFA/XPA

SUBJECT: *Consequences of Behavioral Integrity Perceptions*

1. We have received and reviewed your recent submittal of the *Consequences of Behavioral Integrity Perceptions Survey* in accordance with AFI 36-2601 and USAFA Supplement 1, Air Force Personnel Survey Program.
2. The following USAFA Survey Control Number (USAFA SCN) has been assigned to your instrument: **USAFA SCN 10-23**. This control number expires on 12 Feb 2011. Please obtain a new SCN from HQ USAFA/XPA if you revise the current instrument in any way before this date. Additionally, if the instrument has not been revised, and you plan to administer it after the expiration date, you must request a new survey control number. The entire control number and expiration date must be centered beneath the title on the first page of your instrument.
3. Be aware that based on the Superintendent's guidance, proper approval procedures must be followed if you pursue release of any results associated with this instrument, in a public forum (e.g., journal articles, symposium proceedings). Please be advised that members of the general public may obtain these survey results via the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
4. Per *USAFA Supplement 1*, all survey materials (survey instrument, data elements, feedback measures, reports/briefings) must be maintained for a period of 3 years. Additionally, please ensure copies of all these materials are forwarded to XPA.
5. We suggest you keep this memo on file to show that this instrument has been through the proper approval process. Should you require additional assistance regarding this approval, please contact XPA at extension 333-6481.

//signed//

Nancy Bogenrief  
Survey Control Officer

1<sup>st</sup> Ind, HQ USAFA/XP

Approved / Disapproved

PATRICIA D. EGLESTON, Lt Col, USAF  
Chief, Institutional Assessment



## APPENDIX D

### FSU PILOT TEST – SURVEY 1

#### Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT STUDY - Time 1

##### 1. Welcome to the study of Behavioral Integrity Consequences

Welcome, and thanks for volunteering to participate in this research. This study is being conducted by Kevin Basik as part of a PhD dissertation study (in the FSU College of Business), and you were selected based on your involvement in the Air Force ROTC program. I am interested in examining the outcomes of certain subordinate perceptions in leader-follower relations, and your input is important! This study will enroll approximately 25 junior AFROTC cadets over a 1 week period.

There are a few things you should know about the study:

- Your participation has TWO PARTS: this survey (which should take about 15 minutes), and another one to be e-mailed to you in about two days(also, about 15 minutes)
- There are no risks associated with your participation in this study, and your involvement will help in future leadership research in the Air Force. There will be no compensation or course credit for your participation.
- Participation is voluntary. You can withdraw at any time, and there will not be any negative consequences. Choosing not to participate is an alternative to participating in this study.
- The records of this study will be kept private and confidential to the extent permitted by law. The data you provide will not be published, and your input will be stored securely in a password-protected computer in my locked office.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the primary researcher, Kevin Basik (at 334-467-6346 or [kjb07e@fsu.edu](mailto:kjb07e@fsu.edu)). If you'd like to speak to someone else about questions/concerns regarding this study, you can contact FSU IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306 or 850-644-8633 ( [humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu](mailto:humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu) ).

By completing and submitting this survey, you are indicating your consent to participate.

If you're ready, let's begin.

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT STUDY - Time 1

### 2. Perceptions - BI

**1. Indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements (DON'T OVERTHINK OR TRY TO MATCH UP ANSWERS! JUST RESPOND HONESTLY):**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
There is a match between my Flight/CC's words and actions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My Flight/CC delivers on promises.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My Flight/CC practices what he/she preaches.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My Flight/CC does what he/she says he/she will do.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My Flight/CC conducts him/herself by the same values he/she talks about.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My Flight/CC shows the same priorities that he/she describes.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When my Flight/CC promises something, I can be certain that it will happen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If my Flight/CC says he/she is going to do something, he/she will.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT STUDY - Time 1

### 3. Perceptions - Trust

#### 1. Indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements ABOUT YOUR FLIGHT COMMANDER:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I would be willing to let my Flight/CC have complete control over my future in this ROTC wing.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would not mind putting my well-being in his/her hands.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would feel good about letting him/her make decisions that seriously affect my life.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

#### 2. Indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statement.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Please do not answer this question if you are paying attention to this survey.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT STUDY - Time 1

### 4. Outcomes - Cyn

#### 1. Indicate the degree to which you agree with the following sentences.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Any efforts to make things better around here are likely to succeed.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
AFROTC Det 145 wing leaders are good at running improvement programs or changing things in our "business."	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Overall, I expect more success than disappointment in working in the cadet Wing.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Det 145 cadet wing, as an organization, pulls its fair share of the weight in its relationship with its cadets.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suggestions on how to solve problems around here won't produce much real change.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The Det 145 cadet wing, as an organization, meets my expectations for quality of work life.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Cadet Wing leadership is more interested in its goals and needs than in its cadets' welfare.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT STUDY - Time 1

### 5. FutRes- Ambiguity

**1. All of us occasionally feel bothered by certain kinds of things at work. The following is a list of things that sometimes bothers people.**

**In the context of the AFROTC program, how frequently do you feel bothered by each of them?**

	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Frequently	Most of the time
Being unclear on just what the scope and responsibilities of your job are	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Not knowing what opportunities for advancement or recognition exist for you	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Not knowing what your immediate superior thinks of you and how your performance is evaluated	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The fact that you can't get information needed to carry out your job	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Not knowing just what the people you work with expect of you	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Being unclear about the amount of authority you have to carry out the responsibilities assigned to you	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT STUDY - Time 1

### 6. FutRes- Ldrs Polit Skill

**1. Indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements ABOUT YOUR FLIGHT COMMANDER:**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
He/She spends a lot of time and effort at work networking with others	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/She is able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around him/her.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/She is able to communicate easily and effectively with others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is easy for him/her to develop good rapport with most people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/She understands people very well.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/She is good at building relationships with influential people at work.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/She is particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When communicating with others, he/she tries to be genuine in what he/she says and does.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/she developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work who they can call on for support when he/she really needs to get things done.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
At work, he/she knows a lot of important people and is well connected.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/she spends a lot of time and effort at work developing	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT STUDY - Time 1

connections with others.

He/she is good at getting people to like him/her.

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

He/she believes it is important that people believe he/she is sincere.

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

He/she tries to show a genuine interest in other people.

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

He/she is good at using their connections and network to make things happen at work.

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

He/she has good intuition or "savvy" about how to present themselves to others.

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

He/she always seems to instinctively know the right things to say or do to influence others.

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

He/she pays close attention to peoples' facial expressions.

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT STUDY - Time 1

### 7. FutRes Account

**1. Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements about your role in the AFROTC cadet wing (in this case, your "leader/managers" can be cadet leadership, Det staff, cadre, etc).**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
I am held very accountable for my actions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I often have to explain why I do certain things.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My leaders/managers hold me accountable for all of my decisions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If things "at work" do not go the way that they should, I will hear about it from my leaders/managers.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To a great extent, the success of my immediate work group rests on my shoulders.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The jobs of many people "at work" depend on my success or failures.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
In the grand scheme of things, my efforts "at work" are very important.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Coworkers, subordinates, and bosses closely scrutinize my efforts.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT STUDY - Time 1

### 8. ID code

The only reason we need this is so we can link your first survey responses (this one) with your second survey responses (in about 2 days), and some other performance and demographic data, while still keeping your anonymity protected. At no time will anyone be able to identify you from the information we collect!

**1. Please enter the first initial of your last name and the last 4 numbers of your social security number (with no spaces): For example, K5423**

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT STUDY - Time 1

### 9. Debriefing

That's it (for now)! As a reminder, you'll be getting another e-mailed survey in about two days. When that's done, you'll get a debriefing sheet explaining the purpose of the study. Please complete that survey too (it's a little shorter than this one), because if I don't get both surveys, I can't use any of your data.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Kevin Basik at 334-467-6346 (or [kjb07e@fsu.edu](mailto:kjb07e@fsu.edu)). If you'd like to speak to someone else about questions/concerns regarding this study, you can contact FSU IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306 or 850-644-8633 ( [humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu](mailto:humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu) ).

Thanks again, and you'll hear from me soon!

Kevin Basik

## APPENDIX E

### FSU PILOT STUDY – SURVEY 2

#### Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT TEST - Time 2

##### 1. Welcome to the study of Behavioral Integrity Consequences

Welcome back to part 2 (of 2), and thanks again for volunteering to participate in this research. This study is being conducted by Kevin Basik as part of a PhD dissertation study (in the FSU College of Business), and you were selected based on your involvement in the Air Force ROTC program. I am interested in examining the outcomes of certain subordinate perceptions in leader-follower relations, and your input is important! This study will enroll approximately 25 junior AFROTC cadets over a 1 week period.

There are a few things you should know about the study:

- Your participation has TWO PARTS: survey 1(which you've already completed), and survey 2 (this one, which should take about 15 minutes)
- There are no risks associated with your participation in this study, and your involvement will help in future leadership research in the Air Force. There will be no compensation or course credit for your participation.
- Participation is voluntary. You can withdraw at any time, and there will not be any negative consequences. Choosing not to participate is an alternative to participating in this study.
- The records of this study will be kept private and confidential to the extent permitted by law. The data you provide will not be published, and your input will be stored securely in a password-protected computer in my locked office.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the primary researcher, Kevin Basik (at 334-467-6346 or [kjb07e@fsu.edu](mailto:kjb07e@fsu.edu)). If you'd like to speak to someone else about questions/concerns regarding this study, you can contact FSU IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306 or 850-644-8633 ( [humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu](mailto:humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu) ).

By completing and submitting this survey, you are indicating your consent to participate.

If you're ready, let's begin.

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT TEST - Time 2

### 2. ID#

As a reminder, the only reason we need this code is so we can link your first survey responses with your second survey responses (this one), while still keeping your anonymity protected. At no time will anyone be able to identify you from the information we collect!

**1. Please enter your ID code (first initial of your last name and the last 4 numbers of your social security number with NO SPACES): For example, K5423**

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT TEST - Time 2

### 3. Outcomes - Attitudes

#### 1. Indicate the degree to which you agree with the following sentences.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Most days I am enthusiastic about my work in Det 145.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Each day at work in the Cadet wing seems like it will never end.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I feel real enjoyment in my work in AFROTC (Det 145).	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I consider my job in the cadet wing to be rather unpleasant.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I feel fairly satisfied with my present job in the cadet wing.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT TEST - Time 2

### 4. Outcomes - Com

#### 1. Indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I would be very happy to spend the rest of my time at FSU an organization like Det 145's cadet wing.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I really feel as if the detachment's/wing's problems are my own.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do not feel a strong sense of "belonging" to this organization (Det 145).	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do not feel "emotionally attached" to Det 145 cadet wing.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do not feel like "part of the family" at Det 145.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Det 145's cadet wing has a great deal of personal meaning for me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT TEST - Time 2

### 5. Control - NA

**1. Indicate the degree to which you generally feel this way—that is, how you feel on average.**

	Very slightly or not at all	A little	Moderately	Quite a bit	Extremely
Distressed	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Upset	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Guilty	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Scared	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Hostile	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Irritable	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ashamed	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Nervous	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jittery	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Afraid	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT TEST - Time 2

### 6. FutRes- Self Polit Skill

#### 1. Indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am able to communicate easily and effectively with others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is easy for me to develop good rapport with most people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I understand people very well.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am good at building relationships with influential people at work.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When communicating with others, I try to be genuine in what I say and do.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work who I can call on for support when I really need to get things done.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
At work, I know a lot of important people and am well connected.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I spend a lot of time and effort at work developing connections with others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am good at getting people to like me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is important that people believe I am	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT TEST - Time 2

sincere in what I say  
and do.

I try to show a genuine  
interest in other  
people.

I am good at using my  
connections and  
network to make  
things happen at work.

I have good intuition  
or "savvy" about how  
to present myself to  
others.

I always seem to  
instinctively know the  
right things to say or  
do to influence others.

I pay close attention  
to peoples' facial  
expressions.

☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT TEST - Time 2

### 7. PFT Score

**1. To the best of your recollection, what was your most recent PFA score?**

Score:

## Behavioral Integrity FSU AFROTC PILOT TEST - Time 2

### 8. Debriefing

That's it, you're done! Thanks again for taking the time to do this. These surveys are the pilot test phase of a broader study, so your responses will help me determine whether the questions were interpreted properly.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the consequences (attitudes and behaviors) that occur when subordinates think their leaders don't "walk their talk". I am testing to see if such perceptions impact trust in managers, cynicism to the broader organization, other attitudes, and behavioral things like performance (PFA). The findings will be useful in leadership development programs for cadets, officers, enlisted, and civilians.

If you are interested in the final results of the study, you can contact the Assistant Investigator, Kevin Basik (334-467-6346 or [kjb07e@fsu.edu](mailto:kjb07e@fsu.edu)).

The data for this study will be protected to the full extent of the law. Once the responses have been matched up by ID codes, these codes will be erased from the database. The data will be kept in a locked, password protected computer in Tallahassee, Florida. Any results will be reported at the aggregate level (i.e., "Cadets with high scores on this scale also tended to respond this way.")

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Kevin Basik (at 334-467-6346 or [kjb07e@fsu.edu](mailto:kjb07e@fsu.edu)). If you'd like to speak to someone else about questions/concerns regarding this study, you can contact FSU IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306 or 850-644-8633 ( [humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu](mailto:humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu) ).

Thanks again for your participation!  
Kevin Basik

## APPENDIX F

### MAIN STUDY SURVEY 1

#### 1. Welcome to the study of Behavioral Integrity Consequences

(Survey Control #:USAFA SCN 10-23 Expiration date: 12 Feb 2011)

Welcome, and thanks for your interest in this research.

There are a few things you should know about the study:

-- Your participation has TWO PARTS: this survey (which should take about 15 minutes), and another one to be e-mailed to you in about a month (also, about 15 minutes)

-- For your time in completing the two surveys, you will receive 1 extra credit point in accordance with DFBL policy (awarded after you submit the second survey).

The following three pages reflect some important Informed Consent information, so please review it, and select your participation intent after the third page.

If you're ready, let's begin. Click "next" button below.

## 2. Informed Consent Page

Please read prior to your decision to participate or not participate.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Center for Character & Leadership Development  
USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO, 80840

Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act

Privacy Issues: Records of your participation in this study may only be released in accordance with federal law. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, the Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and their implementing regulations may apply.

STUDY TITLE: Consequences of Behavioral Integrity Perceptions  
PROTOCOL NUMBER: FAC20100026H  
DATE STUDY APPROVED: 1 Feb 2010 DATE ICD APPROVED: 1 Feb 2010  
DATE OF EXPIRATION: 1 Jan 2011

INVESTIGATORS:

PRIMARY: Joseph Sanders, PhD  
Center for Character & Leadership Development  
719-333-7266

ALTERNATE: Kevin Basik  
College of Business, Florida State Univ.  
334-467-346

PURPOSE OF STUDY

You are asked to consider participation in a research study including two online surveys entitled, "Consequences of Behavioral Integrity Perceptions". The purpose of the study is to examine the outcomes of certain subordinate perceptions in leader-follower relations. This study will enroll approximately 150 fourth classmen and 150 second classmen over a 5 week period.

You will be asked to complete two 15-minute online surveys during your participation, with approximately one month between surveys. Your responses will reflect your opinions and attitudes, as well as some demographic (i.e., race, squadron) and performance information. In total, your involvement should be approximately 30 minutes.

PROCEDURES

If you volunteer to participate in this study, we will ask you to undergo the following procedures: You will complete this survey (after agreeing to participate below) within the next few weeks. In approximately one month, you will be sent another link to the second survey, to be completed in a 1 week window. Finally, the researchers will work with USAFA/CW to collect MPA scores for the participants using a "laundry code," in order to minimize the ability to identify the subjects.

Should your investigator find it necessary for you to have a procedure requiring additional informed consent, a separate informed consent document will be completed at the time of the procedure.

BENEFITS

There are direct benefits from your participation in this study. A benefit to participation in this research that is available to you is to receive extra credit as it is stated in your course syllabus and the DFBL Participant Pool Information and Guidelines for your course.

RISKS/INCONVENIENCES

We acknowledge that there is some personal and professional risk to you, should your responses ever be made public. Because of that, multiple steps have been taken to protect your anonymity and your data. For example, even though you will be asked for your "laundry ID" (first initial of your last name and the last 4 of your SSN), your identity will be unknown at all times to the researchers. The ID is used to link your survey 1 and 2 data, and some other performance measures (end of semester MPA data). Once that is linked, the ID code will also be stripped from the data. All

responses will be combined with others in a way that keeps your data anonymous, so please be honest in your answers. All information you provide will be kept private and confidential to the full extent of the law.

#### ALTERNATIVES

Choosing not to participate is an alternative to participating in this study.

The alternative to participation in this research that is available to you is to receive equal credit as it is stated in your course syllabus and the DFBL Participant Pool Information and Guidelines for your course.

### 3. Informed Consent (Pg 2)

#### Informed Consent (continued)

##### IN THE EVENT OF INJURY

Your entitlement to medical and dental care and/or compensation in the event of injury is governed by federal laws and regulations and if you have questions about your rights or if you believe you have received a research-related injury, you may contact the USAF Academy Institutional Research Division (HQ USAFA/XP) at 719-333-6593, the medical monitor or the investigator.

##### OCCURRENCE OF UNANTICIPATED ADVERSE EVENT

If an unanticipated event occurs during your participation in this study, you will be informed immediately. If you are not competent at the time to understand the nature of the event, such information will be brought to the attention of your next of kin.

##### COMPENSATION FOR TREATMENT OF INJURY

If you should require medical care for injuries which result from participation in this study, the medical or dental care that you are entitled to is governed by federal laws and regulations. If you have questions about your rights or if you believe you received a research-related injury, please contact the USAF Academy Institutional Research Division (HQ USAFA/XP) at 719-333-6593.

##### CONFIDENTIALITY

Personal identities will be protected to the full extent of the law. Identifying codes will be used in order to match time one and time 2 survey responses, and to link MPA data to subjects. At no time will the researchers have access to information about the name or other full identifying information about the subjects, and the university departments (XP and CW) matching cadet ID codes to the MPA data will never have access to the survey responses. In addition, identifying information (laundry codes) will be deleted from the final database immediately after the survey responses and MPA scores have been linked by the researchers. When the results of the research are published or discussed in conferences, no information will be included that would reveal your identity. Complete confidentiality cannot be promised, particularly for military personnel, because information regarding your health may be required to be reported to appropriate medical or command authorities. The final database will be maintained by the assistant investigator for a period of 3 years in an SPSS database on a password-protected computer in a secured office location.

##### QUESTIONS REGARDING PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY

If you have questions about this research study, you should contact the principal investigator Joe Sanders (at 3-7266 or joseph.sanders@usafa.edu) or the alternate researcher, Kevin Basik (at 334-467-6346 or kjb07e@fsu.edu) or his research advisor, Dr. Gerald Ferris (at 850-644-3548 or gferris@cob.fsu.edu).

If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or if you have received a research-related injury, you should contact the USAF Academy Institutional Research Division (HQ USAFA/XP) at 719-333-6593.

You may also contact the alternative investigator's IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306 or 850-644-8633 ( humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu ).

#### 4. Informed Consent (Pg 3)

Informed Consent (Pg 3)

##### **DECISION TO PARTICIPATE**

**Your participation in this project is voluntary. Your choice whether or not to participate will not affect your military or Air Force Academy career. If you decline to participate, there is no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled under applicable regulations. You have the right to withdraw consent or stop participation at any time without penalty. Your withdrawal from this project will not cause loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You have the right to refuse to answer particular questions or to decline any procedure.**

##### **Consent to Participate:**

- **The decision to participate in this study is completely voluntary on my part. No one has coerced or intimidated me into participating in this program. I am participating because I want to.**
- **I understand that my decision about whether or not to participate will not affect my military career in any way.**
- **The investigators have adequately answered any questions I have about this study, my participation, and the procedures involved. I also understand that an investigator will be available to answer any questions concerning procedures throughout this study.**
- **I understand that if significant new findings develop during the course of this study that may relate to my decision to continue participation, I will be informed.**
- **I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time and discontinue further participation in this study without prejudice to my rights.**
- **I also understand that the investigator may terminate my participation in this study at any time if he/she feels this to be in my best interest.**
- **I have read all of the above. My questions have been answered concerning areas I did not understand. I am willing to take part in this study.**

##### **NOW PLEASE INDICATE YOUR INTENT BY SELECTING AN OPTION...**

- ☐ I choose to participate in this study (by selecting this option and submitting the completed survey, I am indicating consent)
- ☐ I choose NOT to participate in this study (you will be directed out of the survey website)

Page 5



## 5. BI

**Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements**

**ABOUT YOUR ELEMENT LEADER (EI/Ldr)**

**(DON'T OVERTHINK OR TRY TO MATCH UP ANSWERS! JUST RESPOND HONESTLY):**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
There is a match between my EI/Ldr's words and actions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My EI/Ldr delivers on promises.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My EI/Ldr practices what he/she preaches.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My EI/Ldr does what he/she says he/she will do.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My EI/Ldr conducts him/herself by the same values he/she talks about.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My EI/Ldr shows the same priorities that he/she describes.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When my EI/Ldr promises something, I can be certain that it will happen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If my EI/Ldr says he/she is going to do something, he/she will.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 6. TrtCyn

**Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
In general, people pretend to care more than they actually do.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Most people will tell lies if they can gain from doing so.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unselfish people are often taken advantage of.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
In general, most people are not honest by nature.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
For the most part, people feel put out when asked for help by others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If there is money at stake, personal ethics are thrown out the window.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 7. Ambig

**All of us occasionally feel bothered by certain kinds of things at work. The following is a list of things that sometimes bother people.**

**How frequently do you feel bothered by each of them?**

	Never		Occasionally		Frequently		All of the time
Being unclear on just what the scope and responsibilities of your roles in the squadron are	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Not knowing what opportunities for advancement or recognition exist for you	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Not knowing what your immediate superior thinks of you and how your performance is evaluated	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The fact that you can't get information needed to carry out your tasks/role	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Not knowing just what the people you work with expect of you	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Being unclear about the amount of authority you have to carry out the responsibilities assigned to you	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 8. T-I-L

**Indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree with the following statements**

### **ABOUT YOUR ELEMENT LEADER (EI/Ldr):**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
My EI/Ldr will keep my interests in mind when making decisions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be willing to let my EI/Ldr have complete control over my future in the squadron/wing.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If my EI/Ldr asked why a problem occurred, I would speak freely even if I were partly to blame.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I can be comfortable being creative in the future because my EI/Ldr understands that sometimes creative solutions do not work.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I know that in the future, it is important for me to have a good way to keep an eye on my EI/Ldr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Increasing my vulnerability to criticism by my EI/Ldr in the future would be a mistake.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I had my way, I wouldn't let my EI/Ldr have any influence over future decisions that are important to me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statement.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Please do not answer this question if you are paying attention to this survey.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 9. Acct

Please indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree with the following statements.

In this context, your "leader/managers" can be cadet leadership, AOCs, coaches, teachers, etc.

Also, "coworkers" can be your peers, classmates, teammates, etc.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Agree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I am held very accountable for my actions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I often have to explain why I do certain things.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My leaders/managers hold me accountable for all of my decisions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If things "at work" do not go the way that they should, I will hear about it from my leaders/managers.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To a great extent, the success of my immediate work group rests on my shoulders.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The jobs of many people "at work" depend on my success or failures.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
In the grand scheme of things, my efforts "at work" are very important.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Coworkers, subordinates, and bosses closely scrutinize my efforts.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 10. LdPS

**Indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree with the following statements**

**ABOUT YOUR ELEMENT LEADER:**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
He/She spends a lot of time and effort at work networking with others	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/She is able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around him/her.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/She is able to communicate easily and effectively with others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is easy for him/her to develop good rapport with most people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/She understands people very well.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/She is good at building relationships with influential people at work.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/She is particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When communicating with others, he/she tries to be genuine in what he/she says and does.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/She developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work who they can call on for support when he/she really needs to get things done.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 11. LdPS2

**Indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree about the following statements**

### **ABOUT YOUR ELEMENT LEADER**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
At work, he/she knows a lot of important people and is well connected.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/she spends a lot of time and effort at work developing connections with others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/she is good at getting people to like him/her.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/she believes it is important that people believe he/she is sincere.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/she tries to show a genuine interest in other people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/she is good at using their connections and network to make things happen at work.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/she has good intuition or "savvy" about how to present themselves to others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/she always seems to instinctively know the right things to say or do to influence others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
He/she pays close attention to peoples' facial expressions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 12. Laundry ID#

As a reminder, the only reason we need this ID Code is so we can link your first survey responses (this one) with your second survey responses (in about a month), and some other performance and demographic data, while still keeping your anonymity protected.

At no time will anyone be able to identify you from the information we collect!

**Please enter your laundry ID code (first initial of your last name and the last 4 numbers of your social security number with NO SPACES): For example, K5423**



### 13. Debriefing

That's it (for now)!

As a reminder, you'll be getting another e-mailed survey (a little shorter than this one) in about one month. When that's done, you'll get a debriefing sheet explaining the purpose of the study, and will be awarded your extra credit point.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the primary researcher, Joe Sanders (at 3-7266 or joseph.sanders@usafa.edu), the alternate researcher, Kevin Basik (at 334-467-6346 or kjb07e@fsu.edu), or his research advisor, Dr. Gerald Ferris (at 850-644-3548). If you'd like to speak to someone else about questions/concerns regarding this study, you can contact FSU IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306 or 850-644-8633 ( humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu ) or the USAFA Institutional Research Division at 719-333-6593.

Thanks again, and you'll hear from us soon!

Kevin Basik

## APPENDIX G

### MAIN STUDY – SURVEY 2

#### 1. Welcome to the study of Behavioral Integrity Consequences

(Survey Control #:USAFA SCN 10-23 Expiration date: 12 Feb 2011)

Welcome back, and thanks again for your interest in this research.  
There are a few things you should know about the study:

-- Your participation has TWO PARTS: this survey (which should take about 15 minutes), and another one that was emailed to you last month.

-- For your time in completing the two surveys, you will receive 1 extra credit point in accordance with DFBL policy (awarded after you submit the second [this]survey).

The following three pages reflect the Informed Consent information you consented to on survey 1, so please review it, and select your participation intent after the 3rd page.

If you're ready, let's begin. Click "next" button below.

## 2. Informed Consent (Pg 1)

Please read prior to your decision to participate or not participate.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Center for Character & Leadership Development  
USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO, 80840

### Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act

Privacy Issues: Records of your participation in this study may only be released in accordance with federal law. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, the Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and their implementing regulations may apply.

STUDY TITLE: Consequences of Behavioral Integrity Perceptions

PROTOCOL NUMBER: FAC20100026H DATE STUDY APPROVED: 1 Feb 2010 DATE ICD APPROVED: 1 Feb 2010

DATE OF EXPIRATION: 1 Jan 2011

### INVESTIGATORS:

PRIMARY: Joseph Sanders, PhD  
Center for Character & Leadership Development  
719-333-7266

ALTERNATE: Kevin Basik  
College of Business, Florida State Univ.  
334-467-346

### PURPOSE OF STUDY

You are asked to consider participation in a research study including two online surveys entitled, "Consequences of Behavioral Integrity Perceptions". The purpose of the study is to examine the outcomes of certain subordinate perceptions in leader-follower relations. This study will enroll approximately 150 fourth classmen and 150 second classmen over a 5 week period.

You will be asked to complete two 15-minute online surveys during your participation, with approximately one month between surveys. Your responses will reflect your opinions and attitudes, as well as some demographic (i.e., race, squadron) and performance information. In total, your involvement should be approximately 30 minutes.

### PROCEDURES

If you volunteer to participate in this study, we will ask you to undergo the following procedures: You will complete this survey (after agreeing to participate below) within the next few weeks. In approximately one month, you will be sent another link to the second survey, to be completed in a 1 week window. Finally, the researchers will work with USAFA/CW to collect MPA scores for the participants using a "laundry code," in order to minimize the ability to identify the subjects.

Should your investigator find it necessary for you to have a procedure requiring additional informed consent, a separate informed consent document will be completed at the time of the procedure.

### BENEFITS

There are direct benefits from your participation in this study. A benefit to participation in this research that is available to you is to receive equal credit as it is stated in your course syllabus and the DFBL Participant Pool Information and Guidelines for your course.

### RISKS/INCONVENIENCES

We acknowledge that there is some personal and professional risk to you, should your responses ever be made public. Because of that, multiple steps have been taken to protect your anonymity and your data. For example, even though you will be asked for your "laundry ID" (first initial of your last name and the last 4 of your SSN), your identity will be unknown at all times to the researchers. The ID is used to link your survey 1 and 2 data, and some other performance measures (end of semester MPA data). Once that is linked, the ID code will also be stripped from the data. All responses will be combined with others in a way that keeps your data anonymous, so please be honest in your answers.

All information you provide will be kept private and confidential to the full extent of the law.

#### ALTERNATIVES

Choosing not to participate is an alternative to participating in this study.

The alternative to participation in this research that is available to you is to receive equal credit as it is stated in your course syllabus and the DFBL Participant Pool Information and Guidelines for your course.

### 3. Informed Consent (Continued - Pg 2)

#### IN THE EVENT OF INJURY

Your entitlement to medical and dental care and/or compensation in the event of injury is governed by federal laws and regulations and if you have questions about your rights or if you believe you have received a research-related injury, you may contact the USAF Academy Institutional Research Division (HQ USAFA/XP) at 719-333-6593, the medical monitor or the investigator.

#### OCCURRENCE OF UNANTICIPATED ADVERSE EVENT

If an unanticipated event occurs during your participation in this study, you will be informed immediately. If you are not competent at the time to understand the nature of the event, such information will be brought to the attention of your next of kin.

#### COMPENSATION FOR TREATMENT OF INJURY

If you should require medical care for injuries which result from participation in this study, the medical or dental care that you are entitled to is governed by federal laws and regulations. If you have questions about your rights or if you believe you received a research-related injury, please contact the USAF Academy Institutional Research Division (HQ USAFA/XP) at 719-333-6593.

#### CONFIDENTIALITY

Personal identities will be protected to the full extent of the law. Identifying codes will be used in order to match time one and time 2 survey responses, and to link MPA data to subjects. At no time will the researchers have access to information about the name or other full identifying information about the subjects, and the university departments (XP and CW) matching cadet ID codes to the MPA data will never have access to the survey responses. In addition, identifying information (laundry codes) will be deleted from the final database immediately after the survey responses and MPA scores have been linked by the researchers. When the results of the research are published or discussed in conferences, no information will be included that would reveal your identity. Complete confidentiality cannot be promised, particularly for military personnel, because information regarding your health may be required to be reported to appropriate medical or command authorities. The final database will be maintained by the assistant investigator for a period of 3 years in an SPSS database on a password-protected computer in a secured office location.

#### QUESTIONS REGARDING PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY

If you have questions about this research study, you should contact the principal investigator Joe Sanders (at 3-7266 or joseph.sanders@usafa.edu) or the alternate researcher, Kevin Basik (at 334-467-6346 or kjb07e@fsu.edu) or his research advisor, Dr. Gerald Ferris (at 850-644-3548 or gferris@cob.fsu.edu).

If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or if you have received a research-related injury, you should contact the USAF Academy Institutional Research Division (HQ USAFA/XP) at 719-333-6593.

You may also contact the alternative investigator's IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306 or 850-644-8633 ( humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu ).

#### 4. Informed Consent (Cont - Pg 3)

##### 1. DECISION TO PARTICIPATE

Your participation in this project is voluntary. Your choice whether or not to participate will not affect your military or Air Force Academy career. If you decline to participate, there is no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled under applicable regulations. You have the right to withdraw consent or stop participation at any time without penalty. Your withdrawal from this project will not cause loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You have the right to refuse to answer particular questions or to decline any procedure.

##### Consent to Participate:

- The decision to participate in this study is completely voluntary on my part. No one has coerced or intimidated me into participating in this program. I am participating because I want to.
- I understand that my decision about whether or not to participate will not affect my military career in any way.
- The investigators have adequately answered any questions I have about this study, my participation, and the procedures involved. I also understand that an investigator will be available to answer any questions concerning procedures throughout this study.
- I understand that if significant new findings develop during the course of this study that may relate to my decision to continue participation, I will be informed.
- I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time and discontinue further participation in this study without prejudice to my rights.
- I also understand that the investigator may terminate my participation in this study at any time if he/she feels this to be in my best interest.
- I have read all of the above. My questions have been answered concerning areas I did not understand. I am willing to take part in this study.

##### NOW PLEASE INDICATE YOUR INTENT BY SELECTING AN OPTION...

- ☐ I choose to participate in this study (by selecting this option and submitting the completed survey, I am indicating consent)
- ☐ I choose NOT to participate in this study (you will be directed out of the survey website)

## 5. Laundry ID#

As a reminder, the only reason we need this code is so we can link the info on this survey with the responses you gave on the first survey, and some other performance and demographic data, while still keeping your anonymity protected. At no time will anyone be able to identify you from the information we collect!

**1. Please enter your laundry ID code (first initial of your last name and the last 4 numbers of your social security number with NO SPACES): For example, K5423**

## 6. JS

**1. Indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements.**

**In this case, think of your role responsibilities at USAFA as your "work".**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Most days I am enthusiastic about my work at USAFA.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Each day "at work" at USAFA seems like it will never end.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I feel real enjoyment in my "work" at USAFA.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I consider my role responsibilities at USAFA to be rather unpleasant.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I feel fairly satisfied with my present "work experience" at USAFA.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



## 7. WkEf

### 1. Indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
When there's a job to be done, I devote all my energy to getting it done.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When I work at something at USAFA, I do so with intensity.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I work at my full capacity in all of my duties at USAFA.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If you are paying attention, please do not answer this question.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I strive as hard as I can to be successful in my work.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When I work at something (at USAFA), I really exert myself to the fullest.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 8. SIIPS

### 1. Indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree with the following statements:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am able to communicate easily and effectively with others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is easy for me to develop good rapport with most people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I understand people very well.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am good at building relationships with influential people at work.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When communicating with others, I try to be genuine in what I say and do.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work who I can call on for support when I really need to get things done.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 9. SelfPS2

**1. Please indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree with the following statements.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
At work, I know a lot of important people and am well connected.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I spend a lot of time and effort at work developing connections with others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am good at getting people to like me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I believe it is important that people believe I am sincere.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I try to show a genuine interest in other people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am good at using my connections and network to make things happen at work.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have good intuition or "savvy" about how to present myself to others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I always seem to instinctively know the right things to say or do to influence others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I pay close attention to people's facial expressions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 10. LMX

### 1. Answer the questions below about your relationship with your EI/Ldr

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I like my EI/Ldr very much as a person	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My EI/Ldr is the kind of person one would like to have as a friend	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My EI/Ldr is a lot of fun to work with	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My EI/Ldr would defend my work actions to a superior, even w/out complete knowledge of the issue in question	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My EI/Ldr would come to my defense if I were "attacked" (not physically) by others	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My EI/Ldr would defend me to others in the organization if I made an honest mistake	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do work for my EI/Ldr that goes beyond what is specified by my formal job description	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am willing to apply extra effort, beyond those normally required, to meet my EI/Ldr's goals	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do not mind working my hardest for my EI/Ldr	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am impressed with my EI/Ldr's knowledge of his/her job	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I respect my EI/Ldr's knowledge of and competence on the job	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I admire my EI/Ldr's professional skills	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 11. WkTens

### 1. Indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements.

**Keep in mind that, even if you are unranked, have no formal position in the squadron, or are a fourth class cadet, you still have certain things you are expected to do (your "work role").:**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
My work role in the squadron tends to directly affect my health.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I work under a great deal of tension.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have felt fidgety or nervous as a result of what I am expected to do in my squadron role.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I had a different role in the squadron, my health would probably improve.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Problems associated with my role in the squadron have kept me from sleeping well.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I often think about what I need to do for my role in the squadron when I'm doing other things.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 12. Com

### 1. Indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree with the following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I would be very happy to spend the rest of my time in the Air Force at an organization like USAFA.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I really feel as if USAFA's problems are my own.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do not feel a strong sense of "belonging" to this institution (USAFA).	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do not feel "emotionally attached" to USAFA .	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do not feel like "part of the family" at USAFA.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
USAFA has a great deal of personal meaning for me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

### 13. Demerit Info & Demograph

**1. Please indicate the number of demerits you have received for actions that occurred THIS SEMESTER (regardless of whether you think they were justified or not). List the total number, and don't subtract any for amnesty events. (Your answers are strictly confidential and anonymous - please be as accurate as you can)**

# Demerits this semester: (if none, put 0)

**2. Race:**

- ☐ African American
- ☐ Asian
- ☐ Caucasian
- ☐ Hispanic
- ☐ Native American
- ☐ Other

**3. What is your Squadron? (We just need this so we can group the responses by squadron)**

Squadron #

## 14. OCyn

### 1. (ALMOST DONE!) Answer the degree to which you agree/disagree with the following:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Any efforts to make things better around here are likely to succeed.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
USAFA leadership is good at running improvement programs or changing things in our "business."	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Overall, I expect more success than disappointment in working at USAFA.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
USAFA as an organization pulls its fair share of the weight in its relationship with its cadets.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suggestions on how to solve problems around here won't produce much real change.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
USAFA as an organization meets my expectations for quality of work life.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
USAFA leadership is more interested in its goals and needs than in its cadets' welfare.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



## 15. Trust2 - Cook & Wall

### 1. (THESE ARE THE LAST QUESTIONS!) How much do you agree/disagree with the following statements ABOUT YOUR ELEMENT LEADER?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
My El/Ldr is sincere in his/her attempts to understand my point of view.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Our squadron has a bright future if it continues to have El/Ldrs as trustworthy as mine	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My El/Ldr can be trusted to make unselfish decisions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If you are paying attention, please leave this question blank	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I feel quite confident that my El/Ldr will always try to treat me fairly	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My El/Ldr can be trusted	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I have to rely on this leader in the future, I'll be putting myself at significant risk	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My El/Ldr would never try to gain an advantage by deceiving subordinates	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I trust my El/Ldr	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 16. Debriefing

That's it, you're done! Thanks again for taking the time to do this.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the consequences (attitudes and behaviors) that occur when subordinates think their leaders do/don't "walk their talk". We are testing to see if such perceptions impact trust in managers, cynicism to the broader organization (USAFA), other attitudes, and behavioral things like performance (MPA) and rule breaking (demerits). The findings may be useful in leadership development programs for cadets, officers, enlisted, and civilians.

This data is being collected as part of a study of a PhD dissertation based on the researchers' design (not at the direction of the Air Force) The results will be used in the formal dissertation, and possibly in future peer-reviewed academic articles over the next few years.

The data for this study will be protected to the full extent of the law. Once the responses have been matched up by laundry ID numbers, the ID numbers will be erased. The data will be kept in a locked, password protected computer in Tallahassee, Florida. Any results will be reported at the aggregate level (i.e., "Cadets with high scores on this scale also tended to respond this way.")

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the primary researcher, Joe Sanders (at 3-7266 or joseph.sanders@usafa.edu), the alternate researcher, Kevin Basik (at 334-467-6346 or kjb07e@fsu.edu), or his research advisor, Dr. Gerald Ferris (at 850-644-3548). If you'd like to speak to someone else about questions/concerns regarding this study, you can contact FSU IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306 or 850-644-8633 ( humansubjects@magnet.fsu.edu ) or the USAFA Institutional Review Division at 719-333-6593.

\*\*\*\* NOW PLEASE PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE TO RECEIVE A PARTICIPATION CERTIFICATE. TURN THIS CERTIFICATE IN TO YOUR BS110 INSTRUCTOR FOR 1 EXTRA CREDIT POINT.

Thanks again for your participation!

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